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Abstract
Investing in the stock market is a complicated and risky undertaking for private households. In
particular, private investors face numerous decisions: for instance, whether to invest in stocks
or bonds, buy passively or actively managed investment products, or try something new like
Bitcoin. They must decide where they can get independent nancial advice, and whether this
advice is trustworthy.
As a consequence, information systems researchers design and build nancial decision support
systems. Robo-advisors are such decision support systems aiming to provide independent
advice, and support private households in investment decisions and wealth management. This
thesis evaluates robo-advisors, their design and use and thus their ability to support nancial
decision-making. Addressing this research need, my thesis is organized in three parts (part I-
III ) consisting of four quantitative experimental studies, two qualitative friendly-user-studies,
and one qualitative interview study.
In Part I, Chapter 3 examines how robo-advisors can be designed for inexperienced investors.
In particular, I derive design recommendations for the development of robo-advisor solutions
and evaluate them in a three-cycle design sciences process. Requirements related to the clus-
ters ease of interaction, work eciency, information processing and cognitive load are identied
as key elements for robo-advisory design.
In Part II, Chapter 4 focuses on an important bias in economic decision-making - decision in-
ertia, the tendency to repeat a decision regardless of the consequences. As a result, a decision-
maker can make repeated suboptimal investments. To understand this bias more deeply, I
investigate decision inertia in a general experimental setting and identify motivational and
cognitive drivers of this phenomenon. Thus, I relied on behavioural, on self-reported, and on
bio-physiological measures in three laboratory studies.
In Part III, Chapter 5 species the ndings from Part II to nd and evaluate strategies to re-
duce decision inertia in nancial decision support systems. For that purpose, I investigate two
nudges (design features) to reduce inertia in investment decisions. My results suggest that de-
faults and warning messages can help participants to overcome decision inertia. Furthermore,
the results illustrate that designers have to be careful not to push decision-makers into the
decision inertia bias by accident.
In summary, this thesis gives design recommendations for practitioners and scholars building
robo-advisors. The insights can help to develop robo-advisors, and to increase advisor quality
by considering decision inertia in the system design phase and consequently, it illustrates how
to counteract this malicious decision bias for private investors.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Relevance and Research Gap
Many people avoid making nancial decisions, for example how to save money for retirement,
a house or the education of their children and they consider these kinds of decisions to be dif-
cult and complex (Fisch, Laboure, Turner, & Center, 2017; Looney & Hardin, 2009; Wood,
1986). Moreover, even people motivated to make nancial decisions encounter overwhelming
complexity and variety among the available nancial products and investment possibilities
(Minch & Sanders, 1986). Previous research illustrates that private investors have coped with
this complexity only to a limited extent, due to their scarce cognitive resources (e.g., process-
ing speed, knowledge, or willpower), and consequently make mostly simplied or intuitive
economic decisions (see e.g. Benartzi and Thaler (2007); Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore
(2002); Barber and Odean (2001)).
In order to overcome these shortcomings of human decision-making, information systems re-
searchers aim to design and develop nancial decision support systems. These information
systems help users to handle the complexity of nancial decision-making and make ratio-
nal or deliberative decisions (Fisch, Laboure, et al., 2017). A novel approach in doing so is
robo-advisory (Phoon & Koh, 2017; Sironi, 2016). Building on various assistance components,
robo-advisors guide users through a self-assessment process. By making usage of the assessed
user prole, the robo-advisor computes dierent investment recommendations and supports
individual portfolio selection. Furthermore, the robo-advisor allows one to maintain and rebal-
ance a portfolio after the investment. Since robo-advisors act as merely an economic platform
between providers of nancial products and users (see Figure 1), studies suggest that con-
icts of interest (e.g., principal agent dilemma) are also less common than in traditional asset
management at a bank (Phoon & Koh, 2017; Sironi, 2016).
Figure 1: Robo-advisors act as an economic platform between private households (users) and
nancial product providers.
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Many robo-advisors disclose their business models and pass their brokerage directly to their
users (see e.g., Visual Vest or Betterment). Furthermore, robo-advisors provide nancial train-
ing, nancial encyclopaedias, or further information about the investment process to support
their users in expanding their nancial knowledge. If the user’s investment decision is made,
robo-advisors oer an easy way for private households to maintain and manage investment
portfolios, building on mobile apps or web applications.
Even though robo-advisors represent a promising solution for many potential users, the ques-
tions remain whether robo-advisors can really replace traditional human advisory and asset
managers, and of what the limits of robo-advisor services are. In particular, the design of user-
interaction and self-assessment processes, along with the quality of the advisory service, are
still controversial. For instance, this year, the well-known German consumer protection organ-
isation Öko-Test issued a study of robo-advisors regarding their advisory service (Sternberger-
Frey, 2018). The organisation investigated the most popular 24 robo-advisors on the German
private customer market. None of the advisors tested were free of any crucial defects: "All
portals have some mismatch [...] either they lack transparency or they do not really satisfy
their claim to be a robo-advisor" (own translation) (Sternberger-Frey, 2018, p.110). These re-
sults are corroborated by further recent evidence, illustrating that the conguration process
of many robo-advisors is poorly designed and does not meet the requirements of unexperi-
enced users (Tertilt & Scholz, 2017; Sternberger-Frey, 2018). On the other hand, successful
user-interaction and assessment is crucial for building a user prole, and a portfolio recom-
mendation. It is necessary to provide an adequate advisory based on the user preferences,
risk-attitude and nancial circumstances (Phoon & Koh, 2017). However, in a recent study
Tertilt and Scholz report that they “hardly see any advantages from robo-advisory in the as-
sessment of risk tolerance and risk capacity; or in the quality of the recommended portfolios”
(Tertilt & Scholz, 2017, p. 19). Hence, it is not surprising that in information system research
the advisory service quality of these robo-advisor systems is criticised (Tertilt & Scholz, 2017),
while some even go so far to question the general usefulness of robo-advisors per se (Fein,
2015). Taking all this together, robo-advisory scholars and practitioners face two research
challenges:
The rst challenge is that robo-advisory has hardly been researched so far, and there is a lack
of literature with methodological knowledge on how such systems can be built and designed.
The reason is that robo-advisory remain a very novel tool, so best-practices have not yet been
developed. This absence becomes all the more clear considering that most robo-advisors have
not even been on the market for three years. The oldest robo-advisor, Betterment, was founded
in 2010 (Phoon & Koh, 2017). Furthermore, one of the largest scientic search engines, Google
Scholar, delivers just 204 possible hits for the term robo-advisory in March 2018.
Additionally, previous research in the eld of information systems identies that digitalization
of social and interactive processes - such as nancial consulting - conicts with fundamen-
tal human expectations about interaction and communication in advisory scenarios (Rogers,
Sharp, & Preece, 2011; Bannon, 1995). Robo-advisors replace existing human-based services
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with digital ones and thus face these types of problems. So far, information systems research
has not yet suciently determined how human-based services can be transformed into dig-
ital robo-based services. This transformation raises many questions concerning the expecta-
tions of the users or the general design of the assessment and advisory process, among other
things. Initial studies illustrate that transparency, trust-building and the balancing of infor-
mation asymmetries play a crucial role in the design and development of partially digitalized
nancial advisory (Ruf, Back, & Burkhardt, 2016; Heinrich, Kilic, Ascho, & Schwabe, 2014;
Nussbaumer, Matter, & Schwabe, 2012; Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012). How-
ever, it remains unclear how these issues can be considered in system design, and which design
principles and decisions result from these requirements. Recent studies suggest that a sophis-
ticated user interface is a key issue for scholars and practitioner designing and developing
robo-advisors (Sternberger-Frey, 2018; Ludden, Thompson, & Mohsin, 2015). This suggestion
underlines the need for general guidelines for robo-advisory design.
A second challenge confronting robo-advisor designers is that the “chances of robo-advisory
actually becoming a true disruptive force, depends on the quality of their advice” (Tertilt
& Scholz, 2017, p.3). However, both nancial advisory and its design are dicult (Fisch,
Turner, & Center, 2017; Fisch, Laboure, et al., 2017). It is well known from behavioural -
nance and decision-making research that if people are overwhelmed with complexity they
make an eort-accuracy trade-o (Johnson & Payne, 1985). That is people try to nd a bal-
ance between eortful deliberative thinking and the potential result of their decision-making.
People are therefore face a tension between deliberative, eortful processes and intuitive, ef-
fortless processes (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Kahneman, 2003). In consequence, for com-
plicated decisions, so-called heuristics or "rules of thumb"are applied, based on intuitive pro-
cesses (Gigerenzer, 2008), which reduces the eort required to make the decision yet delivers
satisfactory results in most real-world scenarios (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). This kind of
interaction of so-called deliberative (or System 2 processes), and intuitive (or System 1 pro-
cesses) systematically shapes economic decision-making, as will be discussed in Section 2.1.
However, these dierent types of judgement and decision-making are generally used as theo-
retical explanations for various decision anomalies in various studies in behavioural economics
and nance (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Dhar & Gorlin, 2013; Barberis & Thaler, 2003). Al-
though the decision support literature reports many decision biases that result from heuristic-
intuitive decision-making (see Arnott (2006) for an overview of biases in decision support
systems), my work focuses on a particular bias that plays a relevant role in nancial decision-
making: decision inertia, or the tendency to repeat a decision regardless of the consequences
(Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012).
Numerous experiments have demonstrated that decision inertia is a relevant issue in eco-
nomic decision-making (see e.g., Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016); Erev and Haruvy (2013); Charness
and Levin (2005); Madrian and Shea (2001)), and that it has serious implications for decision
support system design. Decision inertia pushes users towards repeating previous (subopti-
mal) decisions, such that unsuccessful strategies are repeated, and that people stick to their
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default decisions even if they are not economically advantageous. From a decision support
perspective, understanding the drivers of decision inertia is crucial for decision-support sys-
tem design. By understanding the reasons decision inertia occurs, decision support systems
aim to provide the basis for detecting and counteracting decision inertia by way of system
design.
Furthermore, it remains unclear the extent to which the interface of nancial decision support
systems like robo-advisors reduces or even reinforces known biases and errors.
The two challenges in the context of the choice architecture of a robo-advisor can be dis-
cussed in a general decision support context, yielding the theoretical framework illustrated in
Figure 2. This framework, assumes that a user of a robo-advisor system has individual nan-
cial preferences and a specic situation. Building on that situation (and the interaction with
the decision support system) the user makes an investment decision. Behavioural research
(e.g., Generalized Dual-Processing Theory) postulates that the investment decision is made
through an interaction of intuitive and deliberative processes. The robo-advisor measures
the behaviour of the user and supports the decision-making by interventions or feedback (re-
sponse). This more general theoretical framework for nancial decision-making in a decision
support system guides the experimental analysis in Parts I-III.
Figure 2: Conceptual model of the choice architecture and usage of a robo-advisory in nan-
cial decision-making, based on Loock et al. (2013), and Thaler (2008)
1.2 Research Questions
As discussed above, robo-advisor researchers facing design problems booth at a general level
and at a bias-specic level. However, knowledge is limited as regards designing robo-advisory,
and the foundations and cognitive drivers of bias-sensitive design (in particular decision-
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inertia sensitive). Should the knowledge gap persist, the digitalization of nancial advisory
may be dicult to achieve. A need therefore arises to investigate and build theory about
robo-advisory, manifesting in the following research questions:
• Research question 1 (RQ1): How can a robo-advisor be designed for unexperi-
enced investors?
In this rst step, I focus on the general design of robo-advisory. Information systems re-
search lacks methodological knowledge and design guidelines concerning robo-advisors. For
that purpose I conducted a three-cycle design science study to derive, test and evaluate de-
sign requirements for robo-advisors. These design recommendations provide a preliminary
guideline for practitioners and scholars designing robo-advisory solutions.
• Research question 2 (RQ2): What are the cognitive and motivational founda-
tions and drivers of decision inertia? How can they be distinguished?
After establishing a better understanding of decision inertia, I review recent judgement and
decision-making research to provide an overarching concept concerning decision inertia.
Based on this review I show that existing decision inertia experiments can be generalized
into a so called dual-choice belief-updating task Dual-Choice Belief-Updating Task (2CBU),
and provide an experimental framework for further investigations. In a second step, I in-
vestigate motivational and cognitive processes inuencing inertial behaviour in decision-
making based on that framework. I underpin these ndings by controlling for possible emo-
tional and bio-physiological drivers, and by the disentangling motivational and cognitive
foundations of inertia in decision-making.
• Research question 3 (RQ3): How should the choice architecture of robo-advisors
be designed to help users to overcome decision inertia in nancial decision-
making?
Finally, I use ndings from the previous study to derive design features (so called digital
nudges) to reduce decision inertia in nancial decision-making. I systematically design the
choice environment of a robo-advisor to guide the user, based on digital nudges towards op-
timal decision-making (choice architecture approach, (Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2014)). The
ndings provide a general foundation for decision support system design to overcome deci-
sion inertia. Furthermore, these ndings sharpen knowledge about decision inertia and are
used as a basis to derive methods to counteract decision inertia and illustrate the inuence
of decision inertia in a real-world scenario.
Following these research questions (as illustrated in Figure 3), I derive and evaluate general de-
sign recommendations for robo-advisory (RQ1). These ndings can be used as general design
guidelines for practitioners and scholars.
Following RQ2, I try to provide a meaningful conceptual model of decision inertia in decision-
making. This model is enriched by two experimental studies conducted to gain a deeper un-
derstanding of the cognitive foundations of decision inertia. These ndings are generalized
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Figure 3: The three research questions targeting the human behaviour in nancial decision
support systems follow a decision support paradigm.
into methods to counteract decision inertia in a digital choice environment, following a choice
architecture approach (RQ3). I show that decision inertia plays a relevant role in information
systems, and in decision support systems, but can be reduced in strategically designed choice
environments.
1.3 Research Design
The research design and the empirical component of the rst major unit of this work (Part I )
originated in industry cooperation with a large German investment company, while the second
major unit (comprised of both Part II and Part III ) originated in an interdisciplinary research
project with the chair of Cognitive Psychology and Individual Dierences, and the chair of Ex-
perimental Psychology at the University of Mannheim. The purpose of these projects was,
rstly, to better understand human behaviour in robo-advisory, secondly to understand the
cognitive foundations and drivers of phenomenon decision inertia, and nally to make these
ndings usable for information system research. Thus, this work is based on contributions and
insights from decision theory, economics, information systems, psychology and neurology.
Building on these interdisciplinary research streams, this research applies generalized dual-
processing theory as an overarching theory for human behaviour and decision-making. Hu-
man behaviour and decision-making is explained by considering deliberative and intuitive
processes (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Kahneman, 2003). Both processes form our intention,
and consequently result in human behaviour. Generalized dual-processing theory explains
judgement and decision-making across all disciplines investigating human behaviour (Alós-
Ferrer & Strack, 2014). Applying generalized dual-processing theory, dierent approaches and
frameworks have been proposed to structure behavioural research (see e.g. Mirsch, Lehrer, and
Jung (2017); Weinmann, Schneider, and vom Brocke (2016); Thaler and Cass (2008)). Referring
to these interdisciplinary guidelines, this research project uses a behavioural-driven research
cycle. The behavioural research cycle, provides a framework for understanding, investigating
biased decision-making and for deriving counter-methods to overcome it.
With reference to the behavioural research cycle (see Figure 4), the remainder of this work
is organized in the following manner: In Chapter 2, I review the theoretical foundations of
this work (Generalized Dual-Processing Theory, and Choice Architecture). In the subsequent
section, I focus on RQ1, following a design science approach setting forth a robo-advisory so-
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Figure 4: Research Design builds on a behavioural design procedure based on the guidelines
of Mirsch, T. Lehrer, C. and Jung, R. (2017), Weinmann, M. and Schneider, C. and Vom Brocke,
J. (2016), and Thaler, R. Sunstein, C. (2008).
lution for unexperienced investors. The design sciences approach is based on three research
cycles shaping and evaluating the derived design recommendations. In the next section, I fo-
cus on the cognitive drivers of inertia in decision-making. To this end, I review recent ndings
on decision inertia and subsume a generalized experimental paradigm to investigate decision
inertia in a controlled lab environment. These conceptual foundations are necessary to iso-
late decision inertia from other interacting phenomena. I then illustrate the current state of
the decision-inertia research and derive research hypotheses. In doing so, I discuss poten-
tial motivational and physiological drivers of decision inertia. These ndings are generalized
into a rst research model to contribute to existing decision support design research. In the
next step (Section 4), I investigate the cognitive foundations of decision inertia (laboratory
evaluation). The foundations provide further insights into the nature of the drivers of this "re-
luctance to change". Based on the empirical evaluation, I generalize these ndings and try to
derive counter-methods to overcome decision inertia in a real-world scenario. I then continue
in Section 5, presenting an implementation of a standardized decision inertia experiment and
test wheter decision inertia can be reproduced in a laboratory setting. In the next section, a
practical discussion of the ndings and implications is provided. I conclude this work with
an overview of the limitations of the studies, and I briey make recommendations for future
work.
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2 Theoretical Background and Assumptions
Abstract. Today, economists know that economic decisions do not always involve conscious or
deliberate control by the self. There is increasing evidence that most decisions are made by au-
tomated, unconscious processes, or are based at least on an interaction of automated-intuitive
and deliberative processes (see Alós-Ferrer and Strack (2014); Dhar and Gorlin (2013); Gigeren-
zer (2008); Kahneman (2003)). In this section I review the theoretical background of a paradigm:
Generalized Dual-Processing Theories. Generalized Dual-Processing Theories are an established
theoretical framework to understand and explain human decision-making anomalies like deci-
sion inertia, and decision-making in general. Consequently, this section builds the theoretical
foundation for the experimental studies in Parts II and III. Furthermore, it provides a theoreti-
cal foundation for the Choice Architecture approach proposed by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), on
which I rely on in the nal Part III of my thesis.
2.1 Generalized Dual-Processing Theories
Many researchers, have come to solutions to complex problems exactly at a time they were
giving it no thought. For instance, the mathematician Henrie Poincaré reported nding the
solution of a complex problem while entering a bus during an expedition, or it is said that
Isaac Newton discovered the universal gravitation law, when he rested in an orchard and the
famous apple fell on his head.
Unconscious processes are not only relevant to solving complex problems, and they occur
during almost every moment in a person’s life. Certainly one may recognise a spontaneous
solution to a problem while playing sports, shopping or taking a shower. Unconscious pro-
cesses are also triggered if one buys unneeded products at the supermarket (Rook, 1987), or
if one remains comfortably lying on the couch and prefer to watch the new Netix serial in-
stead of exercising, for instance (Anderson, 2003). Today’s judgement and decision-making
researcher suggest this type of cognitive processes do "not involve what we usually associate
with the word thinking" (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.19).
For a long time, research in economics and judgement and decision-making did not take this
type of cognitive processes seriously and followed the paradigm that decisions are made con-
sciously and deliberately. In particular, traditional bounded-rationality research and economists
have postulated that humans make decisions always deliberatively and are always capable
of making rational decisions by comparing the costs and benets of their decisions. Conse-
quently, suboptimal decisions are assumed to be the result of missing information (Friedman,
2007, 1957), or because the actual solution is "satisfying" for the decision-maker (H. A. Simon,
1979). In particular, it has not been considered that suboptimal decisions could be formed sys-
tematically by intuitive, unconscious processes that follow specic rules and heuristics which
contradict utility theory, violating what research has subsumed under the concept of "Rational
Choice Theory" (Thaler, 1980).
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However, judgement and decision-making research in the past three decades (Gawronski &
Creighton, 2013), has started to target this shortcoming and reported a broad range of stud-
ies and tasks in which humans make decisions without processing them deliberatively, and
furthermore behave systematically against their own interests (see Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
for an illustrative overview of such kind of "irrational" decision anomalies). Numerous studies
and theories generalizing and reviewing these ndings of human judgement and decision-
making have established that this happens because human judgement and decision-making
is based on two dierent, and probably distinct cognitive components (Alós-Ferrer & Strack,
2014; Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). In particular, these studies share a common theoreti-
cal paradigm, often described as Generalized Dual-Processing Theory. This paradigm is a kind
of expanded version of the Rational Choice Theory, which assumes one deliberative-rational
mind, while Generalized Dual-Processing Theory postulates that two dierent and distinct
types of cognitive processes form our behaviour and intentions (Thaler, 1980). Or in other
words, the main contention of Dual-Processing Theory is that people rely on intuitive, uncon-
scious impulses and on deliberative, conscious processes in decision-making.
Relying on this foundation, dierent domain-specic dual-processing frameworks have been
proposed to explain decision anomalies across the domains, for instance in social psychol-
ogy (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), consumer behaviour (Strack & Deutsch, 2006), auction theory
(Adam, Krämer, Jähnig, Seifert, & Weinhardt, 2011), preference construction (Dhar & Gorlin,
2013), or as a general framework for economic decision-theory (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014).
All have in common that they link the two facets of decision-making, suggesting that indi-
vidual decisions are the result of the interaction of dierent automatic, impulsive processes
(e.g., intuitive decision-making) or reective, controlled processes (e.g., deliberative decision-
making) (Dhar & Gorlin, 2013; Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014).
In this Chapter, I follow common practice in judgement and decision-making, naming these
two types of cognitive processes by their neutral terms System 1 or intuitive processes, and
System 2 or deliberative processes (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Gawronski & Creighton, 2013;
Stanovich & West, 2000). Furthermore, I illustrate, the most relevant and popular dual-processing
theories building the foundation for many other domain-specic processing theories. How-
ever, before I start discussing and reviewing the theoretical streams, I briey illustrate the key
idea of the dual processing paradigm and the interaction of System 1 and System 2 in more
detail.
For that purpose I follow Kahneman (2003), using an example from the cognitive reection
tests from Frederick (2005). This test is an established measure of human self-monitoring, or
the ability of System 2 to control System 1.
So please try to answer the following questions:
(1) A bat and a ball costs $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball costs? . . . . . . cents
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
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machines to make 100 widgets? . . . . . .minutes
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? . . . . . . days.
- adopted from Frederick (2005, p.27)
As I will illustrate, the cognitive reection test is a revealing example of how the dominant
System 1 can result in an intuitive, unconscious, fast, automatic but wrong answer (Kahneman,
2003). In the rst case, the answer "10 cents" seems to be intuitively correct, probably due to
the analogy that 1.10 can be separated easily in 1 and 0.10, which seems to t the dierence.
However, the correct answer is 0.05 cents, which can also be illustrated by basic mathematical
transformations:
ball + bat = 1.10 (2.1.1)
ball + (ball + 1) = 1.10 (2.1.2)
2 · ball + 1 = 1.10 (2.1.3)
2 · ball = 0.10 (2.1.4)
ball = 0.05 (2.1.5)
System 1 is automatic and fast and can push you intuitively into a decision before System 2
can react. Most people feel so condent in the rst idea that the ball must cost 0.1 and the
bat 1.0 that they do not proof their rst guess, and they give a fast but wrong answer. It has
nothing to do with people’s ability to solve a fth grade calculation, the wrong answer is given
because System 1 provides such a condent response that the slow System 2 has diculties
stopping it.
The same mechanisms are at work in the other questions (Frederick, 2005). In question (2) the
intuitive answer seems to be 100 (5 minutes, 5 machines, 5 parts must result in 100 minutes,
100 machines, 100 parts). However, if the relationship that 5 machines produce in 5 minutes is
linear, and consequently it would take 1 machine 5 minutes for 1 part, and 100 machines also
5 minutes for 100 parts and so on. The last question pushes you into intuitively calculating
the growth rate, which normally results in the insight that you cannot compute it without pen
and paper, and then you probably guess something between around the mean like 25 or 30.
However the correct answer can be given by using the fact that the growth rate doubles every
day. Consequently the pond will be half-covered one time step before it is fully covered, which
is the 47th day. Again, the correct response is far from the intuitive one.
If we take a look at the study of Frederick, some sessions contained only about 5 % of partici-
pants that could answer this questions correctly (see e.g. Michigan State University or Univer-
sity Toledo, Frederick (2005)). Other studies report similar results, manifesting as a persistent
inability of humans override their impulsive System 1 (see Brañas-Garza, Kujal, and Lenkei
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(2015) for a review). This is interesting, because it illustrates across educational background
that humans have a tendency to rely on quick judgements (Kahneman, 2003). This comes even
more to the fore considering the question "A banana and a bagel cost 37 cents. The banana
costs 13 cents more than the bagel. How much does the bagel cost?" (Frederick, 2005), has been
answered correctly by far more participants. This discrepancy suggests that it depends on the
strength of the impulse of System 1, and not on the cognitive abilities in statistical reasoning,
whether or not humans rely on their intuitive processes.
Recent judgement and decision-making research explains this behaviour with dual-processing
theory. The Generalized Dual Process Theories specify the characteristics and interaction of
these two systems in the example. However, they are not related only to this kind of question,
they are used as domain-independent theories of information processing (Strack & Deutsch,
2004). In recent judgement and decision-making research and related disciplines such as eco-
nomics, dual-processing theories are used as an overarching theory to help in structuring and
interpreting experimental results. For instance, Satpute and Lieberman (2006) report that they
are successfully used in judgement and decision-making research to explain categorization
(Murphy, 2002), memory (Squire & Zola, 1996), reasoning (Sloman, 1996), and decision-making
under uncertainty (Kahneman, 2003). For that purpose, dual-processing theories draw their
ndings mostly from reviewing market anomalies in economics, or systematic violations of
rational choice in judgement and decision-making. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky have
generalized recent dual processing literature into a dual-processing model based on prospect
theory to explain biased economic decision-making (Kahneman, 2003).
In Table 1, I list the most popular dual-processing theories in judgement and decision-making,
and their related sources. For a comprehensive review, I refer to Smith and DeCoster (2000) dis-
cusses and compares existing dual-processing theories, or to Gawronski and Creighton (2013)
provide a comprehensive overview of the development of Generalized Dual-Processing The-
ory. Furthermore, I would like to refer to Evans (2012), giving an elaborated overview of
Generalized Dual-Processing Theory illustrating popular misunderstandings, false beliefs and
fallacies about the usage and characteristics of this stream of research.
Table 1: Expanded overview of the most popular dual-processing theories adopted from Alós-
Ferrer and Strack (2014), Stanovich and West (2000), and Evans (2008). The most popular
theories, discussed in the next part of this Chapter are marked in bold.
Source System 1 System 2
Schneider and Shirin (1977) Automatic Controlled
Chaiken (1980), Chen and Chaiken (1999) Heuristic Systematic
Epstein (2003, 1973) Experiential Cognitive or Rational
Evans (1989, 2006) Heuristic Analytic
Fodor (1983, 2001) Input modules Higher Cognition
Continued on next page
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Hammond (1996) Intuitive Analytic
Nisbett et al. (2001) Holistic Analytic
Reber (1993), Evans and Over (1996) Implicit or tacit Explicit
Satpute and Lieberman (2006);
Lieberman (2003)
X-system C-system
Kahneman (2011, 2003) System 1 System 2
Schneider and Schirin (1977) Automatic Controlled
Sloman (1996), Smith and DeCoster
(2000)
Associative Rule-based
Stanovich (1999, 2004) System 1 (TASS) System 2 (Analytic)
Strack and Deutsch (2006, 2004) Impulsive Reective
Toates (2006) Stimulus bound Higher order
Wilson (2002) Adaptive unconscious Conscious
2.1.1 Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
While Kahneman and Tversky’s dual-processing theory is generally accepted in recent judge-
ment and decision-making research, initial contributions to this model have been in context of
the cognitive-experiential self-theory (Epstein, 2003, 1973). This Cognitive-Experiential-Self-
Theory (CEST) was introduced by Epstein. "Integrative" indicates that it has the claim to be
a kind of generalized theory that can be applied to explain human judgements and decision-
making regardless of domain.
The main assumption of Epstein’s theory is the idea that cognitive processes can be organized
in distinct structures (Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Epstein, 1973; Sarbin, 1952). This is opposite to
the one-mind assumption. Following this rationale, Epstein suggests dividing the human self
into an unconscious and a conscious system. These two systems are related to two dierent
cognitive components, building the human understanding of the world, and forming human
intentions.
Furthermore, Epstein assumes that knowledge is represented in dierent individual concep-
tions about the world, embedded in each of these two systems. These individual "reality-
theories" about the world consist of dierent schemes that represent an individual’s under-
standing and knowledge. These schemes can be characterized by their generalizability and
stability (see Figure 5).
The so-called rationale system contains schemes that represent very general world-knowledge
(e.g. I am human, or there exists a god in the world). This type of schemes is very stable, and
24
cannot be manipulated or changed easily. The other type of schemes related to the experiential
system is very situation-specic, and can be changed easily without inuencing the stability
of the personality (e.g. this brand of tooth-paste is a good one). These two types of schemes
are organized hierarchically in the two systems. Epstein describes this in more detail in the
following manner:
„According to CEST [Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory], people adapt to their envi-
ronment by means of two information-processing systems: A preconscious experien-
tial system and a primarily conscious rational system. The two systems operate in
parallel and are interactive. The rational system operates through a person’s under-
standing of logical rules of inference. The experiential system operates according to
heuristic principles (Epstein & Pacini, 1999, p.462).
Following this description, human judgement and decision-making can be modelled as an
interaction of two distinct systems: an experiential system, and a rational system (see Figure
5).
Epstein has postulated that the rst component (the experiential system) is based on pre-
conscious perception and that it works associatively, quickly, and eortlessly (Epstein, 2008,
2003). The associative character is created by the automatic connection of similar, coherent
and emotionally connected stimuli to a global context. Human experiences appear as non-
verbal representations, metaphors, and narratives. The experiential system can make every-
day decisions eortless and is related to emotional decision-making. The experiential system’s
processes are context-dependent, and manifest in concrete (emotional) pictures. Emotions and
aect are inuenced by these pictures and (re-)create these pictures. In his further work, Ep-
stein extended these descriptions and linked the system to motivation and passion, and pos-
tulating that it is also the creator of creativity, humour, empathy and other soft skills (Norris
& Epstein, 2006). Compared to subsequent analogous models of Dual-Processing Theories,
Epstein’s experiential system is more sophisticated and equally important than its counter-
part: the rational system. Furthermore, it contains a wide range of knowledge and not only a
number of unrelated “cognitive short-cuts” (see section 2.1.2).
The second component, the cognitive or rational system, is the human conscious system of
thought. Epstein uses the word "rational" from a cognitive perspective. Particularly, to re-
fer to analytical thinking, but rational outcome is always the optimal outcome (in sense of
Bernoulli rationality, or normative rationality). The rational system is responsible for abstract
and analytical thinking and abstract problem solving, which requires eort in the form of cog-
nitive resources. The cognitive system acquires knowledge through deliberative information-
processing and learning (e.g. from books or explicit sources of information) (Epstein, 2008).
This system can also represent opinions, but the opinions do not come from associations, as
in the experiential system, rather, they come from conscious learning and logical conclusions.
In this way, the system can also learn from experience. Changes in the relations and structure
of the cognitive system are abstract and context-independent. The adoption depends on the
25
Figure 5: The relationship of the experiential and the rational system according to Epstein
and colleagues: The experiential system has minimal generalizability and stability compared to
the rational system; however, it remains very sensitive to context. Each system has a dierent
perspective on a situation and builds the intention.
dominance of the stimuli and is more quickly processed than through the experiential system
(Epstein, 2003). Furthermore, unlike the experiential system, it does not regard emotions, and
it is assumed to be phylogenetically younger, due to its long-term thinking-style, which has
probably evolved in more recent steps of human evolution.
The two systems are equally important and neither is superior. Epstein suggests that both
work simultaneously and interact in both directions or inuence each other. This interaction,
illustrated in Figure 6, works as follows: The intuitive system results in an intuitive response,
while the rational system generates a rational logical response. Our brain uses these responses
to make a decision. The interaction of the systems is simultaneous and sequential. The ex-
periential system reacts faster, but the rational system can suppress it or change the answer.
If the rational system does not react, the response of the experiential system is automatically
expressed. The advantage of the rational system is that it understands the experiential sys-
tem, an understanding that the experiential system does not have of the rational system. On
the other hand, the experiential system can inuence the rational system without the rational
system registering this inuence. In consequence cognitive-experiential self-theory postulates
that both systems are always involved in human decision-making and behaviour.
However, if the responses of the two systems are divergent or incongruent, a compromise
must be found to solve the conict between them. The solution of this conict depends on the
individual dominance of each response (response stumulus). Factors driving the dominance
of the intuitive system for instance include emotional arousal, while the situational circum-
stance of the decision can increase the dominance of the rational system. Epstein suggests that
the solution of this conict is also responsible for biases in decision-making and for supersti-
tious beliefs. This occurs in situations where our rational judgment and decision-making are
overwhelmed by experiental and emotional processing. To understand this relationship more
deeply, Epstein et al. developed a questionnaire (the so called Rational-Experiential Inventory)
to measure inter-individual dierences in the preference for the dominance of the two systems
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996).
Epstein also derived further dierent psychological scales to measure inter-individual dif-
ferences in the characteristics and processing of the two systems, which predicted dier-
ent aspects of human judgement and decision-making reliably and were independent from
other popular predictive performance measures at this time like e.g., Intelligence Quotient (IQ)
(Epstein, 2008). For instance, besides the popular Rational-Experiential Inventory, Epstein et
al. has proposed the Constructive-Thinking Inventory, which measures inter-individual dier-
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Figure 6: Epstein suggests that the two systems interact directly. System 1 considers the con-
text in the decision-making and together with the generalized view of System 2 the intention
is formed.
ences in the eciency of the experiential system or intelligent problem-solving in everyday
decisions (Epstein, 2008; Epstein & Meier, 1989).
The scales measure dierent aspects of constructive and non-constructive thinking (emotional
coping, behavioural coping, categorical thinking, superstitious thinking, naive optimism, neg-
ative thinking, and global scale). The high correlation of the scale with success in other settings
arms the explanatory power of Epstein’s theorization. For example, it could be shown that
high scores in the Constructive-Thinking Inventory are not correlated with intelligence, but
rather predict success in one’s social life, work, mental adjustment and well-being better than
does an intelligence test (Epstein, 2008; Scheuer & Epstein, 1997; Katz & Epstein, 1991; Ep-
stein, 1992; Epstein & Katz, 1992). Subsequent judgement and decision-making research has
provided evidence for the major assumptions of cognitive-experiential self-theory (see Epstein
(2008) for a review), and it is established that Epstein’s work laid a solid foundation for later
generations of dual-processing theories.
Table 2: Overview of the key characteristics of the cognitive-experiential self-theory, based
on Table 2.2 (Epstein, 2008, p.26).
Component Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
Decision-making Make a decision compromise based on the response from expe-
riential and rational system
System 1 Preconscious, automatic, eortless, associative, aective, holis-
tic, context-dependent
System 2 Conscious, deliberative, abstract, weighted arguments, aect-
free, analytic, context-independent
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – Continued from previous page
Measures Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996),
Constructive-Thinking Inventory (Epstein & Meier, 1989)
2.1.2 System 1 and System 2 Model
In a large series of papers Kahneman and Tversky have investigated human judgement and
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1973); Kah-
neman and Tversky (1972); Tversky and Kahneman (1971)). In particular, they have focused
on situations in which subjects have violated the predictions of rational choice theory. For
instance, the participants systematically violated their own preferences in their experiments,
although they could have recognized they were doing so (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).
Kahneman and Tversky observed that these situations were surprisingly diverse and frequent,
and that the eects were also stable on an inter-individual level. Furthermore, Kahneman
and Tversky were surprised about the persistent discrepancy between statistical intuition
and knowledge (Kahneman, 2003). Regardless of the statistical knowledge, experts and nor-
mal decision-makers showed the same systematic deviations from rationality in statistical
decision-making tasks.
Consequently, Kahneman and Tversky have puzzled over how to explain such behaviour. To
explain the numerous studies building on their work and reporting systematic violations of
Rational Choice Theory, Kahneman and Tversky generalized their ndings in the "two sys-
tem model" of human judgement and decision-making (Kahneman, 2011, 2003). The main
paradigm of their model, as in other dual-processing theories such as CEST, is that they distin-
guish between two processing modes of human judgement and decision-making, encapsulated
in two cognitive systems (Kahneman, 2003).
Kahneman termed these two dierent systems, System 1 and System 2, and describes their
characteristics as follows:
„The operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, eortless, associative, im-
plicit (not available to introspection), and often emotionally charged; they are also
governed by habit and are therefore dicult to control or modify. The operation of
System 2 are slower, serial, eortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and de-
liberately controlled; they are also relatively exible and potentially rule governed”
(Kahneman, 2003, p.698).
Kahneman and Tversky wanted to reduce the complex debate about the naming of the system
and the related discussions about their functionalities. They wanted to give a short, sharp and
signicant term for these types of decision-making to make the terms more usable for eco-
nomic modelling. Hence, they simply decided to name these two systems "system 1 and sys-
tem 2" (Kahneman, 2011). The rst can make fast, automatic, and eortless decisions. Because
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these properties are also associated with intuitive decision-making which can be observed in
animals, the decision-making of this system is also related to aective processing. These ef-
fects of system 2 can support heuristic processing. Other sources of simplied, and eortless
decision-making like habits and routines are not part of this system, but they inuence its
behaviour (e.g., emotions that drive the output of system 1 can be suppressed by routines).
System 1 processes all input from the human senses like a lter. It is able to detect outliers
(relevant events) in a big stream on input data. This processing is always active and it cannot
be "shut-down" willingly. Kahneman postulates that system 1’s knowledge is based on experi-
ences and associations. These sources of knowledge are easy to process connected to emotions
an individual’s past. As a consequence the knowledge expressed by this kind of associative
representation, is modied or trained very slowly and follows no general logic (Kahneman,
2003).
The conscious system 2 receives input from system 1. Compared to system 1, system 2 pro-
cesses information slower, and requires more eort of the individual. System 2 processing is
deliberative. The individual processes it consciously and relies on facts represented by rules,
considerations or trade-os. While the system 1 can process much information in parallel, due
to the complexity of the knowledge base and processing, system 2 is a serial processing system.
Starting other processes decreases the eectiveness of system 2, because of its serial process-
ing characteristic. Hence, system 2 is only rarely activated otherwise it runs at low-energy.
Kahneman and Tversky postulate that System 2 can place very high demands on cognitive re-
sources. For instance, many people can remember a time in their childhood when they tried to
solve a complex mathematical problem, and failed to notice basic events in their surroundings,
such as the doorbell ringing. Kahneman and Tversky explain such situations in the following
manner: system 2 consumes so much cognitive resources that the brain could not run certain
system 1 processes (e.g., recognising thering of the door bell). Compared to system 1, system 2
thinking is perceived by decision-makers as controlled, conscious decision-making. Another
feature of system 2 is that it can also partly inuence or control some system 1’s activities, such
as breathing, emotional responses or reexes. However, the initation of system 2 processing is
also very sensitive to distraction (Kahneman, 2003). Most people know, how dicult it can be
to solve dicult cognitive tasks in noisy environments. On the other hand, system 1 processes
relying on associations are not inuenced so easily.
As Figure 7 illustrates, Kahneman dierentiates between content and processing of human
judgment and decision-making. He argues that system 1 is related to human perception at
the level of processing perspective. Both are fast and associative. Systems 1 and 2 have a
kind of long-term knowledge base that inuences decision-making. His theory suggests that
system 1 the perceptions of situations are processed similarly. A relevant further dierence
is that system 1 relies on concepts or perceptions that generate impressions or non-voluntary
decisions, while system 2 can make judgements or voluntary decisions (Kahneman, 2003). As
a consequence, deliberative processes or what judgement and decision-making researchers
term thinking, is located in the system 2. Hence, without an activation of system 2, deliberate
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Figure 7: A descriptive overview of the key characteristics of the dual-process theory of Kah-
neman and Tversky, with the two levels process and content (Kahneman, 2003, p.698).
reasoning is not possible.
Now that the characteristics of the two systems have been presented, the question of inter-
action and actual decision-making remains open. Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, 2003)
postulate that decision-making happens in several steps (see Figure 8). The impulsive response
of system 1 is monitored by system 2. If system 1 does not recognize a pattern in the input
stimuli from the choice set, system 2 gets activated. Otherwise, system 1 generates a fast and
automatic response. This automatic response can be correct, or it can be so fast that system
2 does not activates before the subsequent behavioural response of the decision-maker. If the
system 2 has enough processing time and can recognize an error in the response of system 1,
it overrides or adjusts the response of system 1. This adjustment or override occurs because
the decision-maker does not want to rely on emotions, feelings, or heuristics. System 2 can
adjust system 1 due to missing information in the response of system 1 or when it recognizes
that system 1 makes biased decisions.
Kahneman and Tversky have focused in many laboratory studies on economic decision-making
it therefore poses the question of how this model can now also complement and support ex-
perimental research. In particular, it would be an important contribution to be able to measure
the interaction of the two systems in order to better understand and explain decision-making
behaviour. In order to fulll these requirements, Kahneman and Tversky propose dierent
approaches in their studies. They propose using the facts that the mental capacity of system
2 is limited, and that its processing is serial. Processes in system 1 are eortless, and can be
combined with other tasks (Kahneman, 2003; Pashler & Sutherland, 1998; Kahneman, 1973). If
biases occur only through combining decision-making with other tasks, the source of the bias
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Figure 8: The system 1 and system 2model of human decision-making according to Kahneman.
System 1 gives a fast response, which can be overwritten by a slow response of system 2.
Decision-making is the result of the interaction of the two cognitive systems.
is probably system 2, and vice-versa. To measure the activation of system 1 and system 2, or
to identify the source of a decision, Kahneman further proposes measuring bio-physiological
responses like arousal or pupil sizes, which expand in system 2 processing (Kahneman, 2011).
However, a fully-agreed upon and standardized methodology for such measurements does not
yet exist in judgement and decision-making research.
Table 3: Overview of the key characteristics of the system 1 and system 2 theory, based on
Kahneman (2003).
Component Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
Decision-making Decisions made by uncontrolled impulsive response (system 1),
or deliberatively based on system 2
System 1 Fast, parallel, automatic, eortless, associative, slow-learning,
emotional
System 2 Slow, serial, controlled, eortful, rule-governed, exible, neutral
Measures Combine decision-making with other tasks (Kahneman, 2003;
Pashler & Sutherland, 1998; Kahneman, 1973), bio-physiological
responses (arousal, pupil size) (Kahneman, 2011)
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2.1.3 Reection-Reexion-Model
In the previous sections, I introduced two popular generalized dual-processing models: The
cognitive-experiential self-model, which draws its evidence from studies reporting the high
explanatory power of the rational-experiential inventory and constructive-thinking inventory
(see Section 2.1.1), and the system 1 system 2 model of Kahneman and Tversky, which draws
its evidence from laboratory studies on decision-making under uncertainty. Another model,
provides further evidence from a third methodological perspective: The reection-reexion
model, based on neurological studies of human judgement and decision-making (Satpute &
Lieberman, 2006; Lieberman, 2003).
Other dual-processing theories like the reection-reexion model assume that humans make
decisions based on several judgemental processes organized into two systems, but link these
dierent systems to specic areas in the human brain. Lieberman conceived the reection-
reexion model to target the shortcoming of existing dual-processing theories, which always
dier between automatization and control, which he assumes to be a "shopworn concept"
(Lieberman, 2003, p.4). He expands the previously discussed models and ndings, and con-
tributes to existing dual-processing research, because previous models have not considered
the neural bases of decision-making (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). In particular, his model
explains more deeply when the systems are activated by discussing the consequences of the
permanent activation of the X-system. Lieberman underlines these assumptions of neural rep-
resentations of the two systems in the human brain:
„We will describe the phenomenological features, cognitive operations, and neural
substrates of two systems that we call the X-system (for the X in reexive) and the
C-system (for the C in reective). These systems are instantiated in dierent parts of
the brain, carry out dierent kinds of inferential operations, and are associated with
dierent experiences" (Lieberman, 2003, p.4).
Lieberman’s dual-processing model, dierentiates between an X-system, which can be com-
pared to system 1 processes (automatic/intuitive) of other dual-processing theories, and a C-
System that can be compared to the type of system 2 processes (conscious or deliberative).
The X-system is a parallel processing system. Processed patterns are matched to patterns from
knowledge. These patterns are used as links. This linkage results in a continuous stream of
consciousness, or what humans perceive as the "world outside" (Lieberman, 2003). X-system’s
components are characterized as faster in processing than the C-system, but slower in adop-
tion. Its processing is faster because its structure allows parallel processing. The processed
thoughts and knowledge are unconscious, what Lieberman terms "implicit semantic associa-
tions". If the X-system has a problem or if a specic situation occurs, an alert is triggered and
the C-system gets activated.
The C-system is responsible for deliberative judgement and decision-making. It works serially,
uses symbolic logic, and it can react only on input from the X-system. Also Lieberman assumes
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that the X-System is phylogenetically older. The C-system is highly adaptive, but slow in
processing. This processing style is perceived as an "internal linguistic monologue" (Satpute
& Lieberman, 2006). Due to the costly or resource-consuming processing style, it is easily at
its maximum capacity. As a consequence, it is activated only when it is necessary, or from an
evolutionary perspective, it is sparingly used to save energy.
Table 4: Overview of the key characteristics of the two systems and their related brain areas,
based on the reection-reexion model.
X-System C-System
Orbitofrontal cortex Lateral prefrontal cortex
Basal ganglia Medial temporal lobe
Amygdala Posterior parietal cortex
Lateral temporal cortex Rostral anterior cingulate cortex
Dorsal anterior cingulate Medial prefrontal cortex
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
In the reection-reexion model, distinct brain areas (see Table 4) are linked to the two sys-
tems of judgement and decision-making. The brain areas linked to the C-systems are the
medial temporal lobe, posterior parietal cortex, rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral
prefrontal, medial prefrontal, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).
In general, these brain areas have been linked to analytical thinking and decision-making in
related magnetic resonance imaging studies. For instance, the lateral prefrontal cortex has
been associated with reasoning and logic (Noveck, Goel, & Smith, 2004), and with mathemat-
ical problem-solving (Prabhakaran, Rypma, & Gabrieli, 2001), and related cognitive processes
(Prabhakaran et al., 2001, p.90).
The brain areas related to the X-system are the amygdala, basal ganglia, ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral temporal cortex (Satpute & Lieber-
man, 2006). These brain areas are related to emotional and unconscious processing. For in-
stance, neuro-science studies have linked the amygdala to reward and emotional cognition
(Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998). Lieberman and Satpute discuss that these properties of
the amygdala could trigger the C-system based on personal traits (based on genetics or expe-
riences) due to a reaction of fear (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).
Independent of judgement and decision-making, the X-system streams continuous thoughts
based on pattern matching in the lateral temporal cortex based on the information and knowl-
edge in the C-system. In the reection-reexion model both systems are responsible for in-
formation processing, but compared to other dual-processing models, it is assumed that they
do not directly interact (see Figure 9). Instead the X-system can activate the C-system via an
alert stimulus; the C-system then tries to make a decision analytically or to solve the problems
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of the X-system. The C-system tries to solve this conict, which can be inuenced by cogni-
tive load and motivation (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). In doing so the C-system provides new
information to the X-system to solve the conict.
Figure 9: The two systems with their related brain areas based on Satpute and Lieberman
(2006).
Because the two systems are in dierent brain areas, they can be activated at the same time.
In particular, their working in parallel might cause processing conicts that must be solved by
nding a compromise between the dierent stimuli by processing them deliberatively. Lieber-
man and Satpute have argued that the C-system is activated only if the X-system alerts it
(2006). However, the C-system can set activations in the knowledge base of the X-system.
This kind of marker becomes activated under specic conditions allowing the C-system to
control the X-system indirectly, even when it is not active.
As illustrated in Figure 9, the reection-reexion model follows the same structures as previous
dual-processing theories. However, it is an outstanding characteristic of this model that it
explicitly links the cognitive with the neural. The identication of specic brain areas linked
to biased or rational decision-making could help to get a better understanding of suboptimal
decision-making. As a consequence, this could help to identify biases at the moment they
occur. The discussed areas are mainly linked based on theory, and an empirical proof for some
of the relationships is still pending. However, Liberman and Satpute argue that "it is unlikely
that this model has seen the end of its evolution. It should be taken as a working model rather
than a nished product" (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006, p.88).
Table 5: Overview of the key characteristics of the reection-reexion model.
Component Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
Decision-making Decisions made by X-system based on information from the C-
system, which is activated by alert triggers
System 1 Parallel-processing, fast operating, slow learning, cognition
based on pattern matching, susceptible to associative biases
System 2 Serial processing, slow operating, limited by cognitive abilities,
fast learning, susceptible to distraction
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – Continued from previous page
Measures Neural correlates (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006), see Table 4
2.1.4 Reective-Impulsive-Model
The previous part, raises the need to nd an overarching model integrating the dierent per-
spectives and approaches. Following this rationale to focus on the integration of the dif-
ferent dual-processing theories and models, the reective-impulsive-model of human judge-
ment and decision making has been proposed (Strack & Deutsch, 2006, 2004). The reective-
impulsive-model evolved mainly in a series of two related papers of Strack and Deutsch (Strack
& Deutsch, 2006, 2004). Based on research in consumer and social psychology, the authors
reviewed ndings from cognitive psychology to integrate the dierent predictive aspects of
existing dual-processing frameworks. For that purpose, they postulated ten theses summariz-
ing the key characteristics of their model, which are generalizations of existing dual-process
models and ndings from cognitive psychology.
The foundation of these theses is the assumption, as in other dual-processing theories, that
two type of processes are organized in two dierent systems in the human brain, and that
they follow dierent operating principles (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Finally, human behaviour
is considered to be the result of a joint function of these two systems:
"Basic assumption. Social behaviour is the eect of the operation of two distinct sys-
tems of information processing: a reective system and an impulsive system. The
systems can be specied by dierent principles of representation and information
processing."(Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p.222).
According to Strack and Deutsch, these two systems dier in the way they produce a be-
havioural response. The reective system results in an intention that activates behavioural
schemes, while the impulsive system results in a spreading activation. The latter is a kind
of unconscious reex, processed without intention. While the main purpose of the reective
system is active and conscious thinking and reasoning, the impulsive system relies on the he-
donistic principle of avoiding negative experiences and increasing positive stimulation (Strack
& Deutsch, 2004, p.241).
The impulsive system continuously processes new information, what people perceive as con-
tinuous stream of consciousness, while the reective system is active only when it receives
a salient input (based on intensity and attention level), or when the impulsive system or the
behavioural outcome prompts an error in the decision-making. As a consequence there are
two ways of decision-making: Both systems work in parallel, or the impulsive system works
alone (Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
Considering the knowledge base of the two systems, the impulsive system operates with input
from an associative network (all associations built by experiences by the individual), and the
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current motivational focus of the individual. This so-called associative store, provides numer-
ous schemes and associations as an input for decision-making. For instance, if a consumer sees
fruits on a packaging, the associations "healthy" or "fresh" are automatic associated with the
packaging. The other system, the reective system, uses factual and value-associated knowl-
edge. It works on a sub-symbolic level, and uses pattern-matching and symbolic procedures.
It compares the perceived patterns with patterns from memory, for instance remembering that
a fruit symbol does not mean that something is healthy. The reective system prescribes that
instead the ingredients like sugar or fat should be compared, and provides this information.
Furthermore, the reective system can add relation or "knowledge" into the associative store,
which provides the associative links for the impulsive system. Elements that are linked in the
reective system can be also linked in the impulsive system. However, both knowledge rep-
resentations are encoded in the neural network of the brain, and consequently the dierences
are on a computational level (see also Section 2.1.3).
Another relevant aspect is that the two systems have dierent processing capacities. The
impulsive system is very fast, and it places only very low demands on cognitive resources. On
the other hand, the reective system requires high cognitive capacity, and as a result dierent
reective processes can work only serially and not in parallel. Furthermore, the capacities
of the reective systems are sensitive to high or low levels of arousal, hence dierent levels
of arousal inuence the interaction of the two systems, and the subsequent decision-making
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004, p.223). In particular, in judgement and decision-making research,
there is increasing evidence that the inuence of the reective system is reduced by arousal
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004). For instance, in psychological research, arousal has been linked
to simplied heuristic or stereotypic decision-making (Bodenhausen, 1993). Studies report a
direct association between arousal and intense indoctrination (Baron, 2000), or in nancial
decision-making in electronic markets (Adam, Krämer, & Müller, 2015).
Figure 10: The reective-impulsive-model of human decision-making according to Strack and
Deutsch.
The interaction of the two types of processes (as illustrated in Figure 10) is described in the
following manner: Firstly, the impulsive system activates dierent associations or associative
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clusters in the associative store based on the input it receives. Even if the processing is uncon-
scious, it may result in dierent feelings "without syllogistic processes of inference" (Strack
& Deutsch, 2004, p.224). The reective system is activated if the behavioural schemata of the
impulsive systems are in conict with each other or with the situation. An example of such a
situation is as follows: One schemata proposes to run away, while another schemata proposes
to sit down, and calm down. The solution of this process conict is computed by comparing
the strength of the dierent schemata. If the activation of the schema of the impulsive or the
reective system reaches a specic threshold, the behaviour is activated (Strack & Deutsch,
2004, p.229).
Table 6: Overview of the key characteristics of the reective-impulsive theory, based on Strack
and Deutsch (2004).
Component Reective-Impulsive-Model
Decision-making Decisions are made continuously by an impulsive system, or de-
liberatively based on the reective system
System 1 Fast, parallel, eortless, associative
System 2 Slow, serial, eortful, reective
Measures Manipulating or measuring individual’s arousal as an approach
to measure the inuence or activation of the two systems (Strack
& Deutsch, 2004, p.223)
2.1.5 Dual-Processing in Decision-Making Research
In a series of studies investigating dual-processing, various characteristics have been identied
and associated specically with the two systems. system 1 processing is generally described
as automatic or impulsive, while system 2 processing is mostly described as deliberative. In
the next section, I generalize the ndings from the previous sections, and present and illus-
trate the most relevant characteristics that have been identied across current dual-process
theory research to provide a common groundwork for the subsequent studies. Based on the
suggestion of Evans (2008), I organize these associated attributes of the two kind of cognitive
systems according to four groups of characteristics: consciousness, phylogenetics, processing,
and capacities (as in Table 7).
The rst group of attributes associated with dual-processing can be summarized under the
context of cognitive consciousness of decision-making (Evans, 2008). Decisions made through
of system 1 processing are mostly the result of automatic, eortless, and fast processes. On
the other side, system 2 processing is characterized as controlled, eortful, and slow. This dif-
ference, can be illustrated by the analogy of a child learning to ride a bicycle. The automatic
system starts without knowledge or intuitive associations and rules in this activity. System 2
will probably try to understand each movement and compute the correct behaviour by con-
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sidering all information consciously. However, that approach will consume much cognitive
capacity and the learningprocess itself will be very slow. Hence, the child experiences this
phase as very dicult. However, after some time the child’s system 1 will have learnt some
simple heuristics and reexes to handle the bike. These processes are unconscious and eort-
less, and through them, biking becomes an easy activity. Such examples do not illustrate that
the outcome of one type of processing is worse or less useful, however. For instance, many
scenarios exist in which automatic decision-making can save a person’s life (consider a car
accident, where one must decide how to behave without time to consider all consequences),
and much evidence is available that system 1 allows us do stupid things (see Kahneman (2011),
for a review). Recent evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that the two types of pro-
cesses can overlap, for instance that system 1 processes can be partially built by intention and
automation (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001).
The second group, includes phylogenetic attributes of dual-processing (Evans, 2008). The main
idea of most dual-processing theories is the assumption that the system is phylogenetically
older than the cognitive structures of system 2. It is assumed that humans share this part with
animals. However, this aspect has recently received much criticism in judgement and decision-
making research, because the human mind evolved as a whole, and it may not be comprised
of one distinct system that has evolved due to a single evolutionary process (Evans, 2008,
p.259). Furthermore, there is evidence that humans share with chimpanzees certain system 2
characteristics (e.g. high-order mental representations; Whiten (2000); Evans (2008)).
A a third group of attributes can be classed as processing or functional characteristics (Evans,
2008). Decisions based on System 2 are described as serial-processing, abstract or reective.
However, that System 1 is parallel-processing, concrete, and non-reective is not a contention
shared by all dual-processing theories (Evans, 2008, p.261). For instance, speaking in one’s
mother tongue is based on system 1, while speaking a foreign language, requires use of sys-
tem 2 (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.20). In the rst case, humans rely on fast and intuitive rules
of thumb (e.g., what feels right), and in the second, humans rely on systematic grammar and
rules learnt in language classes. Rule-based speaking is slow, exhausting, and strenuous, so
people do not like to use it very much. They may even lose the desire for the other language
quite quickly. Consequently, dual-processing models suggest that people should try to ac-
tivate system 1 and to rely more on intuitive processes in speaking, or integrating another
language into everyday activities. However, humans cannot always train themselves to learn
intuitive rules that rely on system 1 to make a system 2 processes less taxing. Moreover, slow,
sequential or rule-based processing is something that can also happen in system 1 processing.
For instance, an impulsive response can be sequentially processed. Fortunately, though, this
argument does not work in reverse. A wide range of evidence supports system 2 processing
as mostly characterized by the attributes in Table 7, allowing us to separate these two kinds
of cognitive systems. In other words, it can be assumed that System 2 processing is slow, but
it cannot be assumed that every exhausting, slow decision is based on system 2.
The last group of attributes describes the capacities or individual dierences of dual-processing
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(Evans, 2008). For instance, some studies suggesting an association with System 2 processing
and general intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2008). Others suggest that System
1 is related to aective or emotional decision-making. Furthermore, a relevant distinction in
this area is "that between measures of cognitive capacity and dispositional thinking styles"
(Evans, 2008, p.262). These conceptualizations target dierentiating the cognitive or what
decision-makers are cognitively capable of, and the motivational, or what they are motivated
to do.
Table 7: Overview of the characteristics of the dual-processing theory processes.
Type 1 Process Type 2 Process Sources (Selection)
Category 1
Consciousness
Preconscious Conscious, self-aware Epstein (2008), Kahneman
(2003), Strack and Deutsch
(2004)
Experienced passively
and preconsciously
Experienced actively and con-
sciously
Epstein (2008)
Implicit Explicit Epstein (2008)
Automatic Deliberative, controlled Epstein (2008), Kahneman
(2003), Strack and Deutsch
(2004)
Eortless Eortful Kahneman (2003), Strack and
Deutsch (2004)
Slow learning, resis-
tance to change
Fast learning Epstein (2008),Kahneman
(2003), Satpute and Lieberman
(2006)
Fast Slow Kahneman (2003)
High capacity Low capacity Satpute and Lieberman (2006),
Strack and Deutsch (2004)
Default Process Inhibitory Evans (2008)
Holistic Analytic Epstein (2008)
Category 2
Phylogenetics
Phylogenetic older Phylogenetic younger Satpute and Lieberman (2006)
Evolutionary rational-
ity
Individual rationality Evans (2008)
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – Continued from previous page
Shared with animals Uniquely human Satpute and Lieberman (2006)
Nonverbal Linked to language Evans (2008)
Modular cognition Fluid Intelligence Evans (2008)
Category 3
Processing
Associative Cause-and-eect relations, de-
ductive
Epstein (2008), Kahneman
(2003), Strack and Deutsch
(2004),Thaler and Sunstein
(2008)
Outcome-oriented Process-oriented Epstein (2008)
Intention activation Spreading activation Strack and Deutsch (2004)
Mediated by “vibes”
from past experience
Mediated by conscious appraisal
of events
Epstein (2008)
Categorical thinking Nuanced thinking Epstein (2008)
Organized in part by
cognitive-aective
modules
Organized in part by cross-
situational principles
Epstein (2008)
Self-evidently valid:
"Experiencing is
believing"
Requires justication via logic
and evidence
Epstein (2008)
Parallel-processing Serial processing Kahneman (2003), Satpute and
Lieberman (2006), Strack and
Deutsch (2004)
Non-reective Reective Satpute and Lieberman (2006)
Symmetric knowledge
relations
Asymmetric knowledge rela-
tions
Satpute and Lieberman (2006)
Knowledge in form of
common cases
Knowledge in form of special
cases
Satpute and Lieberman (2006)
Concrete Abstract Epstein (2008), Satpute and
Lieberman (2006)
Continuous Specic (after alert) Satpute and Lieberman (2006)
Skilled Rule-following Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
Category 4
Continued on next page
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Capacities
Universal Heritable Evans (2008)
Associated with aect
or emotions
Aect-free Epstein (2008), Kahneman
(2003)
Independent of general
intelligence
Linked to general intelligence Evans (2008)
Independent of work-
ing memory
Limited by working memory ca-
pacity
Evans (2008)
In summary, the research has been unveiled numerous properties associated with the two
types of processes. The dierences occur on four conceptual levels, and they describe how
the two systems work together. They also allow conclusions to be drawn about the function-
ing of our brain, or they allow researchers to design experiments and to identify situations
in which a specic type of process is preferred. Although most dual-processing approaches
ascribe great importance to both systems, it is generally accepted that System 2 is rarely ac-
tive in contrast to System 1. However, this asymmetry has serious implications for judgement
and decision-making research, because "we often make mistakes because we rely too much
on our automatic system"(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.21). Much research in judgement and
decision-making research has focused on understanding the driving factors across situations
and domains. However, the interaction of both systems and the role of System 1 is a promising
path to fully understand the numerous decision anomalies in when, why, and how decision-
makers act against their own interests in judgements and decision-making.
2.2 Biases, System Conicts and Divergent Processes
While for many years economic judgement and decision-making research has assumed that
deviations from rationality are purely accidental (see Rational Choice Theory) or occur due
to lack of information (see Herbert Simon’s Bounded Rationality Theory), it was one of the
two central contributions of dual-processing literature to show that a large part of human
errors and mistakes are by no means accidental, but that these deviations from rationality
are systematic. And secondly, that these systems can be explained by the duality of human
decision-making (duality of system 1 and system 2).
In the next step, I examine the interaction of the dierent systems and how this interaction
can result in biased decision-making, compared to situations where people behave rational. In
particular, I discuss what happens if these two types of systems result in dierent outcomes,
and how such a conict can be solved - and on the other hand, what happens if it is not solved.
At present, one may assume that the system conicts and the resulting biases are relatively ro-
bust, and that they are mostly independent of the cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2000).
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For instance, Daniel Kahneman reports that he was able to reproduce his experiments on
representativeness heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971) at a conference of the Mathemati-
cal Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Kahneman & Frederick,
2002). Both are conferences where one might intuit that many humans with good mathemati-
cal abilities are present, and that they should not fall for these simple decision traps. Although
calculations were so simple that they could have been calculated without problems on the
questionnaires, numerous participants relied on intuitive, but false guesses to estimate proba-
bilities (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). This initially unintuitive nding led Daniel Kahneman
and Amon Tversky to a series of follow-up studies, which inspired further researchers to get
to the study these biases (see section 2.1.2).
Since the rst studies of heuristics and biases, research in the 1970’s, numerous biases have
been identied, and described. For instance, a review of cognitive biases in decision sup-
port systems identied 37 potential relevant biases for information system design (Arnott,
2006). Another more general review identied up to 76 cognitive biases in the judgement and
decision-making literature (Carter, Kaufmann, & Michel, 2007). Although some of the iden-
tied biases may overlap conceptually, it still shows the susceptibility of the human brain to
rely on systematic decision errors.
A recent, crucial contribution to this research stream was made by Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein. They gathered and reviewed these ndings of heuristics and biases research, and
they developed a theoretical framework to use these anomalies of human decision-making to
improve our health, wealth, and even happiness (2008). This theoretical framework termed
Choice Architecture, is presented in the last part of the following chapter, regarding the fact
that biases can be reduced or debiased by decision support system design based on choice
architecture (see e.g. Arnott (2006)).
Considering the ndings of Section 2.1, it is generally accepted that the interaction of auto-
matic system 1 processes and controlled system 2 processes constitute our intentions. These
two kinds of processes can work together or against each other, and hence can result in dier-
ent responses (for an overview, see Gawronski and Creighton (2013), B. K. Payne and Bishara
(2009), B. K. Payne (2008)). Consequently, the processes of system 1 and system 2 can be con-
vergent, pushing the decision-making towards the same behavioural response. However, they
can also be divergent, meaning that they produce dierent responses. This kind of relation-
ship of divergent and convergent processes, has also been called compatible and incompatible
(Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 2008), or conicting and aligned (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016)
in judgement and decision-making research.
It is assumed that errors or suboptimal decision anomalies occur, because one of the two sys-
tems produces a dominant behavioural response that is erroneous. In most cases of suboptimal
decision-making, people rely on the response of our automatic System 1, even when our con-
trolled system 2 indicates the opposite (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.21). In other words, it might
be that system 2 produces the correct response, but the response of the other system is too
strong or too fast, and people rely on the wrong behavioural response. A typical situation
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would be that decision-maker intuitively decides to eat delicious cake as dessert, but at the
checkout realizes that the decision was wrong (e.g., because system 2 recalling diet plans).
A possible method to model the interaction of the two types of cognitive processes and to un-
derstand erroneous decision-making is the control-dominating process dissociation approach
(Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1991). This approach relies on existing dual-processing theo-
ries, assuming that the interaction of the two systems can be modelled and visualized explicitly.
In the rst version (Jacoby, 1991), system 2 processes are assumed to be dominant and to easily
override the outcome of system 1. If there is no response of system 2 or no strong response
(e.g., if system 2 failed to compute a correct response), System 1 gives a single response.
To investigate this interaction of the two systems, the control-dominating process dissociation
model recommends the usage of processing trees (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). Processing
trees (see Figure 11) are a theoretical expansion of dual-processing theory. They are "tools (a)
for measuring the cognitive processes that underlie human behaviour in various tasks and (b)
for testing the psychological assumptions on which these models are based" (Erdfelder et al.,
2009). Consequently, they give a visual representation of the latent dynamic interaction of the
two processes, and illustrate how the dierent responses result in a behavioural response (see
Erdfelder et al. (2009), or Batchelder and Riefer (1999) for a review).
Figure 11: Process dissociation model of System 1 and System 2 processing with dominant
System 2, based on Erdfelder et al. (2009); Conrey et al. (2005); Gawronski and Creighton
(2013).
Process trees built on the assumption that the behavioural outcome of decision-making, mea-
sured by dierent frequencies of a nominal outcome variable (for instance yes and no) follow
a multinomial distribution (Erdfelder et al., 2009). Following this rationale, dierent probabil-
ities to a correct response can be calculated and the inuence of the latent cognitive process
can be estimated.
An established alternative tool to processing trees are generalized linear models (Erdfelder et
al., 2009), with a dummy variable for the decision conict. These models are also able to ac-
commodate the specic characteristics of dual-processing theory, and provide a more general
perspective on modelling and investigating cognitive processes. By modelling cognitive pro-
cesses with a generalized linear model, dierent direct and indirect measures are regressed on
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the independent variable.
Response = V ariablei +DummyConflict + V ariablei ×DummyConflict (2.2.1)
In the model the dependent variable is response and as described by an independent vari-
able termed variablei, and a dummy variable dummyConflict, which represents the conict of
system 1 and system 2. This approach dierentiates between the inuence of the variablei
regardless of the decision situation, or the response of the two systems. However, by consid-
ering the dummyConflict, the inuence of the variable in case of process conict (e.g. an in-
tuitive reinforcement process and a deliberative Bayesian Updating process) can be measured
(C: cognitive processing vs. A: automated processing). Consequently, variablei describes the
inuence of the variable itself, dummyConflict the inuence of the processing conict, and
variablei × dummyConflict the inuence of the intuitive processing on the decision outcome
response.
Studies in dual-processing research rely on this approach to model competitive system 1 and
system 2 processing. For instance, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) and Charness and Levin (2005) rely
on it to model inertia in decision-making, and conicting heuristic-intuitive and deliberative
processing. (Achtziger & Alós-Ferrer, 2013) follow this approach to model decision-making
under uncertainty.
Following this generalized linear model approach, the latent variable is measured by induc-
ing process divergence and convergence by dierent tasks, and regressing on the decision
outcome. Through investigation of the interaction eect of the variable and the divergence
dummy the drivers of the latent cognitive process can be investigated. The discussed ap-
proaches rely on dierent measures of system 1 and system 2 processing. This is necessary, to
validate the conceptualization and measure the conict of the two systems.
In judgement and decision-making research, various other direct and indirect measures have
been proposed to induce and investigate possible correlates of system 1 and system 2 process-
ing. A rst approach is to make usage of the relationship of System 1 and system 2. Following,
Generalized Dual-Processing Theory, intuitive system 1 processing is eortless compared to
deliberative system 2 processing (see section 2.1). As a result, system 1 processing is much
faster than system 2 processing. Various studies have measured the active systems by com-
paring the response time in miliseconds (see e.g. Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013)).
Another common approach is to work with bio-physiological correlates. Yerkes and Dodson
(1908) have reported that deliberative decision-making works best with an intermediate level
of arousal, while low arousal or high arousal reduces performance in complex cognitive tasks.
This relationship is also known as the Yerkes-Dodson-Law, as illustrated in Figure 12.
Today, it is generally assumed that arousal signicantly inuences the proper functioning
of system 2 (Kahneman, 2011; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Dual-processing literature assumes
(in analogy with the Yerkes-Dodson Law), that System 2, which is responsible for solving
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Figure 12: The performance of the controlled system 2 depends on an individual’s arousal
level, induced by the stimulus. Extreme arousal level are associated with poor processing,
while intermediate arousal is associated with optimal System 2 processing, hence better per-
formance in complex decision-making tasks.
complex tasks, works best for an intermediate level of arousal. High arousal is associated with
low performance in experimental tasks requiring deliberative processing (Baron, 2000), while
low arousal has been also explicitly linked to low performance of System 2 (Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996).
2.3 Using Choice Architecture to Overcome Biased Decision-Making
In the previous section, I focused on the occurrence and theoretical explanation of cognitive bi-
ases and biased decision-making, now I examine the application of the ndings from Generalized-
Dual Processing Theory. First, it should be mentioned that the original studies in the area of
heuristics and biases literature investigated decision-making under uncertainty. For example,
Daniel Kahneman received his Nobel Prize for his work on judgement under uncertainty. His
numerous ndings, which he published together with Amon Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1975) are based on the central assumption that
people generally have diculty making decisions based on probabilities and uncertainties. In
particular, uncertainty can lead to a conict between System 1 and System 2 (see Section 2.2).
Under novel conditions, people tend to rely on heuristics, which can lead to systematic errors
in probability judgements, what has been termed biases in judgement and decision-making
research.
Numerous further studies have shown that these biases have been relatively robust and also
have inuenced by cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2008). On the other hand, several
papers on the topic of "Decision Support", have aimed to reduce the inuence of biases (e.g.
Arnott (2006)). Others have considered biased decision-making as an artefact of the decision-
making environment, rather than the actual decision-making process. Other promising nd-
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ings have been reported by Gerd Gigerenzer, who has focused on how information can be
better processed and presented, thereby reducing biases (Gigerenzer & Horage, 1995), possi-
bility even eliminating them.
A further central step in the judgement and decision-making literature was taken over the
numerous works of Richard Thaler and colleagues. Their work expanded the research in this
eld signicantly by showing that errors or biases do not exist only under uncertainty, but
also under certainty. They are also relatively robust and quite frequent across many decision-
making scenarios. For instance, we know today that the endowment bias is independent of
learning and experience (Thaler, 1999).
Building on this wide range of studies, Richard Thaler laid the foundation for the research
stream of behavioural economics through a series of papers on market anomalies in human
decision making, particularly in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Thaler’s work "Posi-
tive Theory of Consumer Choice" (Thaler, 1980) started other inter-disciplinary behavioural
research streams. Across disciplines, behavioural research (e.g., behavioural economics, be-
havioural marketing and so on), has thus been concerned with better understanding human
decision-making in domain-specic scenarios, and also with deriving recommendations for
political actions, for example, or or interface design.
In this context, further works from Thaler followed the existing research in the eld of heuris-
tics and biases research. For instance, Thaler proposed an explanation of the endowment
eect by means of the concept of loss aversion. In addition, Thaler proposed that if ndings
about biases (such as stability or ubiquity) are correct, these ndings could be used to help
people make better decisions. Thus, a central assumption of the behavioural economics lit-
erature stream is, that the systematic usage of these decision anomalies or biases can benet
humans. In particular, specic choice design interventions (so-called nudges) can help to re-
duce, and gain a better understanding of human errors in decision-making. This central credo
of behavioural economics literature describes the concept of "libertarian paternalism", whose
guiding principle is that private and public institutions should nudge decision-makers into the
best decision for themselves, without eliminating people’s freedoms (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003).
As Thaler describes it more commonly, "When we use the term libertarian to modify the word
paternalism, we simply mean liberty-preserving. And when we say liberty-preserving, we really
mean it. Libertarian paternalists want to make it easy for people to go their own way; they do not
want to burden those who want to exercise their freedom" (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.6).
Building on insights of the biases and heuristics literature, Thaler and his colleague Sunstein
created a theoretical framework termed choice architecture, which in turn is the consistent
implementation of libertarian paternalism. Thaler describes the key concept of choice archi-
tecture with the following metaphor "...designers need to keep in mind that the users of their
objects are Humans [Comment: Thaler termed ’realistic’ decision-maker, which are the opposite
of the homo oeconomicus, as Humans, pp.5-6] who are confronted every day with myriad choices
and cues. The goal of this section is to develop the same idea for choice architects. If you indi-
rectly inuence the choices other people make, you are a choice architect. And since the choices
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you are inuencing are going to be made by Humans, you will want your architecture to reect a
good understanding of human behave. In particular, you will want to ensure that the Automatic
System doesn’t get all confused"(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.85).
Consequently, Choice Architecture postulates the systematic design of the choice environment
to push decision-makers towards the best outcome of their own, without reducing their free-
dom. For that purpose, choice architects rely on a number of so-called nudges. Such interven-
tions are "any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable
way without forbidding any options or signicantly changing their economic incentives. To
count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid" (Thaler & Sunstein,
2008, p.6).
Following this rationale, choice architects make use of a number of dierent design elements
like default values or message framing to guide the decision-maker in the decision environ-
ment (Johnson et al., 2012). For instance, choice architecture has been successfully applied
to increase the savings rates of employees (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). The campaign team of
Barack Obama set double-side printing as the default on all printers during the election cam-
paign and is estimated to have saved about $ 40.000 (Thaler et al., 2014; R. Simon, 2008). In
behavioural economics, many other policy-making scenarios are discussed that nudge people
into options they would choose if relying on system 2 processing, and not cognitive short-cuts,
heuristics or automated-intuitive decision-making (for an overview, see Thaler and Sunstein
(2008)).
Choice Architecture also has relevant implications for decision support systems research. The
studies of Mirsch et al. (2017); Weinmann et al. (2016); Jameson et al. (2014) expand the ndings
of Thaler and Sunstein, and provide a theoretical basis to make them usable in information
systems research. For that purpose, they make use of so-called digital nudges. Digital nudges
are nudges that coming in the shape of "interface (UI) design elements to aect the choices of
users in digital environments" (Mirsch et al., 2017, p.634).
Since the concept is new in business informatics and information systems research, few studies
make use of it (Hummel, Schacht, & Maedche, 2017). However, certain recent approaches fall
back on digital nudges to intervene in the customer’s journey in banking (Hummel et al., 2017),
or to reduce technologicaly resistance, and increase the adoption of electro-mobility (Stryja,
Satzger, & Dorner, 2017; Stryja, Dorner, & Riee, 2017).
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3 Part I: Designing Robo-Advisors
Abstract. Robo-advisory or automated web-based investment advisory in particular promises
many advantages for both banks and customers - but consumer adoption has been slow so far.
Recent studies suggest that this lag in adoption might be due to a mix of low trust in banks, high
expectations of transparency and general inability or unwillingness to engage with investment
questions. Research in decision support and guidance shows customers’ willingness to interact
with a decision support tool depends greatly on its usability. I identify requirements for robo-
advisory, derive design principles and evaluate them in two iterations with a real robo-advisor in
a controlled laboratory study. The evaluation results conrm the validity of the identied design
principles.1
3.1 The Evolution of Robo-Advisory
In the context of service digitalization, human face-to-face banking encounters have been
complemented by online (discount) brokerage and digital banking services (Sironi, 2016; Alt
& Puschmann, 2016). In the 1970s, nancial service providers targeted the U.S. middle class
by introducing discount brokers. In the rst step of the digitalization of wealth management,
discount brokers provided nancial intermediation services with signicantly lower fees than
the traditional advisors. The downside of this approach was the lack of personal nancial
advisory and the small range of available products. Because discount brokers buy and sell
instruments at reduced commissions, the stock market became accessible to a new segment of
customers.
With the rise of the world wide web in the 1990s, online trading and digital platforms became
available to a much broader community. The service providers oered platforms ranging from
networks for auent investors, with retail investors managing their own portfolios to social
trading platforms, where investors interact as in social networks and exchange trades and in-
vestment advice. This way, new customer segments have been developed. The current levels
of digitalization in the context of nancial advisory are digital service platforms like robo-
advisors. According to Sironi (2016), the main goal of a robo-advisor is to support customers
by translating their specic needs into an adequate portfolio of nancial products and to sub-
sequently manage the portfolio automatically. In particular, the advisory eort required to
manage customers with a greater need for customized advice can thus be reduced.
Nowadays, bank account management and other banking services are oered fully digitalized.
However, digitalized advisory services – especially if they are not provided by incumbent
banks - still struggle for acceptance from retail customers despite their substantial cost-saving
1Note. The content of this section is a revised version of two papers, which were created in the course of this
thesis. In particular, the theoretical review of Section 3.2 builds on an article about robo-advisory for the Journal
Business and Information Systems Engineering (Jung, Dorner, Glaser, & Morana, 2018), while the subsequent part of
Section 3 builds on a three-cycle design sciences study in Electronic Markets - The International Journal on Networked
Business (Jung, Dorner, Weinhardt, & Pusmaz, 2017). Other sources of this section are marked as such.
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benets. Customers prefer hybrid solutions, allowing them to search for information and
compare available products online, but still request human advisory before committing to
an investment. Considering the bank and robo-advisor perspective, a combination of these
services provides the opportunity to target the mass of less-wealthy customers, but also to
generate additional revenue through separate fees (e.g. advisory in a branch is given for free,
but robo-advisory phone support or additional features for security or access can be charged
in relation to the eort required of the advisor). Furthermore, the robo-advisory business
model is easily scalable, rendering the service an interesting business model from the service
provider’s perspective.
Figure 13: The digitalization of nancial advisory services towards digital platform (based on
Sironi, 2016).
3.2 Robo-Advisory and Financial Decision Support Systems
Recent robo-advisors are digital platforms comprising interactive and intelligent user assis-
tance components (Maedche, Morana, Schacht, Werth, & Krumeich, 2016) that use informa-
tion technology (IT) to guide customers through an automated (investment) advisory process
(Phoon & Koh, 2017; Sironi, 2016; Ludden et al., 2015). In particular, robo-advisors dier from
existing online investment platforms or online brokerage on two dierent conceptual levels:
customer assessment, and customer portfolio management. The term robo-advisor is currently
almost exclusively used in the context of nancial investment advisory where robo-advisory
increasingly replaces the classic retail customer advisory process. However, the generic con-
cept of robo-advisory could be transferred to other domains such as health care or the real
estate industry. In this work, I focus on nancial robo-advisory in accordance with the pre-
vailing meaning of the term.
Considering the customer assessment, robo-advisors extend existing advisory solutions, be-
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cause they aim to transform the complete traditional, human-to-human advisory process into
a digital, human-to-computer process. Traditional investor proling conducted during in-
person interviews and bilateral interaction is replaced by online questionnaires and self-reporting
processes. The user’s investment goals and purposes, risk anity and aversion, and return and
risk expectations are quantied by algorithms and automated processes on digital platforms.
The assessment is not limited to risk proling but can also include ethical and sector-specic
preferences, for example, a preference for Islamic banking. Hence, human interaction in robo-
advisory is limited to situations not directly related to the assessment or investment process,
including IT-support or fraud management. Due to cost-savings by the automated customer
proling, and the management of the customer life-cycle, robo-advisors target the retail cus-
tomer or non-professional segment, regardless of the user’s actual wealth.
In addition, the customer portfolio management of robo-advisors diers from that of existing
approaches. Customer portfolio management is dened as the management of portfolios in-
cluding one or more nancial products, in accordance with mandates given by clients, on a
discretionary client-by-client basis (European Commission). Robo-advisory is predominantly
based on products that require no or less active portfolio management like an "Exchange
Traded Funds (ETF)". These funds replicate indices and hence require no active decision-
making by portfolio managers regarding security selection and allocation. Cost structures
are therefore often comparably simple and easier to communicate. The strategic asset alloca-
tion is based on the risk-prole of the customer and determined by a quantitative model. This
combination of instrument and allocation selection can be fully automated and hence can
considerably reduce management costs. The provisioning of the whole service via an online
platform additionally reduces personnel and asset costs, while a higher number of customers
can be served. The low complexity of these products makes them easier to explain to a wide
range of customers along with other portfolio management-related advantages of ETFs.
With respect to customer portfolio management, robo-advisors can be further conceptualized
into two distinct groups: active or passive regarding portfolio management, and dynamic or
static regarding customer assessment. If the investment strategy and portfolio construction
approach are xed after the initial adjustment to a customer’s prole, I classify the approach as
static robo-advisory. The robo-advisor performs automated rebalancing only if the portfolio
composition deviates from the optimum, for example, due to market developments. I further
distinguish the rebalancing process. If the rebalancing is fully quantitative, I classify it as
passive. If the investor only receives rebalancing suggestions and decides in self-directed ways
the actual execution, I classify it as active.
In the case that the customer can adjust the overall strategy in a discretionary way at later
points in time (e.g. change investment goals and volumes, reassess risk attitude), I classify
the approach as dynamic robo-advisory. Furthermore, in contrast to previous digital services
of online brokers or recommender systems, robo-advisors provide more sophisticated user
interaction components (push notications for market updates, opportunity and risk alerts,
dashboards, periodic portfolio reviews) and automated execution, while optionally allowing
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for self-directed, discretionary intervention by the customer (development of a nancial plan,
integration of external accounts, or comparison of fees). In summary, the level of automation
is comparably high. Figure 14 summarizes the previous conceptualization of robo-advisory.
Figure 14: Key characteristics of robo-advisory, organized in two clusters: assessment and
management.
Robo-advisory platforms target customers, who cannot invest as much money as traditional
wealth managers expect as a minimum investment (Ludden et al., 2015). Moreover, as market
leader platforms residing in the U.S. demonstrate, robo-advisors attract the targeted customers
with increasing success: For instance, the start-up Wealthfront accumulated 1 billion assets
under management in less than 2.5 years after its market entry (Vincent, Laknidhi, Klein, &
Gera, 2015). The volume managed by robo-advisors continous to grow, and it is currently
estimated to have exceeded 20 billion in globally investable assets (Vincent et al., 2015). Opti-
mistic forecasts predict that robo-advisors will manage 10 % of the whole wealth management
industry by 2020 (Kocianski, 2016).
Given the contemporary digitalization of banking in combination with the interaction be-
tween provider and customer in the nancial context, robo-advisors represent a promising
research area that deserves more attention in the eld of information systems. Robo-advisory
is a young and nascent business model, and research focusing on understanding and design-
ing robo-advisors remains scarce. Existing (design) knowledge on related systems within the
IS domain could be adapted and extended for robo-advisors. For instance, the robo-advisor
Anlage-Finder or Max Blue operated by Deutsche Bank failed on its rst attempt due to legal
problems and a sub-optimal user-experience (Dohms & Schreiber, 2017); it later relaunched as
Robin. Hence, research on decision support, decision aids, product congurators, and recom-
mender systems provide a valuable foundation that can support researchers and practitioners
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to better understand and design robo-advisors.
3.3 Problem and Solution Requirements
This section addresses the question of how to design robo-advisory solutions for unexperi-
enced users. Prior research in information systems has indicated that transforming sensitive
communication processes – such as nancial advisory – from human to IT-based commu-
nication conicts with human cognition and expectations and that the digitalization of hu-
man advisory is a dicult task (see Section 1). Recent research on consumer expectations of
robo-advisory shows that – apart from quality of service – transparency, trust-building and
the balancing of information asymmetries (Ruf et al., 2016; Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, &
Schwabe, 2012; Nussbaumer, Matter, & Schwabe, 2012) are core issues in the design of dig-
ital robo-advisory solutions. Hence, the design of the user interface plays a crucial role in
the speed with which such transformations are adopted and the level of resistance that users
display towards them.
In this design science study, I examine the relationship between transparency, trust, informa-
tion quality, information usability, and the consumer decision to invest (or not), from a design
science perspective (Peers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007; Vaishnavi & Kuech-
ler, 2015). In an iterative procedure, I identify requirements and derive design principles, im-
plement them in a web-based robo-advisory service and evaluate them in two mixed-method
studies. The design principles guided my design process, and I will show that they increase
the quality of the robo-advisor. My study is the rst to focus on a user-centric perspective on
robo-advisory design, with prior research mainly grounded in expert evaluations.
The main objective of this study is to design a robo-advisor that supports risk-averse con-
sumers with little prior investment experience and relatively small savings to come to an
investment decision. A robo-advisor is an “automated investment solution which engages
individuals with digital tools featuring advanced customer experience, to guide them through
a self-assessment process and shape their investment behaviour towards rudimentary goal-
based decision-making, conveniently supported by portfolio rebalancing techniques using
trading algorithms based on passive investments and diversication strategies“ (Sironi, 2016).
As a result, the advisory process of a robo-advisor is based on the traditional process of nan-
cial advisory.
Traditional human advisory services are structured in four (Cocca et al., 2016) to six major
phases (Nueesch, Zerndt, Alt, & Ferretti, 2016; Nueesch, Puschmann, & Alt, 2014), and there
exists no established advisory process for digital service systems like robo-advisory. Dierent
aspects of digitalized nancial advisory have been discussed in the literature (Kilic, Heinrich,
& Schwabe, 2015; Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012; Nussbaumer, Matter, &
Schwabe, 2012), which can be synthesized into the following three-phase approach. Based on
Phoon and Koh (2017); Sironi (2016); Kilic et al. (2015); Nueesch et al. (2014); Nussbaumer,
Matter, à Porta, and Schwabe (2012), I suggest to condensing the human advisory process to
52
the following three phases of robo-advisory: conguration, matching and customization, and
maintenance.
In the rst phase, the conguration phase, the information asymmetry between customer and
advisor is reduced (Kilic et al., 2015). This phase corresponds to the initiation, proling, and
concept and assessment phases of human advisory. In the next phase, the matching and cus-
tomization phase, the gathered information is transformed into an investment recommenda-
tion. With the help of appropriate algorithms, customers receive recommendations that best
t their needs. The customers then decide to which of these oers they want to commit. If
no recommendations meet their perceived needs, customers can recongure their proles to
receive alternative investment recommendations. Compared to other product conguration
tools (like car conguration or clothing conguration), the characteristics of nancial prod-
ucts can change unexpectedly (e.g. value or risk). Hence, during the maintenance phase, the
dierence between the actual needs and the recommendation has to be revised regularly, and
recongurations of the product (rebalancing) need to be initiated in case of a substantial devi-
ation due to economic developments or the changes of customer needs. Figure 15 depicts the
process of a robo-advisor (Phoon & Koh, 2017; Sironi, 2016; Nueesch et al., 2014).
Figure 15: Iterative process of robo-advisory matched with a traditional wealth management
process.
Based on this theoretical process model, I will now discuss and derive the main challenges of
the digitalization of human advisory towards robo-advisory.
In the product conguration phase of a digital advisory service, the information asymmetry be-
tween customer and advisor is supposed to be reduced (Kilic et al., 2015; Nussbaumer, Matter,
à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012). In a traditional advisory process, the advisor prepares the meeting
with the customer (initiation), collects the customer’s needs and wishes and identies the cus-
tomer targets during the meeting (proling) (Phoon & Koh, 2017; Nueesch et al., 2014). Based
on this information, the advisor develops a concept (Nueesch et al., 2014). In robo-advisory,
these steps correspond to a product conguration process, where consumers translate their
goals into a product specication by selecting and assessing options within a predened pro-
duct model (T. Hansen, Scheer, & Loos, 2003). Information asymmetries are reduced by the
robo-advisor collecting data on the customer’s nancial situation and building a knowledge
base of customer input (and behaviour, depending on which algorithms are deployed), and by
the customer collecting and processing information about the robo-advisory process. Pro-
blems in this phase arise when information collection processes are too rigid and customers
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and advisors are “coerced into completeness” (Kilic et al., 2015). In this case, every single step
of the information-collection process is discussed, which can lead to information overload and
persisting information asymmetries (Kilic et al., 2015).
In the matching phase, the collected data is processed to yield a recommendation, and the
recommendation is presented to the customer. The main goal is to transform customer input
into a specic recommendation, explain to the customer how well their individual needs and
wishes match the recommended portfolio, and describe the next steps of the advisory process
(Nueesch et al., 2014). In robo-advisory, algorithms are employed to compute recommenda-
tions based on the input from the conguration phase. The customer then investigates these
recommendations and can decide to invest in one or several of these recommendations. Prob-
lems in this phase arise when needs and recommendations are not well matched, which can
lead to nancial losses such as missed prot opportunities or, more severely, loss of invested
capital. Mismatches occur for many reasons, for instance unexpected asset developments,
lack of competence on part of the advisor, or deliberate steering of customers towards in-
vesting in products promoted by the advisor’s employer. The latter in particular has led to
decreasing customer trust in bank advisors (Ruf et al., 2016) and probably poses an obstacle to
robo-advisory usage when conicts of interest arise (Securities & Commission, 2015) but are
not made suciently transparent. Prior research has highlighted transparency in the robo-
advisory process as one of the main concerns of (potential) customers (Nussbaumer, Matter, à
Porta, & Schwabe, 2012; Nussbaumer & Matter, 2011).
In the monitoring phase, the advisor tracks asset performance and reacts to (expected) changes
by rebalancing the portfolio. In robo-advisory, this task is essentially identical. Usually, trad-
ing algorithms automatically monitor and adjust investments according to consumers’ goals.
Communication and transparency are key factors in this phase for building and retaining cus-
tomer trust. These factors prose considerable challenge for the design of robo-advisors (Ruf
et al., 2016).
Having this discussion in mind, I base my subsequent research on the design science method
(Peers et al., 2007). Design science is a research method to generate knowledge by an iterative
evaluation of a design process of an IT artefact. It consists of the following phases: (i) problem
identication, (ii) suggestion of key concepts to address these problems, (iii) development of a
solution design, (iv) demonstration, (v) evaluation of the solution, and (vi) communication of
central ndings (Peers et al., 2007).
3.4 Requirements Identication
My focus is the identication of design principles and requirements from the point of view of
users with little investment experience and relatively small savings. For that purpose, I identify
design principles used in my subsequent research. Design principles guide the design process
by limiting the design space and helping to guide design decisions, reducing the complexity of
the design process and helping to achieve a high level of design quality (Haki & Legner, 2013).
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Figure 16: Design science research methodology based on Peers et al. (2007).
To this end, I rst carried out a literature review to determine the state-of-the-art of robo-
advisor user-interface design (Webster & Watson, 2002). The meta search engine Google
Scholar was used to search for sources containing the terms “robo advisor” in combination
with “ntech”, “investment”, “transparency”, “nancial decision support” and “design”, and
“interface” or “usability” in the title, the abstract or the keywords. The search specied no
range of years and yielded over 10,000 papers. By scanning titles and abstracts, I reduced this
set to 61 potentially relevant studies. A backward search (Webster & Watson, 2002) yielded an-
other 39 potentially relevant studies. Of these, only seven studies focused on the user-centric
design of robo-advisory solutions. The other publications dealt with a range of other robo-
advisory and FinTech-related topics, for instance the performance of dierent automatic asset
allocation strategies (Musto, Semeraro, Lops, De Gemmis, & Lekkas, 2015), or how FinTech
innovations aect traditional banks’ competitiveness (Alt & Puschmann, 2016). All identied
research focuses on expert-based evaluation. To the best of my knowledge, no prior research
has taken the user-centric view when investigating requirements and design principles for
automated solutions in advisory. I set out to ll this gap.
Table 8: Identied requirements for robo-advisory services based on a systematic literature
review.
Design Requirement Key References
Ease of Interaction MR1.1 Ease of Navigation
How well control elements of the robo-
advsior are integrated and how they are
perceived by the user
Ruf et al. (2016); Ruf, Back,
Bergmann, and Schlegel (2015);
Nueesch et al. (2014); Korner and
Zimmermann (2000); “ISO 9241
Ergonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
Continued on next page
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MR1.2 Controllability
Degree to which users have control over
dialogues and behaviour of the robo-
advisor
Ruf et al. (2016); Nueesch et
al. (2014); Nussbaumer, Matter, à
Porta, and Schwabe (2012); Korner
and Zimmermann (2000); “ISO 9241
Ergonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
MR1.3 Structural Consistency
Consistent formal layout and content
structure
Ruf et al. (2016); “ISO 9241 Er-
gonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
MR1.4 Error Tolerance
How well the robo-advisor deals with
user- or system-induced errors
Ruf et al. (2016); “ISO 9241 Er-
gonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
Work Eciency MR2.1 Eectiveness
How well the robo-advisor helps users to
achieve their goals with a certain accuracy,
completeness or reliability
Ruf et al. (2015); Möwes,
Puschmann, and Alt (2011);
“ISO 9241 Ergonomic require-
ments for oce work with visual
display terminals (VDTs)” (2018)
MR2.2 Eciency
Reasonable relationship between required
eort to use the robo-advisory solution
and the accuracy with which user goals
are attained
Ruf et al. (2015); “ISO 9241 Er-
gonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
Information Process-
ing and Cognitive
Load
MR3.1 Expectation Conformity
How well the user interface relates to the
knowledge and experience of the user
Ruf et al. (2016, 2015); Nuss-
baumer, Matter, à Porta, and
Schwabe (2012); “ISO 9241 Er-
gonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
MR3.2 Ease of Understanding
How much cognitive load is associated
with understanding the retrieved informa-
tion throughout the robo-advisory process
Ruf et al. (2016, 2015); “ISO 9241
Ergonomic requirements for oce
work with visual display terminals
(VDTs)” (2018)
MR3.3 Social Presence
Degree to which the communicators be-
hind the robo-advisor are perceived as be-
ing present or real
Ruf et al. (2016, 2015); Korner and
Zimmermann (2000)
Transparency MR4.1 Cost Transparency
How easily cost or pricing models are
found and understood
Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, and
Schwabe (2012)
Continued on next page
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MR4.2 Process Transparency
Level of following, comprehension of the
possible activities and their succession in
advisory
Ruf et al. (2016); Kilic et al. (2015);
Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, and
Schwabe (2012)
MR4.3 Information Transparency
Ability of the user to monitor and un-
derstand information, transparency about
why certain data is needed from the user,
and what happens to the data
Ruf et al. (2016); Nussbaumer, Mat-
ter, à Porta, and Schwabe (2012);
Alt and Puschmann (2012); Möwes
et al. (2011)
Second, I consulted literature and guidelines for interactive systems interface design for generic,
standard design recommendations. In particular, I referred to the EN ISO norms 9241-110
and 9241-210 which summarize general design requirements for user interfaces, thus broadly
dening relevant concepts and suggesting best practices. The basic principles for designing
interactive systems, specically human-computer dialogues, are suitability for the task, suit-
ability for learning, suitability for individualisation, conformity with user expectations, self-
descriptiveness, controllability, and error tolerance (EN ISO 9241-110). Based on my literature
review, I derived twelve main meta-requirements and four design principles for the design of
robo-advisors (Table 8).
Third, I circulated and discussed these requirements informally with robo-advisory and Fin-
Tech experts at our research institution, at banks, and at FinTech consultancies. Building
on the ndings of the expert discussions and the literature review, I consolidated our set of
requirements into four design principles (Figure 17). Following Haki and Legner (2013), I care-
fully sifted out non-principles when consolidating my requirements (for instance, the experts
mentioned goals pertaining to how a robo-advisor could increase revenues) to make sure that
the principles I identify can indeed provide guidance for design decisions that “bridge strategy
and design” (Haki & Legner, 2013, p.5).
• DP1 Ease of interaction
General requirements concerning interaction with the artefact
• DP2 Work eciency
Support the users’ ability to achieve their goals in an adequate time-eort relation
• DP3 Information processing and cognitive load
Assist the user in information processing and understanding of the conguration
• DP4 Advisory transparency
Provide cost, process, and information transparency
In the following, I briey discuss each design principle and the meta-requirements from they
are derived.
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Figure 17: Meta-requirements, design principles and related design decisions.
3.4.1 Design Principle 1 (DP1) – Ease of Interaction
Information systems research has long identied (perceived) complexity as an important de-
terminant of whether and how fast innovative information systems are adopted (Nueesch et
al., 2014). Perceived complexity is determined, largely by ease of use, which has been cited as
an important requirement for mobile nancial advisory solutions (e.g., Ruf et al., 2015). Ease
of use actually implies two further design requirements for a robo-advisory solution: ease of
navigation, for example how well control elements of the robo-advisor are integrated and how
easily they are found by the user (Nielsen, 1999), and controllability, for example the degree to
which users have control over dialogues and behaviour of the robo-advisor (EN ISO 9241-110).
A high degree of "ease of navigation" is evidenced, for example, in self-explanatory and easily
located website menus (Nielsen, 1999). A high degree of controllability is obtained, for exam-
ple, by giving users the opportunity to control direction and speed of processes according to
their needs (going back, retrieving additional information etc.).
Structural consistency refers to the formal layout and the content structure of the navigation,
interaction, and control elements. A high degree of consistency is derived in a uniform usage
of colour coding or symbols for the same behaviours of the robo-advisor, and increases the
self-descriptiveness of interaction options (EN ISO 9241-110). Error tolerance refers to how
well the robo-advisor deals with user- or system-induced errors – for instance, hitting the
“back” button during a payments process or inputting invalid data (EN ISO 9241-110).
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Hence, I identify the requirements ease of navigation (MR1.1), controllability (MR1.2), struc-
tural consistency (MR1.3), and error tolerance (MR1.4).
3.4.2 Design Principle 2 (DP2) – Work Eciency
Another important determinant of adoption and acceptance of innovative information sys-
tems is perceived advantageousness. Perceived advantageousness relates to how useful the
IS is perceived in relation to other IT solutions (Nueesch et al., 2014). The usefulness of a
robo-advisory solution can be understood in terms of how eectively and eciently the robo-
advisor supports the users in achieving their goals, i.e. nding and investing in an investment
product that matches their needs and goals. This meta-requirement is grounded in the eort-
accuracy framework (J. W. Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), which describes the relationship
between user satisfaction, the eort required to achieve a goal and the quality of the achieved
goal. User satisfaction increases, ceteris paribus, with reduced eort or increased quality. In
this sense, I term the second group of requirements the "work eciency dimension" and divide
it into the two requirements eectiveness and eciency.
Eectiveness describes users’ ability to achieve their goals with a certain accuracy, complete-
ness or reliability. In terms of robo-advisory, a highly eective robo-advisor provides all the in-
formation the user needs to make the investment decision in a comprehensible fashion. While
high net-worth individuals value proactive information pushing (Ruf et al., 2015), this form of
communication appears not to be a major concern for our target group. Their nancial situa-
tion likely does not permit multiple (re-)investments, and the relative advantage of changing
investments tends to shrink rapidly with the amount invested. Some research even suggests
that regular investment updates may be counter-productive, nudging risk-averse consumers
into making more frequent and less benecial re-investment decisions due to fear of losses
(Looney & Hardin, 2009).
Eciency refers to the relationship between required eort to use the robo-advisory solution
and the accuracy and completeness with which the associated goal of using it is attained. An
ecient robo-advisor provides investment alternatives in an adequate time and reduces the
conguration steps to a necessary minimum, helping customers to decide more quickly.
Hence, I identify the requirements eectiveness (MR2.1) and eciency (MR2.2) as the work-
eciency requirements for a robo-advisor.
3.4.3 Design Principle 3 (DP3) – Information Processing and Cognitive Load
Another aspect in the design of robo-advisors is supporting consumers in the processing of
information, and considering their cognitive limitations and their expectations towards com-
munication and interaction modes (Ruf et al., 2016). Considering that the consumers in our
target group are inexperienced, risk-averse consumers, they will need to absorb much new in-
formation, but lack the mental schemata for fast categorization and processing (Nielsen, 1999).
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Hence, expectation conformity, ease of understanding and social presence play a large role in
developing robo-advisors for this user group.
Expectation conformity means that the dialogue and the user interface relate to the knowledge
and experience of the user, for instance from eld of work, education, or generally accepted
guidelines. If they do, the robo-advisor is less likely to be perceived as contradictory or con-
fusing, and it will be easier for users to construct new mental models of the robo-advisory
process.
Whether users will be condent in making their decisions depends greatly on whether or
not the relevant information is easily available and understandable. While ease of interac-
tion refers to the user’s interaction with the robo-advisor (MR1.1-1.4) and eciency refers to
the degree of eort required to achieve the goal of enacting a suitable investment (MR.2.2),
ease of understanding refers to how much cognitive load is associated with understanding
the retrieved information throughout the robo-advisory process. High ease of understanding
is associated with a relatively short time and few cognitive resources required to understand
investment-related information and the robo-advisory process. That easy understanding does
not imply leaving out information is stressed in DP4 (Transparency).
Social presence describes the degree to which the communicators behind the robo-advisor
are perceived as "present" or "real" (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976). Nussbaumer and col-
leagues suggest that this requirement is crucial for the success of robo-advisors since they
lack by design human feedback and communication, which in turn is often perceived as lack
of transparency on the part of the robo-advisor (Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe,
2012; Nussbaumer, Matter, & Schwabe, 2012).
Hence, I identify the requirements expectation conformity (MR3.1), ease of understanding
(MR3.2) and social presence (MR3.3).
3.4.4 Design Principle 4 (DP4) – Advisory Transparency
In the context of IT-supported human advisory services, Nussbaumer et al. (2012) have found
that customers are xedly concerned with cost transparency, process transparency and infor-
mation transparency. Highly transparent designs are associated with increases in customer
satisfaction and willingness to pay. Cost transparency has two components: Customers must
be able to easily nd information on costs, and they need to understand eaily the cost struc-
ture. Costs of recommendation products like portfolio, inuencing directly the eective return
(Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012; Nussbaumer, Matter, & Schwabe, 2012). Pro-
cess transparency relates to how easy one can follow and understand activities and their suc-
cession in the advisory process (Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012; Nussbaumer,
Matter, & Schwabe, 2012). Information transparency, nally, refers to providing the customer
with clarity on why certain information is needed during the advisory process, and the “de-
gree of the client being enabled to monitor and comprehend the information used as the basis
of decision-making and to assess their [decision’s] quality and suitability” (Nussbaumer et al.,
60
2012, p.4). Kilic and colleagues (2015) have examined how process rigidity during the rst
phase of advisory, namely information collection, aects the relationship between customer
and advisor. Since the goal of this phase is reducing information asymmetries, a phenomenon
called “coercing into completeness” may occur (Kilic et al. 2015). This describes interactions
between customer and advisor where every single bit of information, regardless of its rela-
tive importance for the particular customer, is discussed “for the sake of completeness”. Pro-
cess rigidity can exacerbate this phenomenon, which is generally linked to negative outcomes
regarding understanding and transparency, thus perpetuating information asymmetries. A
number of studies deal with the question of how to establish an appropriate level of detail
in customer-advisor interactions to ensure all relevant information is provided but the cus-
tomer is not overwhelmed (Kilic et al., 2015; Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012;
Nussbaumer, Matter, & Schwabe, 2012).
Hence, I identify the requirements cost transparency (MR4.1), process transparency (MR4.2),
and information transparency and privacy (MR4.3).
Next, I conducted benchmark research identiying current robo-advisory platforms that cater
to inexperienced, risk-averse, and less wealthy consumers (Asset Builder, Betterment, Cash-
board, Easyfolio, Future Advisor, Hedgeable, Jemstep, Learnvest, Personal Capital, Money-
farm, Schwab Intelligent, SigFig, Trizic, Upside Advisor, Vaamo, Vanguard Personal, Wealth-
front, Wise Banyan). Since these consumers generally do not wish to (or are not able to) invest
large sums and are likely price-sensitive, I focused on robo-advisors that do not require an ac-
count minimum and do not charge set-up fees. I carefully analysed these robo-advisors in
order to check the applicability of our requirements and design principles and to check our
list for completeness.
3.5 Design, Development and Demonstration
This section describes the iterative consumer-centric approach I followed for designing and
developing a robo-advisory solution that would adhere to the identied requirements. One
common approach in usability engineering is the scenario-based approach (Rosson & Car-
roll, 2002). This approach places the user and the user’s needs at the center of all design and
development activities. As recommended by Peers et al. (2007), I iterated dierent design
cycles to design and develop the robo-advisor. The robo-advisory design requirements were
implemented and evaluated in collaboration with a partner company that had just begun de-
velopment of their robo-advisory solution, explicitly targeting inexperienced, risk-averse and
non-high-net-worth users. In the rst design cycle, I implemented a prototype of the robo-
advisor to provide a proof-of-concept. In the second design cycle, I developed a pre-nal
version of the robo-advisor and in the third design cycle, I evaluated the live robo-advisor. In
order to reduce development complexity, I decomposed the process into sub-problems (MR1
to MR4) as proposed by Peers et al. (2007).
Design Cycle One: The main goal of the rst design cycle was a rst evaluation of the arte-
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fact prototype. Furthermore, I conducted a series of expert interviews with employees at the
case company to gather relevant problems and challenges. The research team examined the
robo-advisory solution independently to assess how well it fullled the requirements. The re-
search and development teams were staed separately which helped solicit a broader opinion
base unfettered by “doability” concerns. The identied design principles were evaluated in a
qualitative focus group with employees of the case company.
Design Cycle Two: The goal of the second design cycle was to provide a systematic evalu-
ation of the design in a laboratory setting. In particular, I evaluated the two phases product
conguration and matching. Robo-advisory design was evaluated in a mixed-method exper-
imental usability study. The study investigated the adoption of the robo-advisor by subjects
belonging to the target customer group. The ndings of the rst study were analysed and
discussed with leading employees of the case company.
Design Cycle Three: The third design cycle served to rene my design principles and to
evaluate the design decisions I made based on the results from the second cycle. After being
adjusted to suit the previous ndings, the design requirements were executed in a fully func-
tional system. The artefact was evaluated in a mixed-method experimental usability study. In
cooperation with the case company, the requirements were discussed and a design framework
was derived (see Section 3.7).
3.6 Evaluation
I adopted a mixed-method approach to evaluate the robo-advisory solution following the de-
sign science method in cycle 2 and cycle 3 (Peers et al., 2007). In both studies, I used screen
recording, the think-aloud method, and standardised and non-standardised questionnaires to
investigate user behaviour. In the second study, I combined these measures with the scenario
technique, click-stream analysis and a standardized risk test (Holt & Laury, 2005).
Think-aloud protocol: The think aloud protocol is a popular method for user-centric usabil-
ity studies (Jaspers, Steen, Van Den Bos, & Geenen, 2004) and has been applied successfully
in the development of information systems. This method aims to determine how users expe-
rience a system, especially when solving a problem or performing a task within it. The user
is asked to use the system while verbalizing everything that goes through their minds. The
think-aloud protocol is well suited to detect usability problems such as cognitive overload or
inappropriate representations. I prepared interview guidelines to make sure that all require-
ments would be commented upon. The interviewer was briefed to remind users to verbalize
their thoughts in case they remained quiet for more than 30 seconds and, in case the user did
not comment upon a requirement, to elicit the user’s opinion on it. I recorded the interviews
and transcribed them for analysis.
Screen recording: The previously illustrated think-aloud method is often combined with
screen recording or screen casting, which helps one to interpret and understand the user in-
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tentions better than based on audio recording alone. In both studies, I recorded user behaviour
with Camtasia studio and used the audio and video le to transcribe the user comments from
the think aloud-method (Nielsen, 1999).
Questionnaires: In both studies, I used questionnaires to collect demographic characteristics.
I also surveyed the participants’ level of nancial knowledge and opinions of nancial products
in general and of robo-advisory in particular.
Click-stream analysis: This method describes the recording of the clicking behaviour of
users while browsing or using specic software applications. It is a method established for
tracking and studying consumers’ decision-making processes (Senecal, Kalczynski, & Nantel,
2005) and in usability design (Ting, Kimble, & Kudenko, 2005). I used the log les to track user
interactions with the robo-advisor and in order to check whether perceived behaviour corre-
sponded with real behaviour (e.g. perceived vs. real amount of scrolling through information
pages).
Risk test: Researchers in economics and psychology have developed dierent questionnaire
and scales to measure and describe the risk attitudes of decision makers. Some of the most
commonly used methods are multiple price lists or lotteries (Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013),
where decision makers are asked to select from paired gambles with dierent risks. By com-
puting the utility of each gamble, risk attitudes can be estimated. I used the multiple price list
as proposed by Holt and Laury (2005). This list allowed us to separate risk-averse user from
risk-neutral users, and to compare these groups in my evaluation.
Friendly user and scenario: Scenario techniques are a popular method to encourage the
user to behave more naturally, and to help them begin a task. In the third design cycle (second
experimental study) I asked users to inform themselves about a private investment with a
specic goal (e.g., holiday, car). Users were then asked to form an opinion on whether the
robo-advisor would be helpful to achieve this goal (Rosson & Carroll, 2002).
Participants and setting: The pretests for both studies were performed in Karlsruhe Deci-
sion and Design Lab (KD2Lab). Participants were aged between 18 and 26 (n=30, male=16) and
recruited using a standard recruitment tool for laboratory experiments, ORSEE (Greiner et al.,
2004). In the rst study (n=11, male=7), participants received 12 Euros each as incentive to
participate. In the second study (n=19, male=9), they participated in exchange for a participa-
tion payment of 8 Euros and a performance-based payment (risk questionnaire) between 0.10
and 3.85 Euros. In the rst study, I elicited participants’ risk aversion informally. In the second
study, I used the Holt and Laury’s (2005) risk test. Nearly all participants (13) were risk-averse.
Three participants were risk-neutral and three tests were lled in incorrectly.
3.7 Findings and Communication
Prior to starting the product conguration process, participants interacted with the website in
order to nd more information on the robo-advisory provider, on prices, on general product
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information (e.g. how an investment fund works) and on terms of service. The evaluation of
design principle 1 (Ease of interaction) and its related requirements showed, in both studies,
that participants paid close attention to it and that they used it as an informational cue for
robo-advisory trustworthiness. Several participants in the rst study made similar remarks
to the eect that failure to nd the menu button and to orient themselve on the homepage
(MR1.1 Ease of navigation) made them question the integrity of the robo-advsior: "The web-
site is a mess – I wonder whether they work as sloppily as they design their website". The
menu display was changed for the second study (DD1.1) at which point it no longer attracted
complaints. The design decision DD1.2 of implementing one long scrollable website for easier
navigation and controllability (MR1.2) and easier switching between handheld mobile devices
and stationary computers received mixed remarks in the rst study. This was mainly due to
confusing links: "When I click on a link, I jump somewhere on the website and don’t under-
stand where I am or how to get back...". This problem is popularly termed the lost in hyperspace
problem (Hardman & Edwards, 1989). Nearly all participants reported this issue, which was
associated with increased reluctance to trust the robo-advisors recommendations and dissat-
isfaction with both the conguration process and the product. Changes on the website to
reduce “jumping” led to a much more positive evaluation in the second study, where the web-
site concept was lauded as modern and up-to-date. Structural inconsistencies (MR1.3) make it
dicult and confusing for users to interact with the robo-adivsor. Several participants voiced
discontent regarding the implementation of this requirement: "I am not sure if the pictures
are supposed to link to somewhere. Some keywords look like links or interaction elements
for me...". This issue was partially solved between the rst and the second study through a
closer link between elements’ functionality and their “look and feel” (DD1.3), leading to a de-
crease in critical comments. Error tolerance (MR1.4) was an issue in the rst evaluation study,
where hitting the browser’s "back" button would result in expired empty screens. Violations
of design principle 1 (ease of interaction) were often commented on with reference to design
principle 3 (assist in easy cognitive processing of information related to investment decision
and advisory process): "All this scrolling past so much information is exhausting. I have to
spend so much eort on understanding the website that I don’t feel like spending eort on
understanding the products...".
Issues pertaining to design principle 2 (work eciency) were raised by many participants of
the rst study. Specically, they felt that the conguration step was confusing. Some consid-
ered the functionality of the conguration interface to be counter-intuitive (violation of MR3.1
expectation conformity) which reduced their trust in the t of the proposed investment to their
goals (MR2.1 eectiveness). The layout of the conguration interface was changed between
the rst and second study to align the “look and feel” of the website with its expected function-
ality, which resulted in much more positive user comments. Some were looking for easy access
to additional information during, not before, the conguration process: "Oh, I wish I could go
back to the page that explains what an ETF is". The robo-advisor was changed accordingly
(DD2.1) and this issue was not raised again in the second study. On a more general level, this
observation ts with a range of other comments by participants on whether the robo-advisor
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provided enough information for them to feel they could make a goal-directed decision: "Well,
I would probably consult an external comparison website before making a decision – the robo-
advisor gives a lot of information, but I value an independent opinion". Interestingly, many
said they would rely on the opinion of their parents. With regard to eciency (MR 2.2 e-
ciency), participants asked for better support in comparing dierent investment alternatives –
"I cannot compare more than two alternatives with the current graphic design". For the second
study, I implemented an interactive design element to support direct comparisons between in-
vestment alternatives (DD2.2). This design shiftsubstantially reduced the number of negative
comments on this issue in the second study. Violations of design principle 2 were commented
on with reference to design principle 3: "For the comparison, I actually have to remember the
names of the alternatives I want to compare. That is exhausting". Overall, design principle 2
was evaluated much more positively in the second study.
Design principle 3 (Information processing and cognitive load) received mixed comments in
the rst study and predominantly positive comments in the second. This improvement was
due to changes to the robo-advisor regarding two underlying requirements. Expectation con-
formity was improved upon by a more intuitive design for the conguration interface. Social
presence was improved upon by giving more details about the employees of the company, in-
cluding pictures and links to social business network proles (DD3.1): "Wow, these are actual
people! That makes the robo-advisor much more trustworthy, in my opinion". Clickstream
analysis showed that they spent quite a long time perusing social information. Several partic-
ipants, especially females, mentioned that they would denitely want to contact the company
by telephone before making an investment, not necessarily because they had questions that
were not answered on the website, but just because "I would feel better about the investment
after talking to a real person". Ease of understanding was commented upon positively in both
studies: "They do a really good job explaining dicult nance concepts, with examples and
in short sentences, and in a very friendly fashion". Participants voiced criticism regarding the
amount of text: "There is so much text! Can’t they use more visual explanations?". In the sec-
ond design cycle, textual explanations were shortened and made less technical (DD3.2), and
explanatory videos were added to the robo-advisor (DD3.3) and rated very favourably by most
participants, both with respect to social presence and ease of understanding. One participant
noted that he considered the videos too playful for a serious matter such as investment deci-
sions. Clickstream analysis showed that, on average, participants paid much attention to the
videos.
The evaluation of design principle 4 (Advisory transparency) showed marked improvement
from the rst to the second design cycle. Participants commented positively on the interactive
cost calculator (DD4.1) and, as clickstream analysis showed, spent much time familiarizing
themselves with the cost structure. Process transparency was overwhelmingly rated good,
but one participant noted that he felt lost during conguration: "I could not understand the
logic [of the advisory process] and did not know what to expect next". Providing more easily
understandable information on the process improved perceptions in the second study. In addi-
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tion, the business model of the robo-advisor was explained in greater detail (DD4.2) in order to
enhance both cost and process transparency. Information transparency was rated as good, for
one because it was easy to understand, for another because most participants found the nec-
essary information fast, except for comparisons to other robo-advisors. One issue in the rst
study was missing information on the portfolios’ underlying assets, which was added prior to
the second study (DD4.3). One participant noted, "I have the feeling that some information is
missing, but could not explain exactly which information". Participants in the second study
reported, on average, better understanding of and higher satisfaction with the products. Sev-
eral participants explicitly noted that the interactive comparison element for portfolios, and
the resulting increase in information transparency, weighed positively in their considerations
of whether to invest with this robo-advisor.
Overall, about half the participants in the second study (n=9) indicated that they would be
willing to invest money with the robo-advisor and that they felt the website left an impres-
sion of trustworthiness. This impression signals a marked improvement over the rst study,
where the majority of parti-
cipants did not consider the robo-advisor trustworthy and would not have considered invest-
ing money with it. The most frequent answers given in the second study were similar to the
following participant’s: "I would start o with a small amount, see how it goes and if it per-
forms well and I feel comfortable with it, I’ll consider investing more". Several participants did
stress, however, that they would denitely want to speak to a human advisor before investing
with the robo-advisor, either through the robo-advisor’s hotline or at their current bank. In-
terestingly, when asked why, most participants were not primarily concerned with obtaining
specic additional information (e.g., comparisons with other advisors or products) but rather
with talking to a real person. "If they could convince me in a personal meeting that they are
trustworthy, I would denitely invest". The remainder of the participants were split between
“undecided” and “opposed” towards an investment. Undecided participants mostly noted that
they would take more time to compare with other robo-advisors and bank products. The re-
luctant participants, frequently explained that they would invest only with a human advisor
or do their own research on investment, and that they did not feel they wanted to risk even a
small portion of their monthly income.
Overall, participants reported that the impression of trustworthiness was one of the major fac-
tors in their attitudes towards robo-advisors. If participants said they would not invest, they
invariably reported missing trust-building aspects like press reports, testimonials, or personal
contact. Transparency and usability played a large role in shaping the impression of trustwor-
thiness. Nearly all participants who expressed an unfavourable opinion of the robo-advisor
explicitly referred to usability issues when asked to explain their opinion, for instance ex-
pressing the lost in hyperspace problem (Hardman & Edwards, 1989), as occurred in the rst
study.
None of the participants felt informed well enough to form an opinion of how good the pro-
ducts were, but very few indicated that they would be willing to educate themselves more
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thoroughly on private investment. In line with this trend, I found that simplifying and short-
ening explanations of nancial concepts between the rst and second design cycle increased,
on average, both willingness to invest on this website and average reported satisfaction with
the robo-advisor. Female participants in particular commented very favourably. The most
frequently reported reason not to invest (straight away) was transparency-related: nearly all
participants stated they would rst solicit an independent opinion of the robo-advisor’s qual-
ity and refer to robo-advisory price comparison reports and websites. The interactive product
comparison elicited positive comments and was cited as a reason to invest with this robo-
advisor.
For further communication, I summarize my results in the house of robo-advisory design,
which presents the four design principles of robo-advisory design that shape customer inten-
tion to adopt a robo-advisor (Figure 18).
Figure 18: House of robo-advisory design, with ease of interaction, work eciency and in-
formation processing dimensions as cornerstones of advisory transparency.
3.8 Discussion
My research addresses the question of how to design robo-advisory solutions for risk-averse,
low-budget, inexperienced consumers. Prior research has indicated that the accessibility and
comprehensibility of the user interface plays a large role in how fast and how reluctantly IT
innovations are adopted (see Section 1).
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study investigating the design and transformation
of digital advisory into robo-advisory from a user-centric perspective. Prior research has fo-
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cused on specic aspects of the design of IT-supported advisory, such as transparency (Kilic et
al., 2015) or service encounters (Nussbaumer, Matter, à Porta, & Schwabe, 2012). I contribute to
robo-advisory literature by identifying, implementing and evaluating four core design princi-
ples and their underlying requirements. Following a design science research process, I identify
and evaluate a broad set of design principles for building a robo-advisor interface for inexpe-
rienced, risk-averse and less auent users. My study is exploratory in nature, and provides a
better understanding of the users’ view on the digitalization of advisory services and it con-
tributes towards improving the theoretical foundations of the design of robo-advisory services.
My study is, to the best of my knowledge, the rst to identify and evaluate design principles
for robo-advisory in an iterative fashion with both experts (in the rst design cycle) and po-
tential users (in the second and third design cycles). The evaluations of the artefacts generated
during each design cycle show that guiding robo-advisor design with design principles, and
subsequent design decisions, improved usability and transparency, and furthermore users’
trust in and satisfaction with the robo-advisor improved. Social presence played a surpris-
ingly large role, with the majority of participants across both studies stating that they would
want to speak to a human advisor prior to making an investment with the robo-advisor. This
tendency was most pronounced from female participants, who commented particularly pos-
itively on the design decisions made to increase social presence. Male participants tended to
react more strongly to perceived lapses in ease of interaction; the design decisions made to
improve ease of interaction led to much more positive evaluations in the second study. Both
genders reacted positively to the design decisions taken to improve advisor transparency and
make information processing easier; only a small minority of male participants would have
preferred more “technical” and complicated explanations. All participants used the degree of
usability as a cue for trustworthiness, with inter-individual variations on how much empha-
sis they placed on each dimension. Our results support prior research in that transparency
was widely reported as the most important driver for customer trust in the product and the
robo-advisor in general.
Overall, my research suggests that the current design of robo-advisory solutions does not (yet)
suciently meet the needs and wants of risk-averse, low-budget, inexperienced consumers to
make them trust the robo-advisor and invest readily. My studies show that design issues are
explicitly used as cues for inferring the trustworthiness of the robo-advisor and its quality of
service. This nding supports our belief that our research on robo-advisory design provides
vital insights for developing solutions suitable for this consumer group. Specically, current
robo-advisors for this consumer group ought to be evaluated with regard to our proposed de-
sign principles. My evaluation study shows that many important design decisions pertain to
interface elements that are relatively easy to change and that one design decision may aect
several design principles, directly or indirectly (e.g., improving ease of understanding posi-
tively aects perceived advisor transparency). For practical applications of my research, the
design principles and the underlying meta-requirements can be used to analyse robo-advisor
interfaces and to evaluate the improvements expected in implementing our proposed design
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decisions.
In addition, my study suggests that the threshold for rst-time online investment might be too
high for this kind of consumer to overcome alone; banks considering moving customers from
human advisors to robo-advisors may want to consider developing (human) advisory plans to
gradually shift customers from one service to the other - for instance, integrating the robo-
advisory solution in human advisory processes. Otherwise, these customers are likely to prefer
the status quo, either investing nothing or relying on human advisory. Considering that banks
are continually downsizing advisory operations except for high net-worth individuals, robo-
advisory services are likely to become the only way for average and below-average income
earners to participate in nancial investment.
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4 Part II: Conceptualizing Decision Inertia
Abstract. Decision-makers tend to repeat previous choices regardless of outcome (a phenomenon
called decision inertia). In this section I review the most relevant studies concerning decision iner-
tia research in judgement and decision-making, neuroscience, and information systems. Based on
the literature review, I discuss the identied measures of decision inertia, the dierent experimen-
tal tasks used to measure it, and their characteristics. Consequently, I propose an experimental
framework for measuring and investigating decision inertia in the lab, and I derive research hy-
potheses to explain decision inertia. Relying on that theoretical groundwork and the research
hypotheses, I present three related experimental studies to investigate the drivers of decision in-
ertia. The results show that decision inertia is driven by motivational and cognitive factors, and
is a multi-determined bias. The ndings of this Part II provide a theoretical foundation to design
counter methods to overcome decision inertia, which is the purpose of Part III of this thesis.2
4.1 Decision Inertia in Decision-Making
Decision inertia has received much attention in recent research, due to its implications for
economic decision-making (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Erev & Haruvy, 2013). Decision inertia is
the tendency to repeat a previous choice, regardless of the obtained outcomes (Sautua, 2017;
Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012). It can be driven by other cognitive or motiva-
tional processes like consistency-seeking (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), decision avoidance (Sautua,
2017), or costs of decision-making (Bawa, 1990), and it manifests as a kind of status quo bias
or resistance to revise a decision (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012).
The concept of decision inertia has been used to explain irrational reliance on previous choices
in numerous settings. For instance, it has been investigated as a potential explanation of
consumers’ reluctance to patronize new brands and their attachments and persistence with
incumbent products (Li, Liu, & Liu, 2016; Polites & Karahanna, 2012), inertia in investment
decisions (Sandri, Schade, Mussho, & Odening, 2010) and economic decision-making under
risk (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Charness & Levin, 2005). Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996) illustrate
decision inertia also in probability reasoning: People tend to keep their lottery ticket over
other available, clearly superior investment options. Decision inertia also has serious implica-
tions for computational judgement and decision-making research (Erev & Haruvy, 2013), for
instance Dutt and Gonzalez (2012) use inertia in computational modelling of human decision-
making, and Akaishi, Umeda, Nagase, and Sakai (2014) consider decision inertia in explaining
and modelling choice repetition in neuro science studies, observing a tendency to rely on pre-
vious decisions but regarded it as noise.
As I describe in the next section, numerous experiments have established that inertia in decision-
2Note. The content of this section is a revised version of two papers, which were created in the course of this thesis.
In particular, Section 4.2.2 is a revised version of Jung and Dorner (2017), while Section 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6 is adopted
from Jung, Erdfelder, Broeder, and Dorner (in press), and Section 4.3 and 4.5 from Jung, Staebler, and Weinhardt
(2018). Other sources of this section are marked as such.
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making is a dynamic process with multiple determinants, and it underlies a systematic de-
viations from rational behaviour (Jung & Dorner, 2017). Based on this kind of perspective,
Alos-Ferrer and colleagues propose a multiprocess scheme of inertia in decision-making, on
which I rely in this work. The authors suggest that decision inertia, or "the tendency to repeat
a previous choice, regardless of its outcome, in a subsequent decision" (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016,
p.1) is an automatized, unconscious, and eortless process, that conicts with rational, slow,
resource-consuming deliberations like correct Bayesian updating (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014).
This conceptualization of decision inertia, suggests that the manifestation of decision inertia is
believed to be present when decision inertia and intuitive and deliberative decision processes
conict. Because conict resolution is eortful, it diminishes decision speed (Alós-Ferrer et
al., 2016; Brody, 1965) and increases suboptimal decisions and error rates (Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2016; Alos-Ferrer, Garagnani, & Hügelschäfer, 2016). Decision inertia manifests in subopti-
mal outcomes, because individuals cannot, or do not consider the full consequences of their
decisions, and relying instead on automatic and impulsive decision strategies.
Previous research provides evidence for this rationale, for instance Marcos et al. (2013) has
observed an inability of individuals to decide without relying on their past decisions. Decision
makers always let previous choices inuence recent decisions, regardless of the instruction to
make these decisions independently. This inuence of previous choices in consecutive decision
tasks, has been observed in numerous studies (Fecteau & Munoz, 2003; Gold, Law, Connolly,
& Bennur, 2008; Akaishi et al., 2014). Recent research shows that the phenomenon underlies
a systematic, autonomous mechanism (Akaishi et al., 2014). In a Functional Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging (fMRI) study, where decision makers had to guess the direction of the motion
of random dots, participants tend to repeat the choices they made in previous trails. Akaishi
et al. modelled this behaviour with a learning rule indicating a system in the valuation and
information processing behind this phenomenon.
In the next steps, I take up these ndings, and review recent decision inertia research. Because
the aim of this work is to transfer these ndings to economic scenarios and considerations of
decision support systems, I focus on decision inertia
• under risk,
• based on experience,
• in subsequent decisions, and
• in economic or related decision scenarios
The rst limitation is, that I focus on decision tasks under risk. Decisions are made under
uncertainty, where each decision can be a win or a loss. This assumption is intended to ensure
the transferability of ndings to the nancial context, as nancial decisions are predominantly
risk-prone, since even "safe" nancial products involve a certain risk of default.
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Furthermore, I investigate decisions based on experience, meaning that decision-maker make
decision by themselves and show decision inertia by themselves. They are not faced with a
row of previous decisions and they do not have to make decisions based on decisions they
did not make alone. This specication is important to mention, because some studies (e.g.,
inaction inertia studies), face decision-makers with decision scenarios that presuppose the
decision maker behaved in a specic manner before. As a result, decision-makers must face
consequences they did not "cause in reality" (e.g., "You missed oer A in this shop last week,
will you still buy there this week?".
Related to this issue is my focus on subsequent decisions, I consider only dual-choice scenar-
ios. In these tasks, the decision-makers make a rst and a second decision. Then the second
decision is investigated and analysed. This kind of dual-choice task is considered repeatedly.
However, I do not investigate a row of multiple consequent choices (e.g., a rst, second, and
third related decision).
Finally, I focus on decision inertia in economic scenarios, because my aim is to provide de-
sign recommendations for robo-advisory or nancial decision support systems. However, I
explicitly avoid focus on decision inertia in incident scenarios (see e.g. (Alison et al., 2015)) or
in disaster management. The decision-tasks in these kind of studies is too far away from the
application of decision inertia in nancial decision support.
4.1.1 Decision Inertia in Judgement and Decision-Making Research
The rst relevant contributions of decision inertia research are the belief-updating tasks from
the experimental psychology of the 60s, which reported an inertia eect or "resistance to
change" (Pitz, 1969; C. R. Peterson & DuCharme, 1967; Brody, 1965; Pruitt, 1961) of decision-
makers in sequential decision tasks. Other studies (C. R. Peterson & Miller, 1965; C. R. Peter-
son, Schneider, & Miller, 1965; Phillips & Edwards, 1966) reported that decision-makers have
diculty revising their subjective probability in an optimal amount (Geller & Pitz, 1968) and
inspired other researchers to investigate this phenomenon in other settings (e.g. Kozielecki
(1966)). Based on the ndings from initial studies, researchers began to investigate possible
explanations for this behaviour and focused on dierences in condence judgements com-
pared to objective probabilities computed by the Bayes’ theorem (Geller & Pitz, 1968).
One group of researchers focused on the inter-individual dierences of errors, providing ev-
idence that it underlays a systematic deviation (Little & Lintz, 1965). This so-called "conser-
vatism bias" can be computed by comparing subjective with objective probabilities and could
partly explain the deviations of future subjective probabilities from correct Bayesian probabil-
ities (Little & Lintz, 1965). Others proposed to measure the decision-makers’ conservatism by
an "accuracy ratio", which is the ratio of subjective and objective log likelihood (C. R. Peterson
et al., 1965).
Researchers such as Brody (1965) or Geller and Pitz (1968) investigated the eect of motiva-
tional drivers like commitment on inter-individual dierences in condence levels. Interesting
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ndings are provided by Brody (1965). In their study, male children were asked to predict the
most frequent word in a subsequent list of words (chose one of two). To measure the eect of
commitment, the participants had to make a non-binding choice of one of two options, before
they received any information (the control group did not choose before receiving informa-
tion). The decisions were made under uncertainty: The participants did not know for sure
which of the ratio of words was the actual one, but had to rely solely on the feedback after
each decision. The results revealed that the initial decision of participants was associate with
more condence, as compared to the control group. Furthermore, if the decision was the less
successful option, the condence increase in subsequent decisions was lower. This nding
suggest that decision-makers need more conviction to revise their option when a decision has
been made. This need was stronger when they rst decided randomly and without informa-
tion upon the suboptimal decision - knowingly and willingly that the rst decision was made
without information and that they could revise their initial decision with no penalty.
Based on previous work, Geller and Pitz (1968) investigated decision speed in the context of
inertia in belief-updating. In each of the trails, participants were asked to choose one of two
"data-generating devices" (bags with poker chips) as a possible source of a sample of ten events.
The participants were asked to predict the next chip (red or blue), and to guess which of the
two bags the chip would be drawn from. For that purpose, they could adjust a toggle switch
in the desired direction. The speed of the decisions was measured secretly. The ndings show
an increase in response time, if the event has been predicted by the participants, and a de-
crease otherwise. More interestingly, dis-conrming events did reduce the response time of
the participants, but it did not reduce their condence level. Geller and Pitz link this results
to a commitment process and that the decision of the participants did not reect their true
opinions. In consequence, they suggest refusing Bayesian models as models of judgement
and decision-making. However these initial ndings provide further evidence, that human
decision-making is driven by deliberative and intuitive processes (see Section 2.1). Conse-
quently, decision inertia could be driven by the conict of these dierent processes resulting
in increased response times, and decreased decision speed.
Further studies investigating inertia were done by Pitz (1969); Pitz and Barrett (1969); Pitz,
Downing, and Reinhold (1967). These studies provide further evidence, that a decision about
the probability distribution of two hypothesis based on a sample of the length n is mainly
driven by the time of the decision. The response diers depending on whether decision-makers
are asked to judge after each draw of n, or at the end (Pitz, 1969; Pitz et al., 1967).
For instance, Pitz et al. (1967) examined the role of decision inertia in a simplied binary de-
cision tasks. In the basic setting, two bags with a dierent number of red and blue chips were
used. The participants could gather information about the distribution of the chips by draw-
ing out balls. In this study, the participants were faced with a xed sequence of 5, 10, and
20 samples from one of the bags. In each round they had to report their estimated proba-
bility that a certain bag was used. The estimates were compared to those predicted by the
Bayesian Theorem. The ndings indicate that subjective probability adjustments were greater
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following conrmation of information or short sequences, on the other hand long samples or
dis-conrming information tend to increase the inertia eect.
Pitz proposed two possible explanations of inertia. Firstly, he proposed commitment as pos-
sible driver of inertia Pitz (1969); Pitz et al. (1967). He assumed that the participants com-
mit themselves in their rst decision, and hence all information that contradict the initial
choice causes cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). To reduce cognitive dissonance, decision-
makers rely on inertia, and ignore or underestimate dis-conrming events. As a second ex-
planation, Pitz proposed the expectancy-hypothesis (Pitz, 1969; Pitz et al., 1967). It is assumed
that decision-makers expect dis-conrming information. Most decisions are made under un-
certainty and the events are probabilistic. Hence, some events may be unlikely to occur, but
occur nonetheless. Decision-maker assume that dis-conrming information about a state-of-
the-world is not unlikely, but do not appropriately consider this possibility.
Related to these ndings Pitz and Barrett (1969) conducted a further study, in which they
varied the level of free information that participants could receive before deciding. The results
suggest that less information was considered if the amount of free information increased, and
hence riskier decision-making was more likely with increasing sample sizes.
In another study Pitz (1969) investigated the commitment process in sequential judgements.
He replicated the belief-updating task from previous studies, but varied the levels of commit-
ment to the previous decisions. If the previous decisions could be recalled easily, the partic-
ipants showed the inertia eect. But under conditions, where the previous decision was not
presented the inertia eect disappeared. Decision-makers without preliminary commitment
showed no inertia eect (Pitz, 1969).
However, the ndings of Pitz do not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the expectancy
hypothesis. As Grabitz (1971) argues, the occurrence of early dis-conrming events reduced
the diagnostic value of the dis-conrming events at high levels of individual condence. Hence,
assumptions about the size of the decision-maker’s expectancy of a negative event are not
credible. Geller and Pitz (1968) also report no support for the expectancy hypothesis.
Grabitz (1971) ran a variation of Pitz et al.’s study using one urn with dierent possible prob-
ability distributions. In the study, participants were asked to select between possible distri-
butions and report their individual levels of condence. As in previous inertia studies the
participants received only a description of the dierent distributions, but they had to base
their decisions on the feedback they received. To test the commitment hypothesis and the
expectancy hypothesis against each other, Grabitz focused on decisions and condence levels
after the rst dis-conrming events in a sequence of samples. If the commitment hypothesis
is true, an early dis-conrming event would cause much more dissonance, than a late one.
As a consequence decision-makers reduced their condence in a decision signicantly less,
compared to when they faced a dis-conrming event at the end of a sequence of samples.
Following this rationale, the expectancy hypothesis predicts the exact opposite. If decision-
makers expect dis-conrming events, the probability of such an event will increase with the
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sample size. Hence, the later the event occurs, the stronger the inuence on inertia. Testing
these hypotheses against each other, Grabitz (1971) found evidence for only the rst.
Based on these ndings, Grabitz and Grabitz-Gniech (1972) conducted a further study based
on a variation of his previous work (Grabitz, 1971); they investigated the commitment and
conservatism hypothesis, and the expectancy hypothesis in context of the inertia eect. Their
ndings suggest that the inertia eect increased with the diagnostic information of an event,
in line with the commitment hypothesis and contrary to of the expectancy explanation.
In order to clarify the relationship of existing results of reinforcement learning and decision
inertia, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) used a variant of the task from Pitz (1969) and Charness and
Levin (2005), which has been used by Achtziger et al. to show that the tendency of choice
repetition or biased decision-making can be linked to increased response times (Achtziger &
Alós-Ferrer, 2013). The variation of the task considers the assumption that decision inertia is a
cognitive process that can conict with other processes (e.g. Bayesian updating, or reinforce-
ment). In their study, they conducted two variants of the urn game (decision inertia conicting
with Bayesian updating, or reinforcement). The participants were asked to make two subse-
quent decisions, and decision inertia was measured by choice repetition regardless of new
information, and by response-time dierences. They postulated that a process conict would
be linked to increased response times (slower decision-making). In line with previous ndings
(Achtziger & Alós-Ferrer, 2013), their results showed more errors and increased response-time
in case of conicting processes in both studies. However their ndings hold only for free de-
cisions (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016, Study 2), indicating that decision inertia is stronger, or exists
only in voluntary, autonomous decisions. If Bayesian updating and reinforcement conict,
they overload decision inertia.
Contradictory to Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016), Zhang et al. ndings oer no support for the con-
sistency hypothesis from Pitz. They investigated decision inertia in an ethical context (Zhang,
Cornwell, & Higgins, 2014). In their study participants were faced with a two-stage decision
task, where repeated cheating was measured. The study’s ndings suggest that decision repe-
tition could be driven by prevention focus. Participants showed a signicant increase in choice
repetition in both cases, as a personal trait and induced by situation. Furthermore, alternative
factors like choice justication were validated. However, the experimental setting from Zhang
et al. (2014) is hardly comparable with the existing decision inertia research (e.g., it had a now
outdated and dierent experimental design), and furthermore the moral framing could have
inuenced the decision-making process. Nevertheless, this early study provides evidence that
results reporting commitment as a driver of choice repetition are not as stable as previously
assumed. Presently, there remains a need to re-evaluate his ndings in a more generalized
decision inertia task (e.g. as in Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016)).
More evidence for motivational drivers of decision inertia comes from Sautua (2017), who
investigated the inuence of regret aversion and indecisiveness on decision inertia in subse-
quent lottery-ticket-switching-tasks. In his study, the participants randomly received one of
two tickets for a lottery. In the next step, they could choose to switch the ticket for a small
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pay-o. Decision inertia was measured as the tendency to keep the perceived ticket, regardless
of the pay-o and the probability distribution of the lottery. By changing the degree of uncer-
tainty of the lottery, or the option to switch tickets Sautua showed that the participants had a
tendency to rely on the previous decision (lottery ticket they received). Both regret aversion
and indecisiveness had signicant inuence on decision inertia. But regret aversion had only
a signicant eect, though only if the participants did not know they would have the option to
switch tickets. However, the study of Sautua is rarely comparable to existing belief-updating
tasks like the study from Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016), the experimental setting is quite dierent.
However, his ndings do suggest that further motivational variables are relevant drivers of
decision inertia. Furthermore, it suggests that regret aversion can be a possible source of de-
cision inertial behaviour, but in this case decision inertia is co-founded with reluctance or the
distrust towards the experimenter which oers the option to switch.
Other research did not investigate decision inertia explicitly, but their studies contains evi-
dence for the decision inertia phenomenon and their ndings provide many interesting impli-
cations for the decision inertia research. The most relevant studies of this kind are Charness
and Levin (2005), and Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013). Charness and Levin (2005) report that
"a person who has elected to make the rst draw from left is substantially more likely to make
the second draw from Left [sic!] than a person who was required to make the rst draw from
Left [sic!]" (Charness & Levin, 2005, p.1305). Their study, which was a replication of existing
methods from experimental psychology and Bayesian updating (see e.g. Pitz (1969); Brody
(1965) ), is the rst that reported clearly that decision inertia could be linked to the autonomy
of a decision. They investigated the ways in which decision-makers rely on Bayesian updating
after successful and after unsuccessful outcomes of a decision after free and required choices.
In their task, the participants had to choose between two urns with two dierent states and
the probability distribution of the pay-os (two choices task). The participants had to choose
freely or were forced, alternately. As in previous belief-updating tasks the rst round could
be used to learn about the state of the world and to make subsequent optimal or subopti-
mal decisions based on Bayesian theorem. By comparing dierent factors with the number
of decision-makers to update prior beliefs in the context of Bayesian theory, they could test
the inuence of these variables on belief-updating. Charness and Levin reported that if the
rst decision was not rewarded (e.g., aect removed in rst round), the participants made sig-
nicantly fewer errors, which provides further evidence that decision inertia could be linked
to commitment or at least to a kind of mental coupling of previous decisions. This nding is
in line with the ndings of Brody (1965), who reported that no commitment had signicant
inuence compared to forced commitment in the rst round of a subsequent decision task.
Other indirect evidence for decision inertia comes from Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013).
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer investigated response-time in relationship to Bayesian Updating.
The ndings suggest that decision inertia exists, and they report an increased tendency to re-
peat a decision regardless of the consequences (see Table 1 in their study; decision inertia or
loss-stay errors: 38.9 and 25.1 %). Furthermore, the study reports an increased response time in
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the case of decision inertia (response time after a loss), but also in the case of general process
conicts. An interesting nding is that neutral situations involve longer response times than
alignment (in particular, decision inertia with Bayesian Updating and treatment ALIGN; see
Table 2 in their study).
Erev and Haruvy (2013) review recent literature in economic decision-making and propose a
descriptive model "Inertia, Sampling and Weighting" that can be used to reproduced economic
decision-making. Their model assumes three response modes: exploration, exploitation and
inertia (Erev & Haruvy, 2013). Inertia is dened as the individual’s tendency to repeat choices,
and decreases when the outcome of a decision is surprising. Following this reasoning, Erev and
Haruvy conceptualize decision inertia as a trait that is stable over the time, but the probability
to rely on depends on the outcome of a decision.
Table 9: Selection of the most relevant ndings from studies investigating decision inertia or
relevant aspects of decision inertia in judgement and decision-making research.
Authors Sample Denition Findings
Alós-
Ferrer et
al. (2016)
Students from
the University of
Cologne (study
1: n=45, 16 males,
M=23.51 years; study
2: n=44, 19 male,
M=23.80 years)
"the tendency to
repeat a previous
choice, regardless of
its outcome, in a sub-
sequent decision."
(p.1-2)
Considered factors: Decision autonomy (free
vs. forced decisions), preference for consistency,
Bayesian Updating, Reinforcement
Results: They assume that decision inertia is a
"cognitive process" potentially "conicting with
other processes" (e.g. Bayesian Updating, Re-
inforcement). They nd evidence that decision
inertia exists in forced and free decisions con-
icting with Bayesian Updating, and in free de-
cisions conicting with reinforcement. Further-
more, they nd learning eects (round number
signicantly negative inuence on decision in-
ertia). If Bayesian updating and reinforcement
conict, they dominate decisions inertia, indicat-
ing that decision inertia can be overloaded by
stronger processes. Furthermore decision inertia
is associated with increased response times and
preference for consistency, which is in line with
a dual-process perspective on decision inertia.
Brody
(1965)
Princeton high
school boys (n=72,
72 males, M=16.1
years)
Na Considered factors: Initial commitment with-
out information, condence
Results: Initial commitment is related to in-
creased initial condence, but does not inuence
the time of a decision. If participants commit-
ted to an incorrect decision, they increased con-
dence more slowly than the control group with-
out an initial commitment, or the group which
committed to a correct decision. Additionally, in-
correct initial commitment results in lower con-
dence in the nal decision.
Continued on next page
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Charness
and Levin
(2005)
Students from the
university of Califor-
nia (Study 1: n=59,
Study 2: n=54, Study
3: n=52)
"taste for consis-
tency" (p.1305)
Considered factors: Reinforcement, Bayesian
updating, decision autonomy, aect
Results: When intuitive and deliberative pro-
cesses conict (e.g., reinforcement and Bayesian
updating, switching after a loss) the error rates
are signicant larger, compared to when the pro-
cesses are aligned. The aggregated drawings
show that the participants had a tendency to re-
peat previous decisions (regardless of the pay-
os), covered by the decision inertia hypothesis.
If the rst round was without pay-o or the par-
ticipants were forced to choose one of the two
urns randomly (only for the rst decision), the er-
rors were reduced. On the other hand, when the
information of the rst round was increased, the
error rates did not change. Besides, the ndings
report positive inuence of gender (female) and
choice complexity on errors; and no learning ef-
fects.
Geller and
Pitz (1968)
Students from the
southern Illinois
university in context
of an experimental
psychology course
(n=22)
"failure to reduce
condence follow-
ing dis-conrming
events" (p.194)
Considered factors: Decision speed, condence
Results: An increase in decision speed is linked
to predicted and conrming events, while dis-
conrming events resulted in slower decision-
making and suboptimal condence revision. Sur-
prisingly, dis-conrming events did reduce re-
sponse time, but did not reduce the condence
level.
Grabitz
(1971)
Students from
the university of
Mannheim (n=36)
"underestimation of
those events, that
are contradictory to
a subject’s presently
favored alternative"
(p.35)
Considered factors: Commitment, expectancy
Results: The ndings support the commitment,
but not the expectancy hypothesis. The par-
ticipants did estimate the probability more cor-
rectly compared to the conrming events the
later the dis-conrming event occurred. This
nding is in line with the commitment hypothe-
sis, which predicts an decrease in overestimation;
but contradictory to the expectancy hypothesis
that predicts an overestimation. Decision time
was slower after dis-conrming events.
Continued on next page
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Grabitz
and
Grabitz-
Gniech
(1972)
Students from
the university of
Mannheim (n=42)
"Informationen mit
gleichem diagnostis-
chen Wert, wurden
verschieden bew-
ertet, je nachdem,
ob sie die subjektive
Wahrscheinlichkeit
der Person erhöhten
oder senkten" (p. 25)
Considered factors: Commitment, conser-
vatism, expectancy
Results: The relative underestimation of proba-
bilities increases with the diagnostic value of an
event. The dierences in the accuracy ratio in-
dicate that conservatism is not the only driver.
Furthermore, the higher the diagnostic value of
a dis-conrming event, the more likely it is to
be underestimated, in other words, strongly dis-
conrming events are more likely to be perceived
as wrong, than are weak dis-conrming events.
Pitz (1969) Participants (n=75,
15 per treatment)
"reluctance of Ss
[subjects] to reduce
their condence in
a decision follow-
ing disconrming
information." (p. 24)
Considered factors: Presentation of previous
judgement (visual, verbal, none), physical move-
ment (user interface), preliminary condence
judgement
Results: Decision-makers decide dierently if
they have to decide sequentially compared to
tasks in which they have to decide at the end of a
sequence of information. When the participants
could easily recall the previous judgement, the in-
ertia eect increased. If previous judgements are
not presented, the inertia phenomenon does not
exist. The ndings provide evidence for a "resis-
tance to reversal" instead of commitment.
Kozielecki
(1966)
Na Na Considered factors: Self-conrmation, con-
dence, hypothesis threshold
Results: Reaction to new information does not
depend on the threshold at the moment the rst
decision. Participants of his study had a tendency
to not adjusting their individual certainty in a hy-
pothesis after disproving conicting messages.
Sautua
(2017)
Student sample from
university of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles
(n=346, about 50 per
treatment)
"the tendency to ad-
here to the status
quo" (p.14)
Considered factors: Regret aversion, indeci-
siveness
Results: Regret aversion and indecisiveness are
linked to decision inertia. When participants
knew that they could switch tickets, the inu-
ence of regret aversion disappeared. On the other
hand, if the participants did not know that they
could switch tickets, the inertia eect increased.
Another stream of decision inertia research is from occupational and organizational psychol-
ogy. The most popular pioneers in this area are Alison and Power, who investigated decision
inertia in a number of real-world settings (Power & Alison, 2017; Alison et al., 2015; Eyre,
Alison, Crego, & McLean, 2008). However, their understanding of decision inertia diers from
that of the majority of existing decision inertia research studies. In particular, they follow the
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naturalistic decision-making paradigm and neglect the existence or the labelling of decisions
as "right or wrong". They focus on the understanding of the cognitive process in real-world
scenarios (Power & Alison, 2017; Alison et al., 2015). As a consequence, deviations from ra-
tional strategies are not computed or can not be identied. In this research stream, the re-
searcher conceptualizes decision inertia as a more general concept, namely the "inability to
reach a decisions" (Alison et al., 2015). Following their conclusion, decision inertia is linked
to redundant information-seeking and choice delay or avoidance. All their studies investigate
decision inertia in critical incidents, which makes their work hardly comparable that of other
research streams. Additionally, the approach makes it impossible to reproduce the ndings in
experimental settings, a further major dierence from contemporary research. Even if their
work might oers insights into the phenomenon of decision inertia at a more general level, in
the context of loss framing or indecisiveness, there remains a need to investigate the way in
which and degree to which their ndings can be linked to the main stream of decision inertia
research. As a consequence, this research stream is excluded in the further investigation (see
Section 4.1).
4.1.2 Decision Inertia in Neuro-Science Research
Since the decision inertia phenomenon is well-known in judgement and decision-making re-
search, it is somewhat surprising, that decision inertia has been treated for a long time as a
random process or as noise in many studies of human decision-making (Akaishi et al., 2014;
Gold et al., 2008; Corrado, Sugrue, Seung, & Newsome, 2005), even in the decision-making of
monkeys (Lau & Glimcher, 2005). However the neural foundations and brain mechanisms in-
volved in decision inertia remain unknown, and there remains a need to identify and classify
the correlates of decision inertia (Fleming, Thomas, & Dolan, 2010).
Recent neuro-science research has targeted this gap, raising discussion of this process as rel-
evant to the understanding of our decision-making and that individuals vary systematically
in their sensitivity to decision inertia. In fact, a recent fMRI study reports that decision inertia
reects a systematic, autonomous mechanism that can be modelled by learning rules (Akaishi
et al., 2014). Consistent with Akaishi et al. (2014), such studies suggest that decision inertia
is an unconscious process and probably strongly dependent on prior decisions. In his study
Akaishi et al. investigated possible explanations for the tendency of decision-makers to rely
on previous decisions in decision-making, even when they are asked not to do so or plan not
to do so. The participants played a variation of the two-direction motion discrimination task
from Gold and Shadlen (2007), where they had to identify the motion of a group of dots with
little sensory evidence. The ndings speak against the assumption that decision-makers’ ten-
dency to rely on previous decisions can not be modelled by response bias, sensory bias or
attention bias (Akaishi et al., 2014). Decision inertia could be observed in delayed-response
decisions, as well in decisions with four options. Participants’ tendency to rely on decision
inertia increased after dis-conrming results or errors in previous decisions, and a decrease
of sensory evidence. Because the participants received no immediate feedback, Akaishi et al.
80
argue that decision inertia could depend on a specic process of error making and not on the
capabilities to detect that an error has been made.
Other learning models have also included decision inertia in their considerations. For instance,
Gonzalez and Dutt (2011), and Gonzalez, Dutt, and Lejarraga (2011) integrated an inertia mech-
anism in their models. In general the ndings suggest that including inertia in instance-based
learning models increases predictive power. A review of Dutt and Gonzalez (2012) compar-
ing dierent learning models with and without an inertia parameter with a popular dataset
as a baseline, supports this suggestion. Although, models with inertia may be better in be-
haviour prediction, they are not superior in modelling trends across dierent tasks, and they
do not persist in decisions without payos (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012). Findings from Lejarraga
et al. (2012) show that certain instance-based learning models can predict risk-taking in the
binary-choice tasks without an inertia factor. However, computational models require such
a mechanism to explain observed risk-taking and alternations (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012). As a
consequence, there is evidence from learning modelling that such inertia mechanism may be
a relevant factor in explaining human decision-making.
Based on the work of Grether (1980, 1992), who investigated heuristic decision-making in
Bayesian belief-updating task, Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, Hügelschäfer, and Steinhauser (2012)
investigated the inuence of conservatism and over- or underestimation of subjective beliefs
on new information in an Electromyography (EMG) study. The results of the lateralized readi-
ness potential indicates that conservative decision-maker have a tendency to immediately rely
on priors, before new information can even be processed. This tendency rules out previous
explanations of the underestimation of new information by conservative decision-makers in
belief-updating tasks, like errors in aggregation of prior (Edwards, 1968), information retrieval
(Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999), or the avoidance of extreme decisions (DuCharme, 1970;
Achtziger et al., 2012). Furthermore, Achtziger et al. observed increased response time in con-
icting situations, providing further evidence for the dual-process perspective of intuitive and
deliberative processes in belief-updating tasks.
Another study of Fleming et al. (2010), investigated neural correlates of the tendency to rely
on, or to switch away from the status quo. In visual determination tasks, the participants had
to decide whether a tennis ball was in or out. After each visual stimulus two options were
presented, with one of the options set as default. An increase in task diculty could be linked
to increased likelihood to rely on the default option. Furthermore, activity in the subthalamic
nucleus and in the frontal cortex increased when participants switched away from the status
quo.
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Table 10: Selection of the most relevant ndings from studies investigating decision inertia
or relevant aspects of decision inertia in neuro-science research.
Authors Sample Denition Findings
Achtziger
et al.
(2012)
Students from
the university of
Konstanz (n=25,
male=13, M=21.8)
Na Considered factors: Bayesian updating, con-
servatism, base-rate neglect, representativeness
heuristic, electro-cortical activity
Results: Deviations from the Bayesian rule can
be linked to electro-cortical activity. Lower sensi-
tivity in conict detection could be linked to par-
ticipants with a tendency to overweight new in-
formation, while a Lateralized Readiness Poten-
tial (LRP) in the brain could be linked to partici-
pants under-weighting new information. The re-
sults suggest that conservative decision-maker do
notice new information, but have a tendency to
immediately rely on the prior in decision-making,
resulting in a decision before the new information
has even been presented.
Akaishi et
al. (2014)
Participants at the
university of Tokyo
(study 1: n=14,
M=27.1 years; study
2: n=11, M=26.5
years; study 3: n=20,
M=25.4 years; study
4: n=15, M=25.3
years; study 5: n=14,
M=23.4 years; study
6: n=17, M=25.5
years; screened for
neuropsychiatric
disorders )
"tendency of choice
repetition" (p.195)
Considered factors: Information ambiguity,
neural activity, 2 vs. 4 choice options, choice de-
lay
Results: Intermediate and low ambiguous infor-
mation results in more decision inertia, does than
unambiguous information. The eect is stable
in two-choice, four-choice, and delayed-response
tasks. Errors in previous decisions, have resulted
in an increased error rate in the next decision.
Motor response bias, sensory bias, and atten-
tion bias were excluded. Activation in the neural
regions medial parietal cortex, posterior cingu-
late cortex, and putamen are linked to decision-
inertial behaviour. Activation in the right frontal
eye eld could be linked to correct decision-
making.
Dutt and
Gonzalez
(2012)
100 participants (sec-
ondary data from
Technion Prediction
Tournament (TPT)
dataset (Erev et al.,
2010))
"tendency to repeat
the last decision
irrespective of
the obtained out-
comes while making
decisions from
experience" (p.1)
Results: Dierent learning models with and
without an inertia parameter are compared on the
TPT dataset. Models with inertia are better in be-
haviour prediction, but not in modelling trends
across tasks.
Continued on next page
82
Table 10 – Continued from previous page
Yu,
Mobbs,
Sey-
mour, and
Calder
(2010)
Volunteers (study
1: n=18, 8 males,
M=22.4; study 2:
n=15, 6 males,
M=24.6; screened
for neuropsychiatric
disorders)
"choosing the de-
fault" (p.14702)
Considered factors: Neural activity
Results: If there is a default option, decision-
makers have a tendency to rely on it. The FfMRI
reports that the tendency to rely on the default is
linked to fewer emotional responses to the out-
come and activity in the ventral striatum, while
the decision to switch away from the default was
linked to decreased activity in the anterior insula
and frustration experienced. Yu et al. (2010) con-
clude that choosing the default is linked to self
rewarding processes.
Another general but relevant nding for decision inertia research is provided by Achtziger,
Alós-Ferrer, Hügelschäfer, and Steinhauser (2015). In their study Achtziger et al. compared
the inuence of monetary incentives and reinforcement by immediate feedback on perfor-
mance in decision-making, a nding also reported by Grether (1980). The hypothesis is that
the relationship between performance and monetary incentivisation is non-linear, and can
thus be inuenced by reinforcement processes. In particular, Achtziger et al. assume that
reinforcement in combination with increasing incentives is linked to more errors in decision-
making. It is argued that the salience of the win or loss of the previous decisions results in
more reliance on non-rational decisions. Or in other words, because of the immediate feed-
back, the decision-makers tend to consider only the last outcome of their decisions, which can
lead to more errors if reinforcement and rational behaviour conict. The conict between ra-
tional decisions and reinforcement was induced by a replication of the task from Charness and
Levin (2005). In the second study, the aect of the rst decision was removed by paying only
the second decision, and forcing the decision-makers to always pick the left urn in the rst
decision. Furthermore the event-related potentials of the participants was measured with an
Electroencephalography (EEG). The results of the two studies report no signicant inuence
of monetary incentives on performance, but a correlation of neural correlates of reinforce-
ment learning (feedback-related negativity amplitudes, 200-300 ms after the feedback) with
errors in decision-making (Achtziger et al., 2015). In the low-incentive treatment, no corre-
lation appeared between the neural correlates and errors. By removing the aect (Study 2),
increased incentives were linked to increased performance. This nding is in line with other
studies which provide evidence that high incentives can cause non-rational decision-making
(Chib, De Martino, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2012), (Mobbs et al., 2009), suggesting that decision
inertia might depend on the incentivation, and the salience of the reinforcement process (see
(Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016)).
Moreover, Cockburn, Collins, and Frank (2014) have also investigated decision-makers’ ten-
dency to prefer freely chosen options above options without alternatives. His ndings could
link biases to inter-individual dierences in reward learning and dopaminergic striatal plastic-
ity. Dierences in the DARPP-32 gene could be identied as possible drivers of this behaviour,
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indicating that bias could be driven by credit assignment that delivers the dopaminergic rein-
forcement learning signals to the striatum (Cockburn et al., 2014). However, the ndings hold
only for rewarded decisions, not for unrewarded decisions.
Further substantial ndings comes from trial-history research. Recent ndings from neuro
science experiments suggest that sensory stimuli discrimination is biased by method of stimu-
lus or cue presentation, and previous decisions (Kaneko & Sakai, 2015). Hence, this could have
implications for decision inertia, because decision inertia tasks pose a history of decisions for
participants. For instance Kaneko and Sakai (2015) conducted a visual target detection task,
where the participants had to conrm the presence or absence of sine-wave gratings on a
screen. Before each experimental stimuli the experimenter gave a cue as to the probability
that a motion would appear. The results show a signicant inuence of the probabilistic in-
formation and the decision of the previous trial (even if the trials are independent, and if the
participants know that). Kaneko and Sakai (2015) summarize that the reason remains unclear
because the mechanism could be driven by three sources: the previous stimulus, decision, or
response. Other studies report similar ndings, and suggest that this mechanism also drives
the processing of sensory information (Gold et al., 2008; Liston & Stone, 2008; Bode et al.,
2012). However, even if the reasons for this phenomenon remain open, a possible reason for
this behaviour is decision inertia. If decision-makers have decision inertia, they will rely on
previous decisions, and this reliance could explain the observations.
4.1.3 Decision Inertia in Information Systems Research
In information systems research, decision inertia has been used in various studies and be-
havioural models to "explain the resistance to change from a status quo" Polites and Karahanna
(2012). The existence of decision inertia has been linked to dierent individual dispositions,
and has been explained by motivational factors. However, the understanding of this mental
process in information system research remains relatively modest at the moment, although
it holds much potential for the explanation of information systems adoption and innovation
resistance.
Jermias (2001) investigated the inuence of commitment and feedback on resistance to ac-
cepting a new accounting system. In his study, 89 participants were assigned into four groups
(2 × 2 full factorial design). The results show a signicant inuence of commitment to the
valuation of the system: in particularly, committed participants rated the chosen system bet-
ter than non-committed participants. However if they received negative information about
their decision, the participants rated the system worse than did non-committed participants.
Furthermore, commitment could be linked to increased decision inertia, regardless of the feed-
back. In the positive feedback condition both groups showed an increase in inertia, and did
not dier signicantly. However, these ndings are in line with studies from judgement and
decision-making research indicating that loss or win framing can inuence individuals’ ten-
dency to rely on decision inertia. Hence, it might be possible that the feedback drives decision
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inertia and as a consequence, that resistance to change increased.
A comparable study has been done by Polites and Karahanna (2012). Their work, has inves-
tigated the inuence of inertia, habit, and switching costs on system acceptance and their
inter-relationship. For that purpose, Polties and Karahanna conducted a survey with about
600 students. An inertia scale was developed and participants were asked to ll it out together
with other items. The results show that the adoption of new systems is caused by habitual
use of the old system, rational considerations about the switching costs, and psychological
commitment due to consistency-seeking. Inertia is linked to increased ease of use, and usage
intention.
Based on this conceptualization of inertia, further studies investigated the acceptance inten-
tion and referred to inertia, which illustrates the benet or need to integrate such a factor in
user-acceptance models. For instance, Chowdhury, Islam, and Rana (2016) relied on inertia in
their model describing the inuence of consumer attitude towards mobile advertising. They
developed a conceptual model of consumer advertising attitude, and evaluated it with stu-
dents in Bangladesh. The results suggest that inertia has a negative and signicant "inuence
on consumer attitude towards mobile advertising" (Chowdhury et al., 2016).
Another study relying on decision inertia to explain resistance to change is from Li et al. (2016).
Their investigation focuses on the acceptance of knowledge-management systems.Their study,
investigated the introduction of a new knowledge management system of participants of a
Chinese petrochemical company was investigated. Data was collected with a survey with
participants containing questionnaires about loss aversion, transition costs, social norms, and
inertia. The results suggest that inertia has an interaction eect with the other factors, and
drives the resistance of the new systems. This provides evidence, that inertia is also driven by
situational and contextual factors. Park (2016) has reported similar ndings. In his study, the
updating behaviour of mobile application users was investigated, and the results suggests a
signicant negative inuence of inertia on willingness to update.
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Table 11: Selection of the most relevant ndings from studies investigating decision inertia
or relevant aspects of decision inertia in information systems research.
Authors Sample & Design Denition Findings
Jermias
(2001)
Students of the uni-
versity of Waterloo
(n=89)
"resistance to
change" (p.146)
Considered factors: Dissonance, commitment,
conrmation, feedback
Results: Participants who choose one of the two
systems by themselves were signicantly more
likely to rely on decision inertia compared to
non-committed participants. Furthermore posi-
tive feedback could be linked to increased iner-
tia, while negative feedback decreased inertia ef-
fect. This eect did not dier for the commit-
ment group as compared to the non-commitment
group when the feedback was positive, but the
eect was signicant dierent for negative feed-
back.
Li et al.
(2016)
Employees of a
petrochemical com-
pany in China
(n=982)
"inertia is dened
as user attachment
to, and persistence
in, using an in-
cumbent system,
even if there are
better alternatives or
incentives to change
[...] consisting of
three components:
aective inertia,
behavioural iner-
tia, and cognitive
inertia" (p.193-194)
Considered factors: Loss aversion, transition
costs, social norms
Results: Inertia has a signicant interaction ef-
fect with loss aversion, transition costs, and so-
cial norms on inertial behaviour (resistance in-
tention). This eect indicates that situational
factors like a company where losses are heavily
sanctioned can act as driver of decision inertia.
Polites
and Kara-
hanna
(2012)
Students from a uni-
versity in the south-
east of the United
States
"user attachment to,
and persistence in,
using an incumbent
system (i.e., the
status quo), even
if there are better
alternatives or in-
centives to change."
(p.24)
Considered factors: Habit, switching costs
Results: The adoption of a new systems is caused
by habitual use of the old system, rational consid-
erations about the switching costs, and psycho-
logical commitment due to consistency-seeking.
Inertia is linked to increased ease of use, and to
usage intention.
Another very interesting approach is from Stryja and colleagues (Stryja, Dorner, & Riee, 2017;
Stryja, Satzger, & Dorner, 2017). They propose to reduce decision inertia by system design in
decision support systems. In their studies, they investigate dierent nudges to overcome the
tendency of decision makers to rely on decision inertia in the case of electric car adoption.
Drawing from organizational change and the psychology literature, they propose priming and
defaults to reduce decision inertia. Firstly, the priming eect builds on recency considerations.
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If the positive aspects of an option are presented shortly before the decision, the decision-
maker will be more to likely rely on that option. In the second case, decision inertia is linked to
the optimal choice, and as a result the negative consequences of decision inertia are removed.
So far, this work is the rst approach targeting the reduction of the eects of decision inertia
by system design and provides interesting insights. However, the work is still in progress and
the nal results of their investigations are not yet available.
In sum, one main nding of the information systems literature review is that decision iner-
tia is mostly measured by self-reporting data and not by objective measurements in the lab.
This methodological tendency is a main dierence from judgement and decision-making re-
search, and from neuro-science. In particular, this dierence raises the question of whether
the constructs are comparable and reliable across the tasks and disciplines. Furthermore, it
is questionable whether the participants answer truthfully. For instance, it remains unclear
whether the perceived behaviour (measured e.g. by NeuroIS methods like EEG), the actual be-
haviour (measured e.g. with click-stream logging), and the reported behaviour (measured e.g.
by questionnaire) are the same.
The division of inertia into three sub-scales, as proposed from Polites and Karahanna (2012),
has been generally accepted, but so far this has not been suciently explained and is only
vaguely linked to existing ndings from judgement and decision-making. As a consequence
there remains a need i) to test and investigate the relationship of actual decision inertia with
the inertia scale from Polites and Karahanna, and ii) to clarify whether the partition, number
and clustering of inertia into the three parts aect, behaviour, and cognitive based inertia
is reliabl and useful. This question is especially pressing, considering the nding that other
studies could not replicate the intern-consistency of the scale in other settings (see e.g. Li et
al. (2016)).
Furthermore, information systems studies focus exclusively on the intention to adopt, or the
resistance to change respectively. The main purpose of this work is to understand and in-
vestigate the drivers of decision-repetition, though and not the manifestation (resistance to
change, or status quo) of this process. In particular, this work concentrates on decision iner-
tia in subsequent decisions, where the reasons why people rely on decision inertia remains
unclear. Recent information systems research does not address this area of focus. Rather, it
investigates inertia relying on a more generalized conceptualization and understanding, but
ignoring the underlying mental processes. For instance, Polites and Karahanna (2012) argue
that specic factors can increase the behavioural consequence of decision inertia (e.g. trans-
action costs are a rational argument for decision-maker to behave inertial). This argument
seems reasonable, but in this work I try to understand why decision-makers rely on inertia
even if its not rational, especially why it occurs regardless of the consequences.
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4.1.4 Distinguishing Decision Inertia from Other Related Terms and Concepts
The previous theoretical background section has illustrated that there exists a broad concep-
tion of decision inertia in judgement and decision-making research. This variance makes the
investigation of decision inertia and the identication of relevant work a dicult endeavour.
Furthermore, decision inertia and decision inertial behaviour has previously been studied un-
der various other labels. There exists a wide range of loss aversion and avoidance biases and
phenomena that may have a conceptual overlap with decision inertia. As a result, there re-
mains a need to further clarify the concept of decision inertia.
DecisionAvoidance: The concept of decision avoidance as a general umbrella term for biases
resulting in non-decisions, proposed by Anderson (2003). He reviewed studies of avoidance bi-
ases and phenomena in judgement and decision-making literature, discussing possible drivers
of choice deferral, inaction inertia, omission bias, and status quo bias as the driving forces
behind human decision avoidance. As a result he has generalized these ndings in a model of
a "psychology of doing nothing", postulating that decision avoidance is caused in particular
by anticipated regret, and selection diculty (Anderson, 2003). Although, this nding might
be useful in explaining and investigating other decision biases, it remains open whether this
assumptions hold for decision inertia. He supposed relations of the drivers have been derived
from a literature review, and they lack an experimental validation. Alison is more clear, posit-
ing that decision inertia "is distinct from decision avoidance (Anderson, 2003) where decision-
makers refuse to evaluate choice through passive inaction (e.g., ‘I choose not to decide for
the time being’). Instead, I have observed how decision-makers fail to act through ‘decision
inertia’" (Alison et al., 2015).
Status Quo and Omission Bias: One of the most common biases related to decision inertia,
is the status quo bias (and its sub-aspect omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1992)). The status quo
bias is based on the assumption that a "decision maker in the real world may have a consid-
erable commitment to, or psychological investment in, the status quo option" (Samuelson &
Zeckhauser, 1988, p.10), while the omission bias postulates that the status quo bias captures the
tendency to decide in favour of the option which requires the least action. Both biases suggest
that the decision-maker shows a behaviour, which can be similar to that of decision inertia
(repeating a suboptimal decision without considering the consequences). However, decision
inertia is not status quo bias, even if it may manifest in some situations as a tendency to favour
the status quo. One argument for of dierentiating between decision inertia and status quo
bias is the fact that in many decision environments for decision inertia research do not contain
a current state, no status quo option, and both options are linked to action (see e.g. Alós-Ferrer
et al. (2016), Charness and Levin (2005)). Thus, when decision-makers in such environments
exhibit inertia, the underlying process cannot be related to status quo bias but rather to a
tendency to repeat previous decisions regardless of the consequences. Consequently, in many
studies participants cannot rely on status quo bias, despite that they show a tendency to repeat
their previous strategy. Another argument for distinguishing the two concepts is provided by
the experiments of Maltz, Romagnoli, et al. (2015), illustrating further evidence against the cur-
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rent conceptualization of status quo bias in judgement and decision-making research, per se.
In a series of experiments, Maltz and Romagnoli investigated the status quo bias in risk-setting
and under changing ambiguous conditions. They conclude that status quo bias disappears in
games where both alternatives are risky, or both ambiguous (Maltz et al., 2015). These ndings
agree with those of with other studies, which postulate that "inertia acts like a status quo bias"
(Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012, p.1), consequently I argue that decision inertia it oers a promising
path to explain the mixed ndings regarding the status quo bias, because it is one part of the
underlying process driving the observed status quo tendency of decision-makers.
Habit: A habit is an “attachment to, and persistence of, existing behavioural patterns (some of
which are habituated) even if there were better alternatives and incentives to change” (Polites
& Karahanna, 2012, p.22). This denition assumes that decision-maker can rely on habits they
have built in judgement and decision-making. Most decision inertia studies (see Section 4.2),
rely on subsequent, tasks to measure decision inertia, where it seems not possible that decision
maker could have enough time to build habits (which typically takes multiple days or weeks).
Accordingly, Polites and Karahanna (2012) reason that inertia and habit must be considered
dierently in research, because habits are learned responses that are triggered automatically,
hence it may be that inertia is driven by other factors.
Endowment Eekt: This bias describes the tendency of decision-maker to estimate the value
of something to be greater if they own that thing (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). Thus,
one could argue that decision inertia is partly explained by overestimation. However, this
claim might not fully explain decision inertia, because decision inertia is about repeating de-
cisions, not about appreciating a good. Moreover, the dierent experimental designs do not
suggest that the participants had a feeling of ownership because they choose between dierent
strategies, urns and so on. Furthermore, participants typically value both options the same at
the outset of a study of decision inertia (showing no endowment). Hence, if at all, biased prob-
ability estimation by the participants could be a possible explanation. In addition, studies on
the endowment eect suggest that the eect is driven by dierent references points (Carmon
& Ariely, 2000), which are not of explanatory value in current decision inertia studies.
Choice Deferral: Describes the tendency of decision-makers facing a dicult decision to
make no choice at all (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999). Consequently, a decision-maker facing a dicult
decision without a defer option, would probably select a random option. This option can
also be the previous decision, which than is equal to decision inertia. In such a case, decision
inertia and choice deferral behaviour would probably overlap. However, this kind of behaviour
would also mean, that other types of errors increase in such scenarios, because the decision-
maker chooses randomly. This possibility has not been observed in decision inertia research.
Furthermore, decision inertia and choice deferral can be separated into distinct outcomes if a
no-decision option were provided. I did this in Section 4.4, and found no signicant inuence
of this feature on biased decision-making. Hence, it seems reasonable that decision inertia
and choice deferral might have shared drivers, but they are distinct biases caused by dierent
factors.
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Inaction Inertia: Another phenomena that has some behavioural overlap with decision iner-
tia is inaction inertia. Inaction inertia is denied as "when bypassing an initial action oppor-
tunity has the eect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities
will be taken" (Van Putten, Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Tykocinski, 2013, p.1). In particular, in-
action inertia has great implications for marketing, as it suggests that discount campaigns
increase willingness to buy in the short term, but reduce the willingness to buy when they
expire. Customers who learn about the campaign afterwards are no longer interested in the
product. Furthermore, inaction inertia can inuence the behaviour of investors who missed
the option to switch strategy in a market (Tykocinski, Israel, & Pittman, 2004). The central
dierence to decision inertia is that the experimental paradigms that generate inaction inertia
presuppose an opportunity has been missed and that the circumstances have changed. Fur-
thermore, the participants do not choose by themselves, they are always presented a short
text describing their past actions. Hence, they never really "make" a rst decision. Decision
inertia tasks do not use this kind of mindset. In their tasks, participants choose between op-
tions, which stay the same across the whole experiment, as the probability distributions and
outcomes. Furthermore, participants make real decisions, and are generally not faced with
descriptions what they have done or will do. Thus inaction and decision inertia can have
the same behavioural consequence in specic cases, but dierent cognitive processes can be
assumed here.
Indecisiveness: Indecisiveness is decision-makers’ inability to make a decision in a timely
manner across situations and domains (Frost & Shows, 1993). It is a personal trait used in
diagnostic psychology to predict behaviour across many domains. In the context of decision
inertia, it is possible that individuals who experience more indecisiveness will have a greater
likelihood of repeating previous decisions regardless of the consequences. In this case, in-
decisiveness assumes that decision-makers show decision inertia when they are indecisive.
Following this hypothesis, decision inertia is therefore caused by an evasion of a decision or
responsibility for it. It seems possible that this might explain dierent aspects of decision
inertia, so, I examine that relationship in more detail in Section 4.4.
4.2 Measuring Decision Inertia in a Dual-Choice Paradigm
In judgement and decision-making research, there exist various approaches to measure the
behavioural or cognitive outcomes of decision inertia in experimental tasks (see, Tables 9, 10,
and 11). A deeper investigation of these tasks shows, that the distinct streams investigate be-
haviour as a proxy for the manifestation of decision inertia under very dierent circumstances,
for example decision inertia after reception of visual information (Akaishi et al., 2014), deci-
sion inertia as a failure in belief-updating (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Charness & Levin, 2005) and
condence in beliefs (Pitz & Barrett, 1969; Geller & Pitz, 1968; Pitz et al., 1967), as an increase
in response-time (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Achtziger et al., 2012), or as reluctance to switch
away from an option after information (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012), as tendency towards choice
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repetition in economic risk games (Erev & Haruvy, 2013; Erev et al., 2010) and so on. As a con-
sequence, the measurement of decision inertia varies widely, and it remains unclear whether
the same results hold in other experimental settings, and if whether they are generalizable at
all.
Thus, I present a neutral and reliable setting to induce and reproduce decision inertia. Further-
more, this paradigm allows one to vary the possible drivers of decision inertia easily. For that
purpose, I oer a short overview of the most relevant tasks of recent decision inertia research,
and discuss their practical value for further decision inertia research. Finally, I summarize
recent decision inertia tasks, and based on these ndings I derive a framework (dual-choice
paradigm) for the analysis of decision inertia for subsequent decisions in the lab.
4.2.1 Operationalization of Decision Inertia
Many papers have induced and measured decision inertia in experimental tasks in the lab,
while some studies have measured inertia-related behaviour (but not decision inertia itself)
through questionnaires (see Table 12). Furthermore, they dier in their understanding and
timing of the decisions. In the decision tasks, there are two ways to conceptualize decision
inertia: subsequent and sequential. Under the rst condition, the participants are faced with
two subsequent decisions and decision inertia is mostly measured by the tendency to rely on
the rst decision. In the sequential version, the participants repeat a decision n times. The
value of n can be represented as many times as they want to repeat the decision, or it can be
represented a xed number of draws.
The most common approach of sequential decision inertia tasks in the lab is based on belief-
updating tasks from Pitz (1969); Pitz and Barrett (1969). These tasks focus in particular on
reluctance to update beliefs in sequential decisions. In these studies, participants are usu-
ally given the task of reviewing the likelihood of a given set of decision alternatives based
on information or a continuous series of pieces of information, if necessary, selecting one of
the options. The probabilities of the two options are usually equally likely at the beginning.
These studies have shown the inertia eect (e.g., the participants underestimate, specically
the impact of contradictory information on their decisions). These tasks allow the measure-
ment of the inertia eect within a subject in a series of task, and they enable one to measure
other correlates like response time or arousal, making conclusions about the conditions and
situations, in which decision inertia is likely to occur.
Continued on next page
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Table 12: Experimental tasks from related research to measure or to induce decision inertia.
Authors Decisions Setting Operationalization
Akaishi et al.
(2014), Gold
and Shadlen
(2007)
subsequent Motion discrim-
ination, choice
between two or four
directions of visual
motion, RDM)
In this task the participants are faced with moving
dots, while the percentage of moving and resting
dots can be varied. The participants are asked to
decide between opposite directions.
Achtziger
et al. (2012),
Grether
(1992),
Grether
(1980)
subsequent Urn discrimination,
between two urns or
cages
The participants are faced to priors (two distribu-
tions) of two sources. The sources contain a dif-
ferent number of two types of balls, but four balls
in total (e.g. one blue vs. two blue). In the rst
screen of each task the distributions of the two
sources are again presented to the participants. In
the next step a sample of m balls, between 0 and
n balls is drawn from the urn and presented to the
participants. Finally, the participants are asked to
choose one of the two source as the most likely
source of the observed ball distribution. No feed-
back is given during the experiment. Response-
time is measured, and linked to time-consuming
process conict resolution (e.g., Bayesian updat-
ing vs. base-rate neglect)
Achtziger
et al. (2015),
Achtziger
and Alós-
Ferrer (2013),
Charness and
Levin (2005)
subsequent Urn discrimina-
tion, between two
asymmetric urns
The participants are faced with two subsequent
decisions, where they are asked to choose one of
two urns as a source of an observed ball distri-
bution (e.g. blue or green balls, or black or white
balls). The urns have dierent distributions and
the distributions are known to the participants.
They have to guess which of the urns was the
source of the observed sample. By drawing one
ball (black or white) out of the urns in the rst
draw, the participants can learn about the state of
the urns, and decide in the second draw optimal
(considering the information based on Bayesian
Theorem) or suboptimal by drawing randomly.
The tendency to rely on decision inertia can be
measured by comparing error rates in case of con-
ict and alignment of decision inertia with other
processes (e.g., Bayesian updating).
Continued on next page
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Alós-Ferrer
et al. (2016),
Achtziger and
Alós-Ferrer
(2013)
subsequent Urn discrimination,
choice between two
symmetric urns
The participants were faced to two subsequent
decisions, where they had to choose one of two
symmetric urns with known distribution, but un-
known state. By drawing out one ball (black or
white) of the urns, the participants could learn
about the state of the urns, and decide in the sec-
ond draw optimal (considering the information
based on Bayesian Theorem) or suboptimal by
drawing randomly. The tendency to rely on deci-
sion inertia can be measured by comparing error
rates in case of conict and alignment of decision
inertia with other processes (e.g. Bayesian updat-
ing).
Brody (1965) sequential
(max. 30)
Word discrimina-
tion, choice between
two words
The participants were asked to guess the most
frequently used of one of two words ("plus", or
"check"). The experimenter said one of the two
words sequentially, after each word the partici-
pants could decide to stop and give their guess
and their condence. Earlier answering was re-
warded, and the words were distributed (18 to 12,
and vice-versa). To investigate the inuence of
commitment, the participants were divided into
groups. The rst two groups had to give an initial
decision, which was incorrect or correct, while
the last group had not to make an initial decision
without information. The variance of condence
and round of decision was investigated.
Dutt and
Gonzalez
(2012), Erev
et al. (2010)
sequential
(max. 100)
Outcome discrimina-
tion, choice between
two buttons
Also "e-repeated paradigm"; the participants are
instructed to select one of two unlabelled buttons
to maximize their outcome. The number of trials
are unknown for the participants. A risky alter-
native (high or low outcome) and a safe alterna-
tive (medium outcome) were linked to one of the
buttons. Participants were informed only about
the result of their decision, and not about the al-
ternative.
Continued on next page
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Geller and
Pitz (1968),
Pitz et al.
(1967)
sequential
(20)
Bag discrimination,
choice between two
bags with poker
chips
In this experiment, the participants had to choose
the most likely of two bags. The two bags con-
tained a xed number of poker chips (e.g. 100)
and were prepared before the experiment. The
probability distributions of the chips diered, for
instance bag 1 containing 60 red and 40 white
chips, and bag 2 vice-versa. The participants were
faced with a sample of chips drawn randomly, and
with replacement from one of the two bags. Be-
fore each single draw, the participants had to pre-
dict the color of the next chip, and after the draw
they had to report their certainty by turning a
wheel to one of three states (bag 1, completely
uncertain, bag 2).
Grabitz
(1971),
Grabitz
and Grabitz-
Gniech (1972)
sequential
(max. 10)
Urn discrimination,
choice between
dierent event ratios
(ratio of balls in an
urn)
Up to 10 draws of a prepared urn with a xed
number but unknown ratio of balls were pre-
sented sequentially. The participants, which did
not know the true ratio of the urn, had to com-
pare given distribution of balls with regard to
their correctness. After each draw, the partici-
pants were asked to write down their assump-
tions about the ball ratio, and the likelihood that
the guess is correct. The participants could stop,
if they believed that they had identied the cor-
rect ratio with a probability of at least 80 %. In
an other version, the participants were told that
some of the samples were wrong.
Jermias (2001) subsequent Usefulness dis-
crimination, choice
between two IT-
artefacts in a
management use
case
The participants were asked to choose between
two systems or are assigned to one of two
groups (System 1 or System 2). The free-choice
group was used as a control group compared
to the forced-choice group to measure commit-
ment. The commitment was induced by asking
the participants to justify their intention for one
of the systems. Before and after the decision par-
ticipants were asked to ll out a questionnaire
about perceived usefulness and their resistance to
change their beliefs about the rst decision
C. R. Pe-
terson and
DuCharme
(1967)
sequential
(max. 100)
Dice discrimination,
choice between two
dierent dices
A sample of one hundred dice roles was presented
sequentially to the participants. The two dices
were six-sided and contained either four white,
and two black sides or vice-versa. One of the
dice was drawn and used to produce the sample
(same dice across the task). The participants had
to report their subjective probability that a cer-
tain dice was been used.
Continued on next page
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Pitz (1969) sequential
(max. 18)
Ball discrimination,
choice between two
ball colors from a
bingo basket
A selection of three red and three blue balls was
put into a bingo basket. One unknown ball was
removed randomly. In the experiment, the par-
ticipants were asked to guess the colour of the
next draw with replacement of the sample and
report their condence in their judgement (on a
scale from 0 to 10).
Polites and
Karahanna
(2012)
Questionnaire, IS us-
age intention
Questionnaire with the sub-scales aective-
based, behavioural-based, and cognitive-based
inertia. Context: "continue using my existing
method for collaborating / sharing les with my
teammates...", example items: "...because I enjoy
doing so." (aective inertia), "...simply because it
is what I have always done." (behavioural inertia),
and "...even though I know it is not the best way
of doing things." (cognitive inertia)
Kozielecki
(1966)
sequential (up
to 25)
Fertilizer discrimina-
tion, choice between
dierent fertilizer
The participants were asked to identify the best
of dierent fertilizer (A, B, C, D, E, H, K). The fer-
tilizer were tested on dierent plants (rapeseed,
hop, or saron). The participants received se-
quential reports (plots) from a fake experiment
which measured the success of the dierent fer-
tilizer, and nally had to decide which one per-
formed the best. Deviations from the optimal
guesses based on the Bayesian Theorem were
computed and compared with the answers from
the participants.
Sautua (2017) subsequent Ticket discrimina-
tion, choice between
two lottery tickets
Each of the participants receives one of two lot-
tery tickets, which can be used to take part in a re-
warded lottery. The ticket contains a colour, and
at the end of the experiment balls are drawn from
a bag containing red and blue balls. The partici-
pants can switch their lottery ticket, which is re-
warded with a small pay-o. Afterwards the lot-
tery is resolved.
Continued on next page
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Yu et al.
(2010)
subsequent Choice between two
cards
In the rst step, the participants are faced with
a possible outcome of a lottery (win or loss) for
four seconds. Afterwards, the participants have
to choose between two cards (left and right) un-
der uncertainty. No information about the proba-
bility is given, and without the knowledge of the
participants the outcomes are predetermined to
have counterbalanced conditions (50 % wins). In
each lottery, one of the cards is randomly selected
as default and highlighted with a yellow frame.
By pressing one of two keys, the participants can
decide which of the two cards they would choose.
Finally, however diverse these experimental task might look, they all rely upon a system which
allows them to be structured by dierent characteristics they have in common. The most rele-
vant characteristic is likely that the existing decision inertia measures can be divided into two
streams based on underlying research method and the way inertia is measured: observation or
questioning. Observed decision inertia measures are calculated based on the behaviour of par-
ticipants in experimental belief-updating tasks (see e.g. Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) ), while other
studies provide questionnaires to measure inter-individual dierences in decision inertia (see
e.g. Jermias (2001)).
Behavioural measures:
• Decision error (e.g. Charness and Levin (2005); Grabitz (1971); Pitz (1969))
• Response-time (e.g. Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016); Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013))
• Bio-physiological activities (e.g. Jung and Dorner (2017); Akaishi et al. (2014))
Questionnaire (inertia-related):
• Ressistance to change questionnaire (Jermias, 2001)
• Ressistance to change questionnaire with sub-scales aect, behaviour, cognition (Polites
& Karahanna, 2012)
As a result, I could identify inertia-related questionnaires (resistance to change), but no explicit
inertia questionnaire to measures individual’s dispositions towards inertia. As a consequence,
I focus on the experimental tasks in the following work. To give a better understanding of the
operationalization I now present a short overview of the main design characteristics of these
tasks (see Table 13).
One relevant characteristic is the number of data sources used to draw the distribution. In
most studies, participants face options or data sources, from which to choose. However, other
related studies use multiple data sources (Akaishi et al., 2014).
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Most of the experimental tasks to measure decision inertia have unknown discrete states of the
experimental environment. These states are linked to dierent distributions of the target vari-
able of the participants (e.g. paid ball colour). In most studies, these states are discrete. Other
studies dier between simple yes or no questions, linked to dierent outcomes dependent on
their correctness.
In most of the tasks the participants face dierent task settings or framings. For instance they
may have to choose one type of specic chips, balls, words or other products (e.g., as with
fertilizer (Kozielecki, 1966) or movements (Akaishi et al., 2014)).
Another specic characteristic of the data generation of the decision inertia related experi-
mental tasks is that the events are symmetrically distributed. Other studies vary the distri-
bution and built asymmetric settings to test inertia against other cognitive processes such as
reinforcement (see e.g., Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016)), while other studies use unknown data gen-
erating processes (for the participants) to investigate the behaviour of their participants.
A further characteristic of decision inertia tasks is stimulus type. In the studies, participants
face a choice set which can be designed in many ways. Furthermore, the feedback (or the infor-
mation cue) providing the information that can be considered or not in the decision-making
process, as relevant to separate inertia from other errors, can have dierent characteristics.
For instance, this feedback can be elicited at the end of the task or during the task (to separate
inertia from learning).
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Table 13: Design characteristics of related decision inertia tasks identied in literature review.
Data generation Stimulus Decision-making
Data sources / distributions:
• 1
• 2
• 4
Discrete states:
• 1 (yes, no)
• 2 (two dierent states,
e.g. colors)
Task setting:
• chips
• balls
• words
• misc (fertilizer,...)
Symmetry:
• symmetric
• asymmetric
• unknown
Type:
• choice set
• feedback (yes, no, at the
end)
Sample size: 1 to n
Time structure:
• subsequent
• sequential
• independent
Draws:
• autonomous (free)
• required (forced)
• mixed, alternating
• mixed, prepared
• mixed, random
Salience:
• low (ambiguous or uncer-
tain) to high (certain)
• visual, motorial, statistical
• framing
Valence:
• win, loss
• physical pain
• unknown
Type:
• choice: binary, or choose 1
of n
• guess: likelihood for source
s, or condence in decision
c
Incentive:
• monetary, linear
• monetary, uncertain, lot-
tery
• misc (course credits, good-
will)
• none
Time restriction:
• yes
• no
The number of decisions measured, sample size, or the rounds of the experiment ranges from
one pair of subsequent decisions to huge studies with 120 or more draws.
Based on the sample size, the time structure of the decisions the participants have to make
varies among subsequent decisions, a series decisions, or decisions (made in isolation from
one another. In independent-decision scenarios, the participants are normally faced with a
sample that has been drawn by a computer and are then asked to make a decision.
The experimental tasks dier also concerning type of draws (or selection). For instance, the
participant can draw a ball freely from one of two urns. Or he or she is forced to select one spe-
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cic option in the second round (forced draw). These two types can be mixed in an alternating,
prepared, or random order.
Furthermore, the information or the information cue the participants receive can be further
dierentiated concerning it’s salience. Salience can be low if the cue is ambiguous or high if
it provides "certain" information (e.g., see decision-making under uncertainty vs. certainty).
Dependent on the type of the task, the stimulus can further be visual (e.g., point’s movement
on a screen), a bodily movement, or statistical information. This type of information can be
further embedded in a specic framing (e.g. regulatory focus framing).
Related to the salience of the stimulus is the valence. this means that the dierent information
(feedback before decision) can be loss vs. win framing. Or a kind of physical pain if the task
has a pain-avoidance incentive instead of a monetary incentive (see Suri, Sheppes, Schwartz,
and Gross (2013)).
Concerning the decision type, decision inertia-related task dier between choices and esti-
mates. In choice tasks the participants have to decide between a yes option and a no option,
or between multiple urns or strategies (up to n). If they have to guess, they are mostly asked
to guess the probability of a specic outcome or event. In other tasks, they are asked to rate
their individual condence in their decision.
The pay-os or incentives of the studies also diverge. Some studies have a linear pay-o func-
tion, while others studies provide lottery tickets paid after the completion of the study. Others
mix these kinds of incentives, or pay their participants with course credits, or participants
volunteer.
Finally, another specic characteristic of decision inertia tasks are time restrictions. Some stud-
ies have only a specic time horizon before participants must answer.
By reviewing the presented decision inertia studies since the 1950s, I have illustrated that
there exist various tasks to measure decision inertia. Specically, judgement and decision-
making research provides dierent sophisticated approaches to measure decision inertia in
a neutral setting without co-foundations with other factors. All these task can be describes
by dierent design characteristics (see Table 13), which allow measurement of the inuence
of dierent factors on choice repetition, erroneous belief-updating, and control of dierent
individual parameters and inter-individual dierences in decision-making.
In addition, there exist various approaches to measure decision-making based on motoral, vi-
sual, and cognitive elements of belief-updating tasks in dierent settings and under dierent
circumstances, while the calculation of decision inertia further diers across the studies. Al-
though these studies provide insight into decision inertia, this subject results in a varied and
unacceptably high number of conceptions of decision inertia. There remains a need to pro-
vide structure to the discussion and sharpen the understanding and measurement of decision
inertia, its underlying mental processes, and its manifestations.
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Figure 19: One trial in a belief-updating task containing two choices (2CBU), following the
dual-choice paradigm, based on Jung and Dorner (2017), and Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016).
4.2.2 Decision-Inertia in a Dual-Choice Paradigm
This section illustrates that this problem can be solved by generalizing existing tasks to a so-
called "dual-choice paradigm" (Jung & Dorner, 2017; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), which underlies
previous decision inertia studies. In particular, I provide a framework to reproduce decision
inertia reliably in the lab, which can be used as a guideline for further decision inertia oper-
ationalizations. One further benet of such a generalization is that this makes existing and
future decision inertia studies comparable, facilitating discussion of its inuences and drivers.
As you have seen, there exist various approaches to measure decision-making based on mo-
toral, visual, and cognitive measures in belief-updating tasks - with such a framework the
inuence of dierent factors on decision inertia can be measured directly.
As illustrated in Figure 19, in most decision inertia tasks, the decision-maker is faced with two
subsequent (or multiple sequential) decisions. Normally, the rst decision is made under un-
certainty, and the second or following decisions rely on the rst decision and the information
provided in response to the rst decision (see Figure 19). The reason is that the decision-maker
does not know the state of the world and has to make a rst decision to gather information.
A rational decision-maker would now consider the information and update his beliefs accord-
ingly (e.g. based on the Bayesian Theorem).
To illustrate that in more detail, take for instance the task from Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) or Pitz
(1969). In the rst step, participants are faced with two urns, but the state of the environment
is unknown to them (in one state, the left urn is better, in the other state, the right one is
better). Consequently, they must choose one of the rst urns randomly. However, based on
the information of the rst draw, they can make an optimal or suboptimal subsequent decision.
In this work, I follow suggestions from Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) that the manifestation of deci-
sion inertia is the result of convergent or divergent processes. Decision inertia is one process
that potentially conicts with deliberative processes (e.g., Bayesian updating), and intuitive
processes (e.g., reinforcement learning).
Following this rationale, and if only the outcome of a decision is observed, the interaction
of the mental processes behind that decision cannot be understood. In particular, in some
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Figure 20: A process framework for the operationalization of decision inertia in a 2CBU, based
on (Jung & Dorner, 2017).
situations the repetition of a decision can be rational or strategically useful. Take for instance,
a game without consequences of inertia and free information available in the future. On the
other hand, there are many situations where this behaviour is suboptimal, or can have at least
life threatening consequences (e.g. patient inertia (Suri et al., 2013)). As a consequence, there
exist decisions, where the tendency to rely on a previous decision is rational (convergent with
other cognitive processes), and where it is not (divergent with cognitive processes).
• Alignment Situation (Process Convergence): The decision-maker gets conrming
information, indicating that his rst decision is probably the optimal decision. Conse-
quently, decision inertia is in line with deliberative processes. If the decision-maker
decides to switch to another option, it would be an error.
• Conict Situation (Process Divergence): The decision-maker gets dis-conrming in-
formation, indicating that his rst decision is probably not the optimal decision. Conse-
quently, decision inertia is in conict with deliberative processes. If the decision-maker
decides to stay, it would be an error.
To nd an adequate measure of decision inertia, most studies measure the decision-maker’s
tendency to under-estimate the new information, or to stick to the previous decision compared
to the situation in which it is rational to rely on decision inertia. Such an operationalization
is illustrated in Figure 20, and has been in detailed in Section 4.2.1.
Figure 20 illustrates two subsequent decisions. The two stages of the trial allow manipulating
the information a decision-maker gets. This is the most popular setup to reproduce the inertia
eect reliably in the laboratory. It allows multiple variations to test for other drivers or to
control for specic variables (see Table 13). For instance, the decision-maker can be forced
to choose a losing or wining option in the rst round to manipulate commitment or aect.
The decision is based on a single stimulus presentation, thus reducing the cognitive eort to
a minimum, and representing a very controlled setting.
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4.3 Research Model and Hypothesis Development
Recent behavioural economic and psychological research has suggested that human decision-
making anomalies can be explained by dual-processing theory (see Section 2.1). This paradigm
suggests that decision inertia can be explained by motivational and cognitive factors in system
1 and its interaction with system 2 processing. In this study, I want to abstract from the specic
context of decision inertia, to provide results that can be generalized to other research areas.
After investigating decision inertia in a general setting, I want to use these insights to develop
counter methods to reduce decision inertia in a specic context (nancial decision support,
Part III of this work, Section 5).
Figure 21: Dierent possible drivers of decision inertia: Motivational factors, cognitive fac-
tors, and emotional factors could explain why people rely on decision inertia in decision-
making.
For that purpose, it is necessary to consider especially the motivational, emotional and cog-
nitive drivers of decision inertia. Therefore, the most relevant possible drivers that could be
identied in the literature are presented in the following. They are systematically classied in
the dual-processing model and their signicance for decision inertia is demonstrated.
4.3.1 Consistency-Seeking (H1)
Preference for consistency is a personality trait based on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger,
1962). It describes the motivation strength of a decision-maker to avoid existing or per-
ceived cognitive inconsistencies like contradictory or conicting thoughts, states or beliefs
(Cialdini et al., 1995). Following this rationale, it is assumed that dissonant cognitions are per-
ceived as highly unpleasant states, and decision-makers use dierent strategies to reduce them.
Decision-makers underestimating their preference for consistency are known for overbidding
in wars of attrition and remaining in costly auctions, even if the chances to win are very low
(Eyster, 2002). So far, many theories have provided evidence of the aversion of decision-makers
to dissonant cognitions (see Rokeach (1960)). The preference for consistency scale measures
this sensitivity of decision makers to resolve contradictions by (irrational) behaviour.
In decision inertia research, it is argued that decision makers could commit themselves to
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the rst decision (Pitz, 1969), and hence stick to it because of cognitive dissonance caused by
change (Grabitz, 1971; Grabitz & Grabitz-Gniech, 1972). Consequently, decision makers are
motivated to avoid dissonance by consistency-seeking, manifesting as decision-inertial be-
haviour. Other researchers have argued that decision makers do not think through a given
issue again, because of their tendency to be consistent, and hence produce decision inertia
behaviour (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). In contrast, research by Zhang et al. (2014) has found no
eect of consistency-seeking towards repeated cheating in a decision task. In their task, par-
ticipants were faced with two subsequent tasks in which they could easily cheat without being
detected. Participants tended to repeat the initial decision across dierent domains, irrespec-
tive of their level of need for consistency. Zhang et al. put forward an alternative explanation,
namely that individuals dier in their regulatory focus when pursuing goals (Higgins, 1998).
Promotion focus refers to maximizing gains in the long run while prevention focus refers to
minimizing losses in the short term. Their results illustrate that prevention focus was indeed
linked to tendency to repeat the initial decision, while preference for consistency did not play
a signicant role (Zhang et al., 2014). However, the experimental setting from Zhang et al. is
dicult to compare with previous decision inertia settings. It seems possible that the moral
task they used aected decision-makers dierently than the neutral decision tasks used in
previous studies.
Additional research was devoted to the eects of choice autonomy. It has been argued that if
decision inertia is based on the preference to be perceived as consistent, the eect should in-
crease following autonomous decisions, and decrease following forced decisions (Alós-Ferrer
et al., 2016). In other words, decision makers will commit themselves more to decisions they
choose deliberately but not to decisions that were made under pressure. This expectation is
in line with other studies investigating inertia in sequential Bayesian updating tasks (Geller &
Pitz, 1968; Brody, 1965), reporting an inuence of commitment.
In the study by Brody, participants were asked to make a preliminary decision of one of two
choices before receiving information about the nature of these choices (Geller & Pitz, 1968). In
the subsequent task, they received information cues from which they could conclude whether
this decision was optimal or suboptimal. After each cue, the test participants had to state their
condence in the merit of their decision. The ndings show that initial preliminary commit-
ment is related to an increase in initial condence in a decision compared to no commitment.
In the context of unsuccessful decisions it is further related to an overestimation of the suc-
cess of the option compared to decision makers that committed to a conrming option. Brody
concludes that committed decision makers needed more disconrming information after an
unsuccessful decision, compared to decision makers without an initial commitment. This con-
clusion indicates that even preliminary autonomous decisions under uncertainty could push
the decision maker towards decision inertia.
Notably, Zhang et al. (2014) did not observe reliable eects of consistency-seeking on decision
inertia. However, their study employed a rather unusual moral decision task that might be
responsible for this null eect. I thus opted to test the consistency-seeking hypothesis once
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again, this time using Alós-Ferrer’s more neutral paradigm, which has been shown to elicit
decision inertia reliably. Hence, I assume that participants with a high tendency towards con-
sistency will more often show decision inertia.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). Decision inertia is associated with an individual’s preference for consis-
tency.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). Decision inertia is associated with decision autonomy, that is, free initial
decisions increase, forced initial decisions decrease decision inertia.
4.3.2 Indecisiveness (H2)
Closely related to this concern is another motivational factor, namely indecisiveness. This
construct describes the inability to make decisions in a timely manner across situations and
domains (Frost & Shows, 1993). It has two components: rst threat-oriented cognition and
negative aect in response to decisions, and second one that manifests as avoidant prefer-
ences and diculties in response to decisions (Spunt et al., 2009). Compared to indecision, that
is, an individuals’ inability to nd a solution that ts his or her preferences best, indecisive-
ness targets individuals’ dispositions such that no decision is taken and that they experience
diculties in reaching a decision (Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002). Hence, I expect that individ-
uals who experience more indecisiveness than others will be more likely to repeat a previous
decision regardless of the consequences.
Evidence for this hypothesis is provided by Sautua (2017) who reported an inuence of inde-
cisiveness on decision-inertial behaviour. Similarly, J. W. Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988)
reported the role of indecisiveness and decision time in a risk condition. They observed an
increased response time for indecisive individuals compared to decisive individuals. This nd-
ing is in line with existing decision inertia research from Alós-Ferrer who reported a positive
correlation between decision inertia and response times (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Achtziger
& Alós-Ferrer, 2013). Notably, this eect exists only in risk conditions, in no-risk conditions
decisive individuals and indecisive individuals did not dier (J. W. Payne et al., 1988), an ob-
servation comparable to the ndings from Charness and Levin who found that risk-reduction
(only paying the second decision in a subsequent task) also reduced the inertia rate (Charness
& Levin, 2005). Payne also observed that highly indecisive participants tend to favour less ex-
haustive decision strategies. Taken together, these ndings suggest that decision inertia could
partly result from the motivational trait of indecisiveness.
Summarizing these concerns, I argue that decision inertia could be caused by indecisiveness in
addition to consistency-seeking as an underlying motivation. Thus, I expect that individuals
will exhibit less decision inertia if I oered a choice set with a decision avoidance option as
compared to the standard choice set in which they are forced to decide. In addition, I expect
that individuals hesitant to make decisions as measured by the indecisiveness scale (Frost &
Shows, 1993) are more likely to rely on decision inertia.
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Hypothesis 2a (H2a). Decision inertia is positively associated with an individual’s indecisive-
ness (as measured by the indecisiveness scale (Frost & Shows, 1993).
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). A decision avoidance option will disentangle the repetition of a choice
from rejecting a decision and hence reduce decision inertia, compared to decisions with no such
option.
4.3.3 Emotions and Arousal (H3)
Deliberative decision-making relies on the interplay of sensory and emotional information,
and memories of previous decisions and outcomes (Haber, 2011). A driver of biased decision-
making, counteracting these deliberative processes, is arousal. Because, intuitive processes
are processed with substantially less cognitive eort, combined with a low threshold for pro-
cessing information (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), arousal inuences individuals tendency to rely
on these processes (Sanbonmatsu & Kardes, 1988). In particular, in decision-making under
risk, recent research illustrates the negative inuence of high levels of arousal on subjective
evaluations (Dhar & Gorlin, 2013). Regarding decision inertia, there is evidence that arousal
could be a possible reason for individuals to rely on decision inertia.
Initial evidence, pointing to the inuence of aective arousal on decision inertia can be found
in Charness and Levin (2005). In a sequential belief-updating task, the decision inertia eect
can be reliably reproduced (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). However, they also reported that, if the
rst decision is not rewarded, the decision inertia eect is reduced. Hence, the (aective)
response to the rst decision seems to be a relevant driver of decision inertia. More evidence
for this hypothesis comes from (Yu et al., 2010). In a study, investigating the neural basis
of repetition behaviour, reliance on a default could be linked to brain areas responsible for
anticipating risk and risk-attitude. Hence, inter-individual dierences in aective responses
to the rst decision in the ventral stratum, along with the linked bio-physiological responses,
could be a possible explanation for occurrences of decision inertia (Yu et al., 2010).
If decision inertia is a cognitive process potentially conicting with deliberative processes like
Bayesian updating, we expect that this conict also manifests physiologically. Hence, because
the tendency to resist decision inertia and to rely on deliberative thinking requires more eort
than relying on intuitive processing, this tendency should increase an individual’s cognitive
arousal. This assumption supports existing approaches to measure decision-inertia physio-
logically, as in the work of (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), who propose decision-time as a further
indicator for the conicting processes and the tendency to rely on decision inertia.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). An increase in arousal is associatedwith an increase in deliberative thinking,
and hence with decreased error rates.
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4.3.4 Action Orientation (H4)
Next, I turn to the question of the degree to which decision inertia is driven by the results of
previous decisions. The theory of action control (Kuhl, 1994b, 1981) suggests that people dier
in disposition as to how they process negative or positive events. In particular, the theory of
action control suggests that the manner in which negative events are processed is moderated
by the action orientation of a decision maker. Action orientation is a personality dimension
and can be measured using the action orientation scale by Kuhl.
Research suggests that highly action-orientated decision makers go easily about negative
events, are more overcondent in their ability to inuence events, and are more motivated
to take action (De Lange & Van Knippenberg, 2009; Jostmann, Koole, Van Der Wulp, & Fock-
enberg, 2005; Kuhl, 1994b). For instance, Raab and Johnson have observed that action-oriented
players made faster and riskier decisions than did less action-oriented decision makers (Raab
& Johnson, 2004). On the other hand, low action-oriented (so-called state-oriented) decision
makers are barely able to regulate their emotions and to accommodate negative experiences.
It is important to note that action orientation may not only help decision makers to over-
come negative consequences and maintain intentions but that it is also linked to the tendency
to make a decision too quickly and without considering possible negative consequences in
sucient detail. These features of action orientation have been replicated in the context of
irrational choice negation and inaction inertia (Van Putten, Zeelenberg, & Van Dijk, 2009).
Moreover, Kazén et al. have reported that state-oriented participants who have diculties
overcoming negative events perform better in error detection than do action-oriented partic-
ipants after experiencing a negative aect (Kuhl, 1994b, 1994a, 1981).
Following these arguments, I assume that action orientation could partly explain why decision
makers rely on decision inertia. To illustrate this, let us rst assume that the rst of two subse-
quent decisions was suboptimal. State-oriented decision makers will tend to rethink their next
decision and not make it regardless of the consequences, because they cannot easily ignore
the negative aect of the loss. However, action-oriented decision makers will not attach any
particular importance to the loss and will make their decision regardless of this loss. There-
fore, they will also tend to repeat a suboptimal decision that resulted in a loss, and thus show
more decision inertia.
This consideration leads us to our next hypothesis. I expect action-oriented or disengaged
decision makers to be more prone to exhibiting decision inertia. Specically, because they
will be less inuenced by the negative result of the rst decision, they will more likely rely
on the suboptimal choice again, as contrasted compared to state-oriented decision makers
who perceive the loss information more severely (van Putten, Zeelenberg, & Van Dijk, 2013;
Van Putten et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Decision inertia after a loss is positively associated with an individual’s
action-orientation.
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4.3.5 Bayesian Updating and Conservatism (H5)
The foregoing discussion has focused on motivational variables that have so far been inves-
tigated as determinants of decision inertia almost exclusively. In the current work, I extend
the psychological perspective by including potential cognitive variables as well. I propose that
decision inertia varies with cognitive factors. Our rst assumption relates to the processing of
uncertain information and the process of updating probabilities of hypotheses based on a sam-
ple of observations. Experimental studies have provided ample evidence of conservatism in
the intuitive probability estimates of humans, caused by imperfect Bayesian updating (Phillips
& Edwards, 1966). Conservatism means that newly acquired sampling information is consid-
ered to an insucient degree as compared to the normative standard of the Bayesian’ theorem.
Rather, people tend to rely on base-rates determined on a priori grounds more than they should
according to Bayes’ Theorem.
By comparing subjective with objective probabilities, Little and Lintz reported constant dif-
ferences at the subject level that could partly explain the deviations of future subjective prob-
abilities from correct Bayesian probabilities (Little & Lintz, 1965). Following this rationale,
this conservatism bias may lead to seemingly irrational behaviour – in our case, to the in-
sucient updating of a prior belief and hence, to a repetition of a decision that has become
less favourable according to the new and incoming information. Thus, the well-documented
Bayesian conservatism might explain decision inertia without the need to invoke motivational
explanations.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Decision inertia is associated with suboptimal Bayesian updating (i.e., con-
servatism, cf. Phillips and Edwards (1966)): The more conservatism in Bayesian updating, the
stronger the decision inertia eect.
4.3.6 Evidence Threshold (H6)
Furthermore, I propose that a further cognitive factor refers to the accumulation of evidence
against a currently held hypothesis vis-á-vis the individual evidence threshold of a person – that
is, how much evidence is required to convince a person to switch to an alternative hypothesis
or, in other words, to reject a currently held hypothesis.
A similar concept was proposed in early Bayesian-updating studies (Kozielecki, 1966). Kozi-
elecki proposed that decision makers vary in that they can require dierent levels of evidence
to accept a hypothesis as true. He reported that participants did not adjust their level of con-
dence after disconrming information, until a specic level of evidence was accumulated.
Also, Hausmann and Läge (2008) have showen that an individually assessed evidence threshold
could predict subsequent information search and stop behaviour better than various decision
heuristics proposed in the literature (Hausmann & Läge, 2008). Similarly, Söllner and Bröder
(2016) have demonstrated that participants varied considerably in their evidence thresholds,
but the thresholds were also sensitive to extrinsic factors such as acquisition costs (Söllner &
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Bröder, 2016).
Whereas our rst cognitive explanation focuses on the ability to properly update probabilistic
information, the second one emphasizes individual dierences in the desired level of condence
(e.g., the probability or evidence against, which a currently held hypothesis can be abandoned
in favour of a hypothesis)
Hypothesis 6 (H6). Decision inertia is associated with individual dierences in evidence thresh-
olds: The higher the threshold, the stronger the inertia eect.
4.3.7 Faith in Intuition (H7)
Furthermore, I assume that individuals’ tendency to rely on decision inertia is associated with
the tendency to use heuristic processing and cognitive shortcuts. For instance, biased decisions
have been associated with lower capacity for cognitive reection (Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011),
as measured by the cognitive-reection test (Frederick, 2005). Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer
have shown that high scores in the cognitive-reection test are linked to overweighting of the
sample information (Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2012). In a subsequent study, Alós-Ferrer and
Hügelschäfer compared the inuence of dierences in the intuitive-analytic cognitive styles
of decision-makers on errors in probability judgments (Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2016).
They found evidence that the tendency to rely on heuristic decision-making and suboptimal
probability processing. Following this rationale, I assume the following:
Hypothesis 7 (H7). Faith in intuition is positively associated with decision inertia
4.3.8 Framing (H8)
Relying on regulatory focus and framing literature, I assume a relationship between a specic
regulatory focus orientation and decision inertia. In particular, promotion-focused individu-
als are more likely to behave more riskily in memory classication tasks (Higgins, 1997). This
behaviour is in line with the ndings of Liberman et al., who showed that promotion-focused
individuals are more likely to exchange a resumed task for a dierent task (Liberman, Idson,
Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). They showed the same for changing an endowed object. Hence,
promotion-focused individuals are open to change and tend to revise previous decisions even
if the new situation does not explicitly represent a gain. This proclivity makes promotion-
focused individuals hold less to previous decisions, even if they had positive outcomes. This
is in accordance with Friedman and Foerster, who showed that promotion-oriented individ-
uals are more creative and tend to use less conservative strategies in order to come up with
new ideas Friedman (2001, p.102). In a subsequent study, they could show a relationship be-
tween promotion-focus and less accurate but faster task performance (Förster, Grant, Idson,
& Higgins, 2001), which should increase their error rates when Bayesian updating is in line
with decision inertia. On the other hand, considering prevention focus, Friedman and Förster
found that prevention focus cues, for example cues that induce a prevention focus state, lead to
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Figure 22: Final research model, with the most relevant potential drivers of decision inertia,
separated into motivational, cognitive and emotional factors.
more risk-averse, less creative and hence a more perseverate processing procedure (Friedman
& Förster, 2001). Specically, they had participants think of as many ways of use for a brick
that they can think of. They found that prevention-focused individuals used many exemplars
that they had already used in a previous task or associated material and hence came up with
less innovative, but more conservative ideas. Liberman et al. showed that prevention-focused
individuals tend to resume with an interrupted task (Liberman et al., 1999), showing a ten-
dency to adhere previous decisions. This nding accords with those of Zhang et al. (2014),
who showed that a prevention focus leads to a repetition of even immoral previous behaviour.
As a consequence, I assume that promotion-focused individuals will behave in more exploratory
and risky ways, while prevention-focused individuals behave more conservatively and repeat
a decision. Therefore, I argue that prevention-focused decision-makers should show more de-
cision inertia (loss vs. non-loss framing), and promotion-focused decision-makers respectively
less decision inertia (gain vs. non-gain framing).
Hypothesis 8 (H8). A situational prevention focus (loss vs. non-loss) compared to a promotion
focus (gain vs. non-gain) is positively associated with decision inertia
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4.4 Investigating Motivational and Physiological Drivers of Decision
Inertia
The main purpose of this experiment was to examine motivational and emotional drivers of
inertia in decision-making. I assumed that motivational aspects and emotions could explain
why decision-maker rely on decision inertia. As the subsequent studies of this part, this work
builds upon a multiple-process perspective of decision inertia, as proposed by Alós-Ferrer et
al. (2016) and Alós-Ferrer and Strack (2014). Hence, I consider decision-making as the result
of interacting processes that can converge or diverge (see Section 2.1). Based on this per-
spective, Alós-Ferrer and colleagues suggest that decision inertia is caused by automatized,
unconscious, and eortless processes that diverge from rational, slow, resource-consuming
deliberations Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016). This understanding of decision inertia, that I adopt
here, suggests that decision inertia can be observed when intuitive and deliberative decision
processes are in divergence, resulting in more suboptimal outcomes.
4.4.1 Method
The dependent variable of this investigation is decision inertia, that is, the decision-makers’
tendency to repeat the previous decision regardless of the consequences, even if it is clearly in-
ferior to other options (Sautua, 2017; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). In an experimental task, decision
inertia means that decision-makers will repeat their previous decision.
To test the rst three hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H2a, H2b, and H3), I made use of the dual choice
paradigm based on experimental tasks that have previously been used to induce decision in-
ertia (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Pitz, 1969).
Fur this purpose, I implemented the urn game task from Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016); Charness
and Levin (2005) two choice options. The game includes two equally likely states of the world
("up" and "down") and two lotteries (left and right). The lotteries consist of two urns, each of
which contains six black or white balls. In the up state, the left urn contains four black balls
and the right urn contains two black balls. In the down state, the distribution of black balls is
reversed: The left urn contains two black balls, the right urn four.
One round of the game consists of two consecutive urn draws such that drawing a black ball
results in a reward. The state of the world remains constant throughout one round (e.g., two
consecutive draws). The participants can choose freely whether to draw from the left or the
right urn but they have no information about the state of the world prior to the rst draw. After
the rst draw, they can infer the most likely state of the world (hence, the pay-o-maximizing
urn choice for the nal draw) based on the colour of the drawn ball. If participants are fully
rational Bayesian updaters, it is expected for them to make pay-o-maximizing choices by
always choosing the urn with the higher probability of containing four black balls.
Following the dual-choice paradigm, I would expect participants who exhibit decision inertia
to stay with their rst choice. If they chose the right urn for the rst draw, they will chose
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Table 14: Implemented lotteries of the urn game, based on (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Pitz, 1969).
State Left Urn Right Urn
up (p=.5) • • • • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
down (p=.5) • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ ◦
the right urn for the second draw – regardless of the consequences of their rst decision. For
example, let us assume that the participant chooses the right urn in the rst draw. If the result
is a white ball, it is more likely that the state of the world is up. To maximize their chances of
drawing a black ball in the second draw, the participant ought to choose the left urn for their
second draw. Staying with the rst (i.e., inertia-driven) choice would be suboptimal.
Conversely, if the participant chose the right urn in the rst draw and came up with a black
ball, it is more likely that the state of the world is down. The participant ought to choose
the right urn again for their second draw. Optimal choice and inertia-driven choice would be
identical in this case (choose right urn again).
I expect that if decision inertia is present, I will observe more suboptimal decisions when
Bayesian updating and decision inertia-driven choices diverge (e.g. in the case of drawing a
losing ball rst). In this situation, decision inertia would predict to repeat drawing from that
urn, while correct Bayesian updating suggests switching urns. These two processes are in
divergence and result in two dierent behavioural outcomes. However, when the rst ball is a
win, both processes converge and predict to repeat the urn. Following this rationale, I measure
the occurrence of decision inertia by comparing the rate of suboptimal decisions in the sense
of Bernoulli rationality, and response times between all situations where Bayesian updating
and decision inertia are in convergence or in divergence (Jung & Dorner, 2017; Alós-Ferrer et
al., 2016).
To test whether decision inertia is driven by indecisiveness between the two urns, I imple-
mented a third option. Every second pair of draw decision participants is faced with an avoid-
ance option. This option results in a small but xed return. I assume that this option would
give indecisive individuals the possibility to choose an option without deciding (H2ab).
4.4.2 Participants
40 adult participants (27 male, 13 female, age range=18-29, M=22.4, SD=3.06) took part in the
experiment at Karlsruhe Decision and Design Lab. They received a participation fee of 2.50
Euro and a performance-based payment of 0.10 Euro for each drawn black ball. Mean pay-o
was 6.48 Euro (SD=0.47). If they decided to press the avoidance option, they got a small xed
return (0.01 Euro). The experiment took approximately 30 minutes.
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Figure 23: Procedure of the experimental investigation of Study 1.
4.4.3 Physiological Measures
In this study I used Electrocardiography (ECG), to measure the electrical activity of the heart.
I measured the heart rate in beats per minute, which is a common proxy for the participants
current level of arousal (Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Berntson & Cacioppo, 2007). Following
H3, I assumed that decision inertia and arousal are associated with increased cognitive eort,
resulting in increased heart rate variability measured by the ECG. In particularly, I focus on
the arousal of each individual decision-maker in each phase of the experiment (e.g, rst draw,
rst result, second draw, and second result). Every decision-maker’s heart rate was measured
relative to basic arousal level as assessed in a calibration phase before the experiment (θHR).
4.4.4 Procedure
In a rst step, the decision task, instructions and questionnaires were chosen in line with
(Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016) and Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013). In this design, participants are
faced with two choice situations or treatments. Based on the result of the rst choice, in the
second choice the decision to rely on the previous option can be optimal (correct Bayesian
updating), or it can be suboptimal (no correct Bayesian updating). I measure decision inertia
as the tendency to rely on the rst of two subsequent choices, regardless of the outcome of the
rst one by comparing the rates of suboptimal decisions in case of divergence and convergence
of decision inertia and Bayesian updating. To measure the inuence of indecisiveness, I added
an avoidance option labelled “Decline” in every second two-draws round. Because I wanted
to reduce confounding eects, I varied the choice sets (standard vs. with avoidance option)
alternately.
Overall, I organized the experiment based on the general experimental framework for conduct-
ing IS experiments with Brownie (Jung, Adam, Dorner, & Hariharan, 2017). Consequently, the
experiment consisted of ve main steps: In the rst step, the sensors were attached to the
participants. The sensors of female participants were congured and attached by female re-
search assistants, and for male participants vice-versa. Afterwards, the participants received
instructions on the experiment and their task. Only after they had successfully completed
a comprehension test could participants proceed to the actual experiment. In the third step,
participants played the two-draw urn game 40 times (80 draws) with the standard choice set
and the avoidance choice set alternately. In the last step, they were asked to complete ques-
tionnaires on demographics and personality-related characteristics: indecisiveness (see Spunt
et al. (2009), appendix Table 21), the short scale of preference for consistency (see Collani and
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Blank (2013), appendix Table 23), and action- and state-orientation (see Kuhl (1994b), appendix
Table 25).
4.4.5 Results
I computed the individual rates of suboptimal decisions in the two choice situations. Hence, I
compared the participant’s tendency to make an optimal decision under divergent conditions
(divergence between Bayesian updating and decision inertia) vs. convergent conditions (con-
vergence between Bayesian updating and decision inertia). An optimal decision is a decision
in the sense of the Bayesian theorem. If Bayesian updating predicts the repetition of a deci-
sion, decision inertia is in line with the optimal decision. However, it results in suboptimal
decisions if it would be optimal to switch according to Bayes’ theorem. A major explanation of
suboptimal decisions in divergent conditions is that participants rely on decision inertia, while
an explanation of suboptimal decisions in convergent situations might be that the participants
simply make careless errors in their behavioural response (e.g., clicking the wrong choice).
The mean rates of suboptimal decisions in the two choice situations in case of divergence
and convergence between inertia and correct Bayesian updating were 32.8 % (SD=29.2) and
6.5 % (SD=10.4), respectively. Hence, decision makers decided much more frequently in a
suboptimal way if decision inertia and Bayesian updating prescribed opposite choices. Because
the error rates are not normally distributed, I used a non-parametric test for dierences in
medians. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated that mean error rates in case of
divergence were signicantly higher than in case of convergence (n = 40, Z = 4.7883, p ≤
.001, r = .76). Previous studies reported similar error rates (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). Hence,
our results suggest that I were able to replicate the decision inertia eect reliably in our setting
and that the eect size is similar to that of previous studies (e.g. Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016)).
Because I assumed that decision inertia could be driven by decision avoidance (H2b), I added
a third button that returned a small but xed pay-o of 0.01 Euro (see above) to provide an
adequate possibility for indecisive individuals to choose an option without the need to process
the information or to actively decide upon one of the two urns. To investigate this assumption,
I checked for signicance dierences between the two dierent choice sets. In a rst step, I
split the data into two choice sets with and without the avoidance option, and then I checked
whether the decision inertia eect persisted in both sets. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank
test indicated that the dierences in mean error rates were signicant for both choice sets
(standard set: Z = 4.4836, p ≤ .001, r = .72, set with avoidance option: Z = 4.4226, p ≤
.001, r = .71), but mean error rates between the two choice sets did not signicantly dier
(convergence: Z = 0.53931, p ≥ .05, r = .08; divergence: Z = 1.3462, p ≥ .05, r = .21).
Figure 24 illustrates these relationships.
However, the avoidance option was rarely chosen: Only 9 times did participants decide to
choose the avoidance option instead of one of the two urns in the whole experiment (n=3,
min=2, max=4).
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Figure 24: Suboptimal behaviour distributions in decisions with and without an avoidance
option.
Other studies suggest that the conict of decision inertia and deliberation manifests addition-
ally as increased response times (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). Mean response times in case of
conict were 1562 ms (median=1539 ms, SD=402 ms) and in case of alignment 1473 ms (me-
dian=1448 ms, SD=423 ms). A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated that there was
signicant dierence (n = 42, Z = 1.77, p ≤ .1, r = .3).
Figure 25: Comparison of the distribution of individual response-times in case of conict
(black) and alignment (grey)
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As an indicator of arousal, I measured individuals’ heart rates before the experiment, and
during decision-making. Heart rates were derived from the ECG data determined with bio
plux hubs. To compare heart rate changes across participants I computed an additional heart
rate value per participant normalized by the baseline heart rate from the initial rest period.
(a) Arousal in win vs. loss condition (b) Arousal after optimal vs. suboptimal decision
Figure 26: Comparison of the distribution of arousal after a positive result (black) and negative
result (grey), or after overcoming decision inertia compared to relying on decision inertia.
At rst, I computed the mean arousal level during decision-making in case of aligned and
conicting processes. Mean heart rates in case of conict were 72.6 bpm (median=75.5 bpm,
SD=25.6 bpm) and in case of alignment 72.0 bpm (median=76.2 bpm, SD=26.6 bpm). A
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated that there was no signicant dierence (n =
42, Z = 0.36, p ≥ .05, r = .05).
Secondly, I compared the mean arousal level of the participants after decision-making. A two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated that there was no signicant dierence of mean
heart rates (n = 42, Z = 1.6, p ≥ .05, r = .25) in case of relying on a suboptimal de-
cision (mean=76.0 bpm , median=76.4 bpm, SD=25.3 bpm) and in case of correct Bayesian
updating (mean=74.0 bpm, median=76.4 bpm, SD=25.5 bpm). However, I found signicant
(n = 42, Z = 2.49, p ≤ .05, r = .4) dierences in case of a positive result (mean=74.2
bpm , median=75.7 bpm, SD=23.7 bpm) and in case of a negative result (mean=75.9 bpm,
median=77.8 bpm, SD=24.0 bpm).
Furthermore, I found a decreasing heart rate across the experiment (see Figure 27), in line with
recent ndings in the literature and linked to a habituation eect of participants towards the
task and the experimental situation (Wilson, 1992).
Regarding the error distributions at an individual level, I found considerable heterogeneity
across individuals. Similar results have been reported by Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016); Charness
and Levin (2005), indicating that our results matched those of other researchers also at the
individual level. Figure 28 illustrates the frequency of individual error rates across the partic-
ipants.
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Figure 27: Deceasing arousal level across the experimental treatment.
Figure 28: Frequency of suboptimal behaviour in case of convergence or divergence with
decision inertia.
To investigate possible antecedents of decision inertia, I measured dierent personality traits.
Following the urn game, all participants had to complete a web-based questionnaire. With
the exception of the preference for consistency score (mean=3.47, SD=0.82, α=0.62, each item
measured on a 5-point Likert scale), the internal consistency of our independent personality-
related variables indecisiveness (mean=2.83, SD=0.72, α=0.85, also measured using 5-point
Likert-scales per item), and decision-related action-orientation (mean=0.53, SD=0.25, α=0.76,
binary scale per item) was overall around 0.8, indicating sucient internal consistency of the
construct measures.
I followed previous studies (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Charness & Levin, 2005) and conducted a
random eect regression on suboptimal (e.g., non-Bayesian) decisions (binary variable, 1=True)
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to take the individual observations into account. I considered each participant as a random ef-
fect and all other factors as xed eects. To compare situations where decision inertia diverged
versus converged with Bayesian updating, I added a dummy variable indicating divergence (bi-
nary variable, 1=True). Note that this variable allows one to distinguish whether the predictors
considered aect suboptimal behaviour in general (no interaction with divergence dummy) or
whether they aect the occurrence of decision inertia selectively (interaction with divergence).
This is a common procedure to measure the inuence of factors on decision inertia (see e.g.
Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016); Charness and Levin (2005)). All variables were z-standardized to
obtain standardized beta regression coecients.
Table 15: Random-eects probit regression on suboptimal behaviour (1=suboptimal).
Variable Beta (SE) P
(Intercept) -1.67 < 0.001 ***
Action orientation -0.28 0.11
Divergence (1=True) 1.37 < 0.001 ***
Preference for Consistency -0.19 0.23
Indecisiveness -0.02 0.89
Avoidance Option (1=True) 0.06 0.69
Trial Number -0.07 0.10 .
Gender (1=Male) -0.43 0.15
Divergence x Action orientation 0.28 < 0.01 **
Divergence x Preference for Consistency 0.08 0.42
Divergence x Indecisiveness 0.10 0.32
Divergence x Avoidance Option -0.13 0.50
Number of obs: 1560; random eect: participant id, participants: 40; Tjur’s D = .308,
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Considering the non-interaction eects, there is a positive eect of divergence (p < 0.001) as
expected. This indicates that divergence of cognitive processes leads to a generally increased
risk-ratio to make a suboptimal decision.
On the other hand, if I split suboptimal behaviours into choice repetition when switching is
better (decision inertia; divergence = True) and switching when repetition would be more
optimal (error; divergence = False) by considering the interaction of divergence with other
predictors, I nd a signicant inuence of action orientation. Because action orientation is
only signicant as an interaction eect with the divergence indicator, this nding suggests that
action orientation boosts decision inertia selectively, not suboptimal second-draw decisions in
general.
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4.4.6 Discussion
The results do not support the notion that decision inertia is driven by motivational inu-
ences such as commitment or consistency-seeking. In this setting, the regression (see Table
15) showed no signicant inuence of preference for consistency and no signicant interaction
eect between consistency-seeking and divergence. This nding suggests that the tendency
to repeat a decision might emerge for other reasons. At rst glance, this result is align with
ndings such as those of Zhang et al. (2014), who reported no signicant inuence of prefer-
ence for consistency. Nevertheless, recent research also shows that decision inertia is a subtle
process (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). It cannot be ruled out that the avoidance option available
in every second choice set of our setting could have diminished the participants’ need to feel
consistent. Conversely, the "free-choice vs. forced-choice" setting of Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016)
could have pushed participants to be consistent with their initial decisions. I test these pos-
sibilities in the next study. Another reason for these inconsistent ndings might be, that the
results revealed only a very low internal consistency for the preference for consistency score
(α = 0.61) in the sample.
Additionally, I checked for possible inuences of individual dierences in indecisiveness (H2a)
or decision avoidance (H2b). In both cases I found no signicant inuence, in particular no
inuence of the avoidance option on error rates, and no inuence of indecisiveness on a ten-
dency to avoid a decision or repeat a previous decision. This lack of inuence suggests that
indecisiveness as a motivation to avoid decisions or negative aect when making decisions
(Spunt et al., 2009), is probably irrelevant with respect to decision inertia, at least in the deci-
sion paradigm used here.
However, the signicant interaction between action orientation and divergence indicates that
a high score in action orientation is linked to increased risk-ratio for decision inertia. Action-
oriented decision makers go easily about negative events, and hence more often show decision
inertia.
Finally, the eect of trial number tended to be negative (albeit not signicantly so, p = 0.1)
suggesting that participants committed fewer errors in second draws the longer the experi-
ment took. This trend might be due to learning eects, that is, gaining experience with the
task might result in better performance overall. These ndings agree with those of other com-
parable studies that also reported fewer second draw errors in later trials (Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2016; Charness & Levin, 2005). This agreement is interesting, because it suggests that decision
inertia could be reduced by extended training in Bayesian updating.
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4.5 Investigating Cognitive Drivers of Decision Inertia
The aim of this study was to propose and investigate a possible explanation of the mixed moti-
vational ndings concerning decision inertia. I hypothesized that inter-individual dierences
in cognitive reection, and inabilities to correctly process Bayesian information could further
be relevant drivers of the inertia phenomenon. The mixed ndings in previous studies may be
explained by inter-individual dierences in cognition.
4.5.1 Method
In this setting, I relied again on the setting of the rst task of rst experiment (see the previous
section). To compare situational regulatory focus, I had to implement a second variant of this
experimental task. In this variant, I faced the participants with two framed situations that were
equivalent with respect to probabilities and objective outcomes (see Otto, Markman, Gureckis,
& Love, 2010; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). Specically, the framing of the urn game was
changed to a task oriented around loss framing versus win framing, executed similarly to
previous studies (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2017). In the loss frame condition, participants received an
initial endowment of EUR 0.20 for each two-draw decision set and lost EUR 0.10 when drawing
a white ball. In the win frame condition, participants won EUR 0.10 when drawing a right ball
without having an initial endowment. Furthermore, participants in the promotion condition
received result messages like "You have won 0.10 MU" (e.g., MU: monetary units) or “You did
not win 0.10 MU”, and in the prevention condition they received result messages like "You
have not lost 0.10 MU" or "You lost 0.10 MU". To compare the induced situational framing,
I let the participants play each condition randomly (40 rounds promotion condition, then 40
rounds prevention condition, or in the other way round).
In the second step, the participants played one round of the Brown–Peterson distraction task
(Peterson & Peterson, 1959) to avoid direct framing or memory eects, before they played the
second version of our urn game. The distraction task took about 30 seconds, and the working
memory of the participants is overwritten, while they are asked to remember two trigrams,
while subtracting values from a number. A correct answer in the task was rewarded. Finally,
the participants were faced with a variation of the urn game to measure their capabilities in
Bayesian Updating (Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2012). In this version of task 1 the computer
choses an urn in the rst round and draws a series of balls randomly from this urn with re-
placement. After each draw, participants estimated the posterior probability that this is the
predominantly "black" urn. This task is a common procedure to measure participants capa-
bilities in Bayesian updating and conservatism, introduced by Phillips and Edwards (Phillips
& Edwards, 1966). To incentivize participants, correct answers (+/- 5 per cent error tolerance)
were rewarded with a small monetary pay-o at the end of the task. The accuracy of the esti-
mates is measured by the mean deviation between the correct Bayesian posterior probability
and the estimates over all draws (dierence between objective and subjective probability).
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4.5.2 Participants
54 adult participants (30 male, 24 female, age range=17-30, M=21.74, SD=2.54) took part in the
experiment at the Karlsruhe Decision and Design Lab. The participants were recruited from
our student pool from the Karlsruhe Decision and Design Lab, and received a participation fee
of 2.00 Euro, a payment of 3.00 Euro for the questionnaire, and a performance-based payment
of 0.10 Euro for each drawn black ball or correct answer. Mean pay-o was 10.85 Euro (SD =
1.04). The knowledge quiz and the experimental tasks took approximately 30 minutes.
4.5.3 Procedure
To address my hypotheses, I carried out the following experiment, which consisted of three
steps (see Figure 29). Approximately two weeks prior to the experiment, participants regis-
tered for our experiment. By registering a specic time for their participation, they registered
randomly for a treatment. After registering, and they were asked to participate in an online
questionnaire. They were told that they would receive 3 Euro on the day of the experiment
for lling out the questionnaire until one week before. In the questionnaire, I measured faith
in intuition (Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000) and demographics. The online questionnaire was
implemented in Limesurvey (Schmitz, 2012).
Figure 29: Procedure of the experimental investigation of Study 2
The procedure of the experiment was based on that of the previous study (see Section 4.4).
The instructions were presented on the computer. Half of the participants were rst provided
with an introduction consisting of the urn game in a win frame, followed by the urn game
in a loss frame. The other half of the participants received the same instructions, but in the
opposite order. Before the experiment, participants had to answer control questions to ensure
they understood the general procedure of the experiment. The decision tasks (urn game and
Bayesian updating game) were prepared in the KD2Lab using a computer version of the ex-
perimental task as done by Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016). The computer version was implemented
with Brownie following the Brownie standard guideline for the design and implementation of
computer-based experimental tasks (Jung, Adam, et al., 2017).
4.5.4 Results
To measure decision inertia, I compared again mean rates of suboptimal behaviour in case of
divergence and convergence between inertia and Bayesian updating (26.3 per cent, SD=24.9;
7.4 per cent, SD=12.4), respectively. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated that
the former error rate was signicantly higher than the latter (n = 54, Z = 5.39, p < .001, r =
.73). Previous studies (see Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016), or Study 4.4) report similar error rates,
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indicating that I could reproduce the inertia eect reliably in my setting. However, if I compare
errors between the win and loss-framing condition (see Figure 30), a Wilcoxon signed rank test
found no signicant dierences between Bayesian updating and decision inertia.
Figure 30: Comparison of the two framing treatments in Study 2.
Regarding error distributions at the individual level, I found inter-individual heterogeneity
(Achtziger et al., 2015; Charness & Levin, 2005), best represented by two clusters of partici-
pants. Across both conditions, one large group of participants exhibited error rates above 25
% and one smaller group showed error rates of about 60 %. Similar results have been reported
(Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), indicating that the participants did not respond randomly, and that I
could reproduce the decision inertia eect reliably.
In the investigation of the inuence of the cognitive drivers on decision inertia, all participants
had to complete a web-based questionnaire until one week before the experiment. In this ques-
tionnaire, I measured participants’ faith in intuition beforehand (mean=3.3, SD=0.6, α=0.84).
Furthermore, I standardized (z-transformed) all variables and ran a random-eect probit re-
gression on second-draw errors to investigate the relationships between skills in Bayesian up-
dating, faith in intuition, and framing. I conducted a random eect regression on suboptimal
decisions to account for the individual observations. The lack of Bayesian updating skills was
computed as the mean dierence between objective and subjective probability (as described
above).
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Figure 31: Cross-treatment comparison of suboptimal behaviour in free and forced draws.
Table 16: Random-eects probit regression on suboptimal behaviour (1=suboptimal).
Variable Beta (SE) P
(Intercept) -2.18 < 0.001 ***
Divergence (1=True) 1.07 < 0.001 ***
Framing (1=Loss, 0=Win) 0.28 0.03 *
Lack Of Bayesian Updating Skills 0.19 0.16
Faith in Intuition -0.03 0.81
Trial Number -0.03 0.41
Gender (1=Female) 0.36 0.14
Divergence x Framing (1=Loss, 0=Win) -0.12 0.44
Divergence x Lack Of Bayesian Updating
Skills
0.07 0.38
Divergence x Faith in Intuition 0.20 < 0.01 **
Number of obs: 2160; random eect: participant id, participants: 54; Tjur’s D = .27,
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
4.5.5 Discussion
Considering the direct eects on suboptimal decisions, I found a signicant positive eect of
framing on suboptimal decision-making, suggesting that participants with an induced preven-
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tion focus are more likely to make more suboptimal decisions in the urn game. The signicant
inuence of divergent processes shows that divergence of cognitive processes increases subop-
timal decisions (decision inertia). However, I found no signicant eect of Bayesian updating
skills or faith in intuition on suboptimal decision-making in my task. If I consider the drivers
of decision inertia, by examining the interaction eects of process divergence with the three
other factors, the results show a signicant eect of framing of an individual’s tendency to
rely on heuristic processing (faith in intuition), but no signicant eect of skills in Bayesian
updating or loss framing.
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4.6 Distinguishing Cognitive and Motivational Drivers of Decision
Inertia
To build on my ndings in Section 4.4 and 4.5, and to disentangle cognitive and motivation
drivers of decision inertia and addressing the remaining hypotheses, I carried out a second
experiment including three tasks: one task to measure decision inertia (Task 1) as in Section
4.4, followed by two additional tasks that measured individual evidence threshold (Task 2) and
performance in probability updating (Task 3). This experimental task has been used reliably
to induce decision inertia and allows me to compare my present ndings with those of my
rst study. In my third study, participants were again faced with two urns, each with each six
balls that could each be black or white, and there were two dierent options for how black
and white balls were distributed in the urns.
4.6.1 Method
In this setting, I also planned to investigate the inuence of decision autonomy on decision
inertia (H1b). Hence, the rst task took the same setting as in the rst experiment (see Section
4.4), but with the addition that participants were faced with free or forced draws alternately.
This experiment replicates the urn game by Alós-Ferrer et al. with forced and free decisions
(Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). The rst choice was either left to the decision-maker or made by a
computer. Because free choices result in higher commitment, this setting allowed us to investi-
gate the inuence of commitment-induced consistency on decision inertia (H1b). Furthermore,
this method allowed us to compare the ndings to the original setting from Alós-Ferrer, and
to dierentiate between autonomous and required decisions.
In the second and third tasks, participants were faced with variations of the urn game of
Task 1 (dierent distributions of black balls and number of balls per urn). In the second task
designed to measure evidence thresholds, participants were given an additional option in the
rst draw. They could draw as many balls as they liked from the rst urn (with replacement),
thus increasing their knowledge of the probable state of the world. However, each additional
draw incurred a small monetary penalty. For each of a series of trials, I identied the point
when the participants stopped sampling in order to play the lottery. To allow for a test of H5,
the number of balls drawn consecutively was used as a measure of the participant’s subjective
individual decision threshold or "desired level of condence".
In the third Bayesian updating task (see Study 2), the computer chose an urn in the rst trial
and drew a series of balls randomly from this urn with replacement. After each draw, partici-
pants estimated the posterior probability that this is the predominantly "black" urn, resembling
the probability-updating task introduced by Phillips and Edwards (Phillips & Edwards, 1966).
Correct answers were again rewarded with a small monetary pay-o at the end of the task. As
before, the accuracy of participants’ estimates was measured by the mean deviation between
the correct Bayesian posterior probability and the estimates over all draws (dierence between
objective and subjective probability).
Afterwards, participants had to respond to a questionnaire addressing motivational personal-
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ity traits (preference for consistency, action orientation) and demographical factors to replicate
our ndings from Study 1. Between the three experimental tasks, participants were given a
distraction task to avoid cognitive depletion and to reduce carry-over eects. This task was
a computer-based version of a short-term memory task introduced by Peterson and Peterson
(L. Peterson & Peterson, 1959) and was given once between the three main tasks. Participants
were faced with two trigrams (number and characters) and had to subtract 3 from the number
trigram each time a ball appears. Subsequently, they were asked to repeat one of the trigrams
randomly.
4.6.2 Participants
101 adult participants (56 male, 45 female, age range=19-37, M=22.8, SD=2.95) took part in the
experiment at Karlsruhe Decision and Design Lab. The participants received a performance-
based payment of 0.10 Euro for each black ball in the main task or correct answer in the
distraction task and 0.50 Euro for answering the questionnaire. Mean payo was 14.07 Euro
(SD = 1.82). The experiment took approximately 60 minutes.
4.6.3 Procedure
The procedure of the experiment was based on the previous study. I again followed the de-
sign of Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016). Participants had to play two types of two-draw situations.
In the rst type, participants could choose the rst urn by themselves. In the second type,
participants were confronted with a random choice from the computer. Because I wanted to
reduce confounding eects, I varied choice sets alternately. After receiving the instructions,
and passing the rst questionnaire, the participants played the two-draw urn game 80 times
(160 draws). The decision task, instructions and questionnaires were replicated according the
descriptions of Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016). Next, the participants played one round of the dis-
traction task (L. Peterson & Peterson, 1959), followed by the evidence threshold task.
Figure 32: Procedure of the experimental investigation of Study 3.
According to H5, I assume that participants dier in the amount of information or evidence
they need to make a decision (= decision threshold value). Therefore, I no longer reduced the
decision to two subsequent decisions, but gave the participants the opportunity to take balls
from one urn several times before they had to make a nal decision.
Finally, after a further round of our distraction task, the Bayesian updating task was presented.
In this last task, the participants were faced with ve sets of samples drawn by the computer.
The participants were shown the draws successively. After each draw, they were asked to
indicate the correct Bayesian probability of the urn being the predominately black one. The
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samples were drawn randomly from the computer and consisted of 10 balls. All participants
played the same ve sets (see Appendix C).
Afterwards, the participants were asked to complete three questionnaires. Because of the low
internal consistency of preference for consistency in the rst study, I used a questionnaire
originated by Cialdini et al. (1995). In contrast, the previous action- and state-orientation (see
Kuhl (1994b), appendix Table 25) and demographics questionnaire were the same as in Study
1 and Study 2.
4.6.4 Results
To measure decision inertia, I compared again mean rates of suboptimal behaviour in case of
divergence and convergence between inertia and Bayesian updating, resulting in error rates
of 24.0 % (SD=24.1) and 8.7 % (SD=11.6), respectively. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank
test indicated that the former error rate was signicantly higher than the latter (n = 101, Z =
7.5792, p < .001, r = .75). These observations replicate previous results.
Furthermore, I checked for signicant dierences between the two choice sets (free vs. forced
rst draw, H1b). The ndings show that the dierences in mean error rates remain signicant
for both sets (free draws: Z = 7.709, p < .001, r = .77, forced draws: Z = 5.4178, p <
.001, r = .54).
Comparing errors between the free and computer-provided choices (see Figure 1), a Wilcoxon
signed rank test found signicant dierences in case of convergence (Z = 5.0519, p <
.001, r = .50), but not in case of divergence between Bayesian updating and decision inertia
(Z = 0.96841, p > .05, r = .10). The ndings are in line with previously published ndings
on eects of free choices on decision inertia (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016).
Figure 33: Cross-treatment comparison of suboptimal behaviour in free and forced draws.
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As before, I investigated the error distributions at an individual level. Again I found strong
inter-individual heterogeneity, indicating that the participants dier considerably in their
decision-inertia proneness.
Figure 34: Frequency of suboptimal behaviour in case of convergence or divergence with
decision inertia.
To investigate motivational drivers of decision inertia, I measured dierent personality traits.
The preference for consistency score (mean=5.87, SD=1.22, α=.84, 9-point Likert item scale),
and action orientation (mean=0.49, SD=0.19, α=.78, binary item scale) had sucient internal
consistency as measured by Cronbach’s alpha.
As in Study 1, I conducted a probit regression on suboptimal behaviour with divergence be-
tween decision inertia and Bayesian updating as a dummy variable. This approach allows us to
compare the inuence of our variables on decision-making in general (convergence, dummy
variable = 0) and on decision inertia in particular (divergence, dummy variable = 1). I used the
variable "Number of draws required for a decision" as a proxy for the evidence threshold in
Task 2. This variable reects the mean number of draws participants make before they decide
upon one of the urns. To investigate the inuence of decision autonomy (H1b), and because
of the dierent error rates in our choice sets, I run two dierent probit regressions (Model 1
without a dummy-variable, and Model 2 with a dummy variable indicating whether the rst
decision was free (forced draw=False) or not (forced draw=True). The lack of Bayesian updat-
ing skills was computed as the mean dierence between objective and subjective probability
(as described above).
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Table 17: Random-eects probit regression on suboptimal behaviour (1=suboptimal).
Variable Beta (SE) P Beta (SE) P
(1) (2)
(Intercept) -1.97 < 0.001 *** -2.5 < 0.001 ***
Action orientation -0.07 0.35 -0.08 0.30
Divergence (1=True) 0.64 < 0.001 *** 0.89 < 0.001 ***
Preference for Consistency 0.01 0.84 0.02 0.81
Lack of Bayesian Updating Skills 0.21 < 0.01 ** 0.23 < 0.01 **
Number of Draws to Decide -0.28 < 0.01 ** -0.32 < 0.001 ***
Trial Number -0.06 < 0.001 *** -0.07 < 0.001 ***
Gender (1=Male) -0.16 0.21 -0.20 0.18
Forced Draw (1=True) - - 1.13 < 0.001 ***
Divergence x Forced Draw - - -0.39 < 0.001 ***
Divergence x Action-orientation 0.16 < 0.001 *** 0.19 < 0.001 ***
Divergence x Preference for Consistency -0.01 0.65 -0.02 0.58
Divergence x Lack of Bayesian Skills 0.01 0.72 0.00 0.87
Divergence x Number of Draws to Decide 0.02 0.62 0.05 0.39
Number of obs: 16160; random eect: participant id, participants: 101; Tjur’s D (1) = .122
Tjur’s D (2) = .188; Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Considering the non-interaction predictors, I observe a signicant negative eect of the trial
number (p < 0.001) and a positive eect of divergence (p < 0.001), replicating our correspond-
ing results in Experiment 1. Furthermore, I see a signicant positive eect of low Bayesian
updating skills on suboptimal behaviour in general. Moreover, there is a signicant negative
eect of the number of draws before a participant decided on an option.
If I consider the interaction of divergent processes with the other variables to investigate the
drivers of decision inertia (choice repetition, when switching is better), I nd again a sig-
nicant positive relationship between decision inertia and action-orientation. Because action-
orientation is only signicant in the case of interaction with divergent processes, this indicates
only a signicant positive inuence of action-orientation on decision inertia or the tendency
to repeat a decision regardless of the outcome. Furthermore, I found a signicant negative
inuence of forced draws on decision inertia, but a positive inuence on suboptimal decision-
making in general.
4.6.5 Discussion
I observed signicant negative eects of Bayesian updating skills on suboptimal decisions in
general but no specic eect when decision inertia diverged from Bayesian updating. The
signicant negative eect of number of draws until a decision was made indicates that higher
decision thresholds decreased the likelihood of suboptimal decisions. In addition, the results
show that the interaction eect of divergence with decision inertia and action-orientation is
signicantly positive. This nding suggests that action-oriented participants are more likely
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to rely on decision inertia in situations when decision inertia and Bayesian updating suggest
dierent behaviours.
In the second regression analysis (Model 2), I considered decision autonomy. The signicant
eects suggest that lack of decision autonomy increased suboptimal decisions in general, but
decreased the tendency to rely on decision inertia. Thus, decision makers who make their
rst choice freely exhibit more decision inertia later on. As in Experiment 1 (see Section 4.4),
I found no signicant inuence of preference for consistency on decision-making or decision
inertia.
I would like to use this concluding section of Chapter 4 to point out another very unusual
behaviour of a small minority of the participants in my studies. In most of the pretests and
in all my studies investigating decision inertia, a small percentage of participants (about 5 %),
tried to nd a pattern between the data-generating process of the urn game. The participants
used the instructions or the provided papers to note which urns had given which result and
when (see Figure 35). However, since this is a random process, the results of the urns cannot
be predicted beyond the two draw decision. This was clearly communicated and also asked
about in the knowledge task questions.
(a) front. (b) back.
Figure 35: Notes of one of the participants in the pretest study of part 2. The dierent results of
the urns have been noted, which suggests that the participant did not understand the concept
of random draw.
This unusual behaviour suggests that there must be other mechanisms besides the drivers
under consideration that can cause decision inertia. Here the question arose whether the cog-
nitive aspects of decision-making could not play a greater role after all, especially with regard
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to the understanding and handling of statistics and statistical information by test subjects re-
search in the eld of experience sampling (Kaufmann, Weber, & Haisley, 2013), in particular,
suggests such processes and shows that the related errors can be reduced through training.
In sum, I found that suboptimal decision-making in general depends on an individual’s (lack
of) cognitive capabilities in Bayesian updating and the amount of information an individual
requires to reach a decision. However, these results do not hold for decision inertia specif-
ically. For decision inertia, I found signicant interactions of individual dierences only in
action-orientation and experimentally induced decision autonomy. Furthermore, other possi-
ble causes of decision inertia like a preference for consistent information did not receive empir-
ical support. This indicates that decision inertia is possibly not a consequence of consistency-
seeking or the commitment process or the cognitive inability to process the new information
correctly. Instead it might be the result of the role negative or dis-conrming information
plays for the individual.
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5 Part III: Overcoming Decision Inertia in Robo-Advisory
Abstract. Modern nancial planning tools like robo-advisors claim to support user’s wealth man-
agement. This study relied on a choice architecture approach to investigate the benet of robo-
advisors in investment support and to overcome biased nancial decision-making, in particular
towards decision inertia in investment decisions. A robo-advisor was constructed and a simple
market simulation was built to investigate the eectiveness of two digital nudges (defaults and
warning messages). Furthermore, I controlled for confounding variables (e.g., nancial literacy
or risk aversion). The results indicate a signicant inuence of both nudges on reduced deci-
sion inertia. This nding indicates a possibility of reducing nancial decision inertia through
robo-advisor design, and it suggests that nancial planning tools can help users to overcome their
nancial decision biases.3
5.1 Decision Support and Financial Decision-Making
The self-directed investment of users on capital markets in order to save, for example, for
a pension or to become a home owner, is a complicated matter for most private investors
(Looney & Hardin, 2009; Wood, 1986). Current research provides ample evidence that decision-
makers are overwhelmed by this kind of multi-criteria decision problem (Minch & Sanders,
1986) and because of their limited cognitive capacities, they tend to make an eort-accuracy
trade-o (Johnson & Payne, 1985; Looney & Hardin, 2009). This implies that decision-makers
are basically striving to keep the eort associated with a decision as low as possible. On the
other hand, however, they try to maximize the result. Decision-makers often face tension
between deliberative and eortful processes, on the one hand, and intuitive and eortless
processes, on the other (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Kahneman, 2003). As a consequence of
this conict, decision-makers often rely on the intuitive decision-making processes in complex
decision-making situations (Gigerenzer, 2008). In particular, it is argued that this tendency
results from simpler and less strenuous cognitive processes. This interplay of deliberative and
intuitive processes systematically shapes economic decisions, and has been used as theoretical
explanation for dierent decision anomalies in various studies in behavioural economics and
nance (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Dhar & Gorlin, 2013; Barberis & Thaler, 2003).
Considering nancial decisions in particular, it is well known that eort-accuracy trade-os
cause decision makers to rely on heuristics or rules-of-thumb instead of deliberative decision-
making (Gigerenzer, 2008; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; Thaler, 1980). While it may be a great
advantage of heuristic (nancial) decisions that they can be made quickly, automatically, and
with little eort since they solve problems by simplication (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975), they
consequently also lead to potentially suboptimal decisions. Experimental ndings show that
this observation holds true both for economic decisions under uncertainty (Looney & Hardin,
2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975, 1971) and for those under certainty (Thaler, 1999, 1985).
In particular, nancial advisory research reports numerous studies providing a wide range of
3Note. The content of this section is a revised version of Jung and Weinhardt (2018) and Jung, Erdfelder, and
Florian (2018), which were created in the course of this thesis. Other sources of this section are marked as such.
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evidence that private investors make simplied assumptions and deviate systematically from
rational behaviour. In recent years, numerous biases in the eld of asset management have
been identied (Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, & Meyer, 2012). Take, for instance,
that private households have a tendency to underdiversify portfolios (Calvet, Campbell, & So-
dini, 2007; Ahearne, Griever, & Warnock, 2004), they shy away from taking risks (Badarinza,
Campbell, & Ramadorai, 2016), and they have a general tendency to follow inertia in invest-
ment decisions (Calvet et al., 2007; Madrian & Shea, 2001).
In sum, it is widely accepted among researchers that most heuristics can lead to systematic
errors in nancial decision-making (see e.g. Calvet et al. (2007); Barber and Odean (2000)).
However, the crux of this issue is that many investors are unaware of this fact. Those in-
vestors who would have a need for advice to overcome these mistakes, or to discover them do
not seek that advice (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Specically, the investors, who need help the
most, do not consider taking it. On the one hand, this decision may have justiable reasons,
such as the fact that private investors often consider investment advice to be expensive, bi-
ased, or manipulative. On the other hand it is also a reason for distrust regarding investment
advice in general (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). High fees in particular, can massively reduce the
protability of seeking consultation; an expensive consultation can even become a loss for the
private investor (French, 2008).
In the past, so-called exchange-traded funds (ETF) were intensively discussed as a possible
panacea for this problem (see Bhattacharya et al. (2012); Boldin and Cici (2010); French (2008).
These nancial products mirror the performance of an index, or market, or industry sector.
This is mostly done automatically and therefore, unlike an actively managed fund, traditional
ETFs do not need a human decision maker such as actively deciding portfolio managers. The
missing fees for an active manager makes ETFs also cheaper compared to actively managed
funds. Hence, ETFs oer an advantageous way to invest in a highly diversied portfolio, a
reasonable strategy for the average investor (French, 2008).
As a result, many investors are increasingly relying on ETFs. The problem, however, is that
even these new alternative forms of investment are rarely used protably by private investors,
as they are either sold or bought at the wrong time, or unfavourable products are selected
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Other studies suggest that the cost of ETFs can vary substantially
(Hortaçsu & Syverson, 2004), or that private investors tend to prefer more expensive ETFs
(Elton, Gruber, & Busse, 2004). Moreover, investors can choose from a large number of ETFs,
so it may be dicult to make an appropriate instrument selection. Current research suggests
that despite the simplication of investment products for investors, cognitive biases can still
arise (Bhattacharya, Loos, Meyer, & Hackethal, 2016). As a solution to this dilemma, and in
order to provide investors with low-cost products and high-quality advice, so-called robo-
advisors are being discussed in recent decision support research (see Section 1).
If private investors have a tendency to make biased investment decisions, and if external in-
vestment advice can give them unbiased support and help them to overcome their mistakes,
private investors would benet from low-budget, automated investment advice. Robo-advisors
are online platforms that have exactly this purpose and are intended to support investors
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in their investments. By means of various user assistance components, investors are guided
through an automated self-assessment process (Phoon & Koh, 2017; Sironi, 2016). As a re-
sult of the self-assessment process, various investment alternatives are proposed to the user,
and these alternativesare further maintained in accordance with the user’s strategy through
various rebalancing techniques. In general, a distinction is made between passive and active
robo-advisors. While active robo-advisors let the user decide upon the execution of the invest-
ment strategy, passive robo-advisors invest in a certain strategy that is maintained and can be
changed only by user intervention.
Compared to traditional investment advisory, robo-advisors thus oer independent nancial
advice, since most robo-advisors act only as a platform between clients and nancial product
providers (Phoon & Koh, 2017). In addition, robo-advisors currently oer ETFs only as an
investment option, passively managed and thus enabling low costs to be realized. The savings
are eventually passed on to the users. Inexperienced investors benet from robo-advisors,
especially, as robo-advisors present information in an understandable way and oer a cost-
eective alternative to traditional nancial advice.
Although it seems that robo-advisors reduce many of the problems associated with traditional
nancial advisory, there is also the risk of cognitive biases. This risk is all the more rele-
vant when one considers that inexperienced investors are the primary target group of robo-
advisors. As such, robo-advisors could be a pitfall for many private investors, in particular.
Therefore, it is of utmost relevance for these systems that biases are not fostered by the de-
sign of the choice environment. Research in behavioural economics and choice architecture
suggests that unwanted biases can be successfully reduced through the design of the choice
environment of the decision-makers (Johnson et al., 2012; Thaler & Cass, 2008). Thus, the
choice environment in which the decision is made can be changed and clearly controlled in
robo-advisors. It is this possible, from a design point of view, to provide controlled advance-
ment of certain cognitive biases. In other words, an inertia-sensitive design for robo-advisors
reduces suboptimal decisions in advance rather than postponing them to a later time.
5.2 Designing Digital Nudges for Decision Support Systems
Information systems research illustrates that decision support systems like recommendation
agents, can help users make better-informed and less-biased decisions. For instance, recom-
mendation agents can help users to screen large sets of products enabling them to nd pre-
ferred products with little search eort (Häubl & Trifts, 2000). Another recent study illustrates
that tagging messages of a recommendation agent with social information can facilitate infor-
mation retrieval (Kretzer & Maedche, 2018).
An additional advantage of recommendation agents is that they allow inuencing the decision-
making of their users in a controlled and predictable manner (Johnson et al., 2012). Findings
from behavioural economic research suggest that a choice is not made independent of envi-
ronment, but that it is directly inuenced by the way it is embedded, structured, and presented
in the environment (Johnson et al., 2012). Examples include listing specic products alongside
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other alternatives (Cooke, Sujan, Sujan, & Weitz, 2002); or by making specic products more
salient, the preferences of the users can change (Häubl & Trifts, 2000).
The theoretical groundwork for the design and development of such bias-sensitive systems is
established by choice architecture (Thaler et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2012). Choice architecture
is a theoretical framework to deliberately design the choice environment of decision makers
and to improve it for the decision makers’ benet. Building on ndings from dual-processing
theory (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Kahneman, 2003), choice architecture postulates two dier-
ent types of cognitive processing that build up the intention of users: an intuitive system that
is fast but heuristically driven, and another slow and rational system that is able to compute
deliberative decisions. Behavioural economics classies the rst type of automatic decision-
making as “System 1”, and the second type as “System 2” (Thaler & Cass, 2008; Kahneman,
2003). Intention building, or which of the systems will dominate the decision-making process,
also depends largely on the choice environment. As this choice environment thus relevantly
inuences users’ decisions, choice architecture aims to systematically design this environment
(Johnson et al., 2012). Just as an architect designs a house for the future residents and designs
rooms and pathways according to the needs of the inhabitants, a choice architect should build
the choice environment in accordance with the users’ needs (Thaler et al., 2014). The choice
environment should guide users to the best option, which should be as easily accessible as
possible (Thaler et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2012).
Choice architecture provides a plethora of interventions to make information systems as help-
ful as possible for their users. For this purpose, techniques like defaults, framing, or anchoring
are proposed to design the choice environment, and hence to push the user of an information
system to a specic decision outcome (Weinmann et al., 2016; Jameson et al., 2014; Johnson
et al., 2012). The systematic use of these tools is called nudging. Research suggests that users
are generally more willing to accept these types of interventions, because the users do not feel
limited in their freedom (Johnson et al., 2012), in particular, when users benet from them.
Hence, choice architecture can provide a theoretical foundation to design decision support
systems to reduce the eect of biases like decision inertia in decision-making (Jameson et al.,
2014; Thaler et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2012).
In nancial decision-making, choice architecture approaches have been successfully used to
reduce biases by considering them in the design strategy (Thaler et al., 2014; Silver, 1990) of the
information system. For instance, Looney and Hardin illustrate that myopic loss aversion can
be reduced by the design of a nancial planning tool (Looney & Hardin, 2009). Or Bhandari
et al. have illustrated the general, positive inuence of decision-support systems in debiasing
investors in nancial decision-making (Bhandari, Hassanein, & Deaves, 2008).
A further idiosyncrasy of human judgement and decision-making that has serious implications
for nancial decision-making but has received less research interest is decision inertia, or the
tendency to repeat a previous decision, regardless of the outcome (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016;
Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012). However, a recent review illustrates that decision inertia reects an
important aspect in economic decisions (Erev & Haruvy, 2013). Decision inertia is discussed as
a possible explanation of the psychological processes that lead decision-makers and potential
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investors to repeat a suboptimal decision (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Charness & Levin, 2005). For
instance, in a study of entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur investment behaviour, Sandri et al.
report an inertia eect manifesting in the tendency to hold a suboptimal investment, regard-
less of rational considerations about risks of loss (Sandri et al., 2010). Sautua reported decision
inertia in an economic lottery game (Sautua, 2017). In the experiment’s task, the participants
repeated their previous decision even if it was economically suboptimal in a subsequent period.
Additionally, in consumer decision-making, economic research observes a form of consumer
persistence to buy the same product multiple times (Dubé, Hitsch, & Rossi, 2010). Also, how-
ever, many dierent studies evaluating nancial decisions of private households illustrate that
inertia also leads to suboptimal decisions in nancial planning and decision-making (Agnew,
Balduzzi, & Sunden, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001). Furthermore, the cognitive foundations of
inertia in subsequent decision-making have received no attention so far. The actual triggers of
decision inertia remain uncleaer (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). In addition, only a few papers that
allow conclusions as to how decision inertia or similar behaviour can be reduced (Alós-Ferrer,
Hügelschäfer, & Li, 2017).
Even if decision support literature suggests that biases can be reduced by information system
design (Weinmann et al., 2016), it remains unclear whether and how these ndings can be
transferred to robo-advisors. In particular, the question arises whether they can be applied
there at all, or whether nudges have a dierent eect in other semantic contexts. For example,
framing is seen as one of the central tools of choice architecture (Johnson et al., 2012). However
recent studies show that the inuence of framing is not stable (Fagley & Miller, 1990) and that
framing eects do not always work. The inuence of framing depends on gender, risk-taking
and cognitive style. Not only on a general level with regard to nudging, but also specically
for decision inertia, contradictions can be found in the literature. Thus, various studies (Welsh,
Ordóñez, Snyder, & Christian, 2015; Zhang et al., 2014) each report an exactly opposite eect
of framing on inertia of decision in a moral context.
The above summary of the literature underlines a clear need to investigate and validate various
nudging or debiasing techniques in a bias-specic and application-specic manner. Figure 36
illustrates the theoretical relationships of the approach of this study that has been discussed in
this section. Based on the raised research question (RQ3), the aim is to design a robo-advisor
sensitive to nancial decision inertia. For that purpose, this study relies on nudges that di-
rectly inuence the nancial decision-making of the users, and should help them to overcome
decision inertia, when it is necessary (Johnson et al., 2012). Nudges are design features that
support eortless and automatic processing towards a direct decision (Thaler et al., 2014).
5.3 Robo-Advisory Design and Hypotheses Development
The main purpose of this experimental study is to investigate the inuence of the derived
nudges (implemented by two design features) on decision inertia, and (sub-) optimal invest-
ment decisions in the context of a robo-advisor. The research model in Figure 36, illustrates
the relationship of the dierent nudges implemented by dierent design features, and individ-
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ual’s tendency to rely on decision inertia, which can be objectively measured by valuations
that are contrary to the Rational Utility Theory (see experimental design below).
Figure 36: Research framework for this investigation (adopted from Section 1).
The implemented nudges of the choice architecture toolbox and the resulting choice environ-
ment are part of an overarching system design to guide decision makers through a decision
process (Silver, 1991). This work aims to design the choice architecture of the nancial deci-
sion support system to nudge decision-makers to have less decision inertia. In the next part
of this work, the hypotheses based on the tools of the choice architecture are illustrated.
5.3.1 Default Nudge (H1)
A choice architecture approach to design the choice environment sensitive to inertia in
decision-making requires addressing the behavioural drivers of the tendency to repeat a deci-
sion (or option) without shifting away. The rationale behind this approach is that people rely
on heuristics and inertia because they do not want to expend cognitive resources.
Choice architecture research suggests that defaults are an appropriate tool to counter-act this
suboptimal behaviour by nudging people towards other heuristic processing (Johnson et al.,
2012). When deciding between dierent options, where one of them is pre-selected, decision-
makers tend to rely on the default heuristic (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), which means that they
usually choose the default option a signicant number of times. Following this rationale, this
study assumes that if decision-makers show decision inertia, they repeat a previous investment
without considering the alternatives. If the optimal decision is pre-selected and if that option
is not the previous one, however, decision inertia and the default bias are in conict. Based
on the choice architecture literature, it is assumed that this situation results in the behaviour
that the decision-maker repeats the default instead of the previous decision. Many dierent
studies in the eld of behavioural design support these conclusions. So far, defaults are also
successfully applied in other scenarios to nudge people to certain behavioural changes. For
instance, Stryja et al. (see Stryja, Satzger, and Dorner (2017); Stryja, Dorner, and Riee (2017)),
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proposed defaults and priming as possible nudges to overcome the resistance to change in
innovation acceptance. In their study, default nudges signicantly inuenced resistance to
acceptance of electronic cars (Stryja, Satzger, & Dorner, 2017). In another study, the tendency
for air travellers to pay for carbon-osets could be increased by default nudges (Brouwer,
Brander, & Van Beukering, 2008).
Another point is that defaults could also be perceived as choice recommendations. As a result,
decision-makers who are uncertain of their decisions, or who do not know how best to decide,
perceive the default as a socially desired option and are therefore more inclined to follow it
(Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). It is assumed that investors use decision-support systems
like robo-advisors because they want to relinquish a part of their responsibility (e.g. send
orders to the market on their own or gather information about investments). On the other
hand, they want to have the possibility to monitor their investment, which is a core feature
of robo-advisors. Furthermore, they want to retain control or the feeling of control over their
investment decisions. Nudging with a default option seems to be a fair compromise between
these considerations and would nudge users of robo-advisory towards the optimal decision,
without reducing the feeling of being in control.
These considerations suggests the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Preselecting the optimal option based on Bayesian rationality in the user-
interface, will increase the decision-maker’s tendency to choose that option, and hence reduce the
decision-maker’s decision inertia.
5.3.2 Warning Message Nudge (H2)
Furthermore, this study proposes warning messages as a second nudge to reduce the tendency
to rely on decision inertia. Warning messages are built on cognitive feedback theory (Balzer,
Doherty, et al., 1989), which provides a framework to design feedback giving information about
the cognitive system and the current decision-making related to the decision maker’s own
strategy. Compared to other feedback approaches, cognitive feedback is intended to encour-
age users of the information system to think more about their decisions and thereby prevent
premature decisions (Sieck & Yates, 1997). If participants are subject to inertia, warning mes-
sages building on cognitive feedback should encourage biased decision-makers to reconsider
their decision and, if necessary, to consider alternative options. Warning messages relying
on cognitive feedback have been successfully used not only in decision support systems in
other economic decision environments (see e.g., Xiao and Benbasat (2015) or Winkler and
Moser (2016), but also in nancial decision support systems to reduce biased decision-making
(see e.g. Bhandari et al. (2008)). For instance, Sengupta et al. measured the performance of
participants hired as virtual project managers in an economic market simulation (Sengupta
& Abdel-Hamid, 1993). The market simulation consisted of a spontaneously changing envi-
ronment and the participants’ economic performance of the given task was measured. Con-
sidering the dierent feedback and project groups, Sengupta and Abdel-Hamid (1993) found
that subjects induced with cognitive feedback performed signicantly better than the other
subjects with feed-forward or outcome feedback.
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However, the eectiveness of warning messages depends mainly on how the messaging pre-
sented to the decision-maker (Xiao and Benbasat 2015). The complexity of the warning mes-
sage, for example, tends to decrease fault correctability as well as benchmark eciency among
individuals (Kulhavy et al. 1985). For that purpose, this study relies on the evaluated design
of warning messages as proposed by Bhandari et al. (2008).
Following this rationale, it is assumed that the warning messages building on cognitive
feedback, may decrease the decision inertia of the users of the decision support system. Such
a system simultaneously aims at choice accuracy and a more directive approach to inuence
an individual’s understanding. Hence, it is postulated that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Proving warning messages relying on cognitive feedback by the decision
support system will decrease the decision-maker’s decision inertia.
5.4 Evaluate Digital Nudges to Overcome Decision Inertia
The current experimental investigation makes use of a between-subject, scenario-based lab-
oratory experiment, where the behaviour of the participants is measured in the absence of
external inuences. The dependent variable, decision inertia, is dened as the tendency to
repeat the previous decision regardless of the direct consequence, even if the consequence is
clearly inferior to alternative options (Sautua, 2017; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). Following es-
tablished decision inertia research, this study relies on a dual-choice belief-updating task (so-
called dual-choice paradigm) to measure decision inertia (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Achtziger
& Alós-Ferrer, 2013; Charness & Levin, 2005) in the nancial decision-making setting. In par-
ticular, decision inertia can be measured by the dual-choice paradigm by comparing errors of
investors in choice sets when choice repletion is rational, and when it is not (Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2016). For that purpose a simple market simulation was designed, where the participants had
to invest with a robo-advisor. The robo-advisor itself has been implemented on the Brownie
platform, allowing me to build on an established framework for experiments in information
systems research (see also Section 4.2).
5.4.1 Method
In this task, participants were asked to virtually invest money with the robo-advisor in a mar-
ket simulation, and successful outcomes were rewarded. Participants received 0.10 Euro (10:1
exchange rate) for each virtual monetary unit (MU) they had at the end of the experiment. The
nancial planning process in the robo-advisor had a market phase representing the main task
of this experiment. During the market phase, participants were confronted with two subse-
quent investment decisions, repeated 60 times (120 rounds, which means 60 investments, and
60 rebalancing rounds), with the purpose to measure the decision inertia bias. In each round,
the participants had to decide between two dierent investment strategies. The two strategies
have dierent success rates (see Table 1), dependent on the market state.
However, the current market state is unknown to the participants. After every two subsequent
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Table 18: The properties of the market with two dierent states, based on the dual-choice
paradigm (see Alós-Ferrer et al. 2016; Charness and Levin 2005).
State of the Market Strategy 1: Stocks Strategy 2: Bonds
Bullish Market (p=.5) Success Prob.: • • • • ◦ ◦ (4/6)
Payo: Win 1 MU, Loss 0 MU
Success Prob.: • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ (2/6)
Payo: Win 1 MU, Loss 0 MU
Bearish Market (p=.5) Success Prob.: • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ (2/6)
Payo: Win 1 MU, Loss 0 MU
Success Prob.: • • • • ◦ ◦ (4/6)
Payo: Win 1 MU, Loss 0 MU
decisions (investment and rebalancing), the current market state is assigned randomly anew
(based on the probabilities in Table 1). The task of the participants was to make a successful
nancial decision as often as possible, because the pay-o of the experiment depends on the
outcome of their investments in each round. The participants can do that by using Bayesian
updating to guess the state of the market, based on the feedback of the rst investment deci-
sion.
If a participant exhibits decision inertia, a choice architect would expect them to stay with
their rst choice. If they chose the bond strategy for the rst draw, they will choose the
bond strategy for the second draw - regardless of the consequences of their decision. For
example, let us assume that the participant chooses the bond strategy in their rst draw. If the
result is no success, it is more likely that the state of the market is bullish, relying on correct
Bayesian updating (it is a 4/6 posterior probability that the market is bullish, and 2/6 posterior
probability that the market is a bearish market). To maximize the chances in the second round
(rebalancing decision), the participant ought to choose the stock strategy for the second draw.
Based on the information from the previous draw, it can be said that staying with the rst,
inertia-driven, choice (bond strategy) is sub-optimal. Conversely, if the participant picked the
bond strategy in the rst round resulting in a success it is more likely that the state of the
market is bearish. The participant ought to choose the bond strategy again for their second
rebalancing decision. Optimal choice and inertia-driven choice are identical (choose bond
strategy again).
Based on other decision inertia studies building on that paradigm (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016;
Charness & Levin, 2005), the occurrence of decision inertia is measured by way of comparing
mean error rates of correct Bayesian updating, when choice repetition is suboptimal. The
dierent screens of the experiment are illustrated in more detail in Figure 37.
5.4.2 Participants
The study was conducted in the Karlsruhe Decision and Design lab. 96 adult participants
(male=55, female=55, other=0, age range=19-50, SD=3.60) took part, and were recruited with
HRoot (Bock et al. 2014). They received a performance-based payment of 0.10 Euro for each
successful investment, and were paid a fee of 3.0 Euro for answering the questionnaire. Mean
payo was 9.17 Euro (SD = 0.57). The whole experiment took approximately 45 minutes.
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Figure 37: Selected screens of the distinct investment steps of the main experimental task,
based on the dual-choice paradigm (Alós-Ferrer et al. 2016), and implemented in a general
robo-advisory structure (see Section 3).
5.4.3 Procedure
To address the hypotheses, the following experiment was carried out, consisting of ve steps
(Figure 4). The steps are based on the Brownie guideline for conducting experimental research
in information systems (see Section 4.2). In the rst step, participants received instruction on
the experiment and to participate in the experimental investigation had to consent in with a
comprehension test to follow. These steps are necessary to make sure, that the participants
are well-informed about the procedure and the circumstance of the market simulation and the
investment game. In the next step, participants were induced to invest in the robo-advisor.
Participants were then asked to invest the money in the provided robo-advisory solution. For
that purpose they played multiple investment rounds (120 rounds, equals 60 investment and
60 subsequent rebalancing decisions). After every second round (rebalancing decision), the
market state was reset randomly.
For the design and wording of the warning message, this study relied on Bhandari et al. (2008).
When the user exhibited for the rst time decision inertia, a warning message appeared (e.g.,
“You receive this feedback to help you to make your rebalancing decision. Currently, you just
repeated your previous decision. However, the analysis suggests that the other strategy is
more promising for you.”). Following Bhandari et al., in this study the message appears only
once; otherwise, the constant warning would cause an unwanted change in user behaviour,
because it would have to be clicked away every time, and not because the user reconsidered
his decision strategy.
Figure 38: Procedure of the experimental investigation: in the market simulation participants
are assigned randomly to one of the three conditions (between-subject design).
The design of the decision task and instructions were chosen in line with Alós-Ferrer et al.
(2016), and Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013). Furthermore, risk-aversion (Dohmen et al., 2011),
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nancial literacy (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007), gender and age were measured as control vari-
ables. Before the experimental study took place, a pre-test was conducted to make sure that I
could reproduced decision inertia in the lab.
5.4.4 Results
Decision inertia was measured based on the dual-choice paradigm (see Section 4.2). In this
paradigm, decision inertia is operationalized as the tendency of the participants to repeat
a previous investment without correctly considering the new information. In the market
parametrization this occurs, when the rst investment is a loss, and the decision-maker re-
peats it without correct Bayesian updating. Consequently, the individual rates of suboptimal
inertia-driven decisions are computed. They are then compared across the dierent treat-
ments (see Figure 5) to investigate whether the nudges reduced participant’s decision inertia.
The mean rates of inertial decisions in the investments were 42.13 % (SD=28.7) in the control
condition, 29.83 % (SD=25.71) in the default nudge treatment, and 27.38 % (SD=19.62) in the
warning message treatment.
Figure 39: The eectiveness of nancial support nudges: A comparison of the implemented
nudges (defaults and warning messages) to reduce decision inertia in a decision support sys-
tem, and the control group without nudges.
In order to test the two hypotheses (H1, H2), which state that digital nudges can inuence the
tendency to rely on decision inertia, the average inertia rate of the participants across the three
treatments are compared against each other. In a rst step, an ordinary least square regression
that regresses the treatments (coded as dummy variables) on the decision inertia rates (Model
1) is used. As a robustness check, a model (Model 2) is computed that controls for potential
confounds. In both models, a one-sided p-value was used to test the directed hypotheses.
141
All non-dummy variables (particularly decision inertia, nancial literacy, risk aversion, and
age) were z-standardized to obtain standardized beta regression coecients. Furthermore, as
a robustness check a one-way ANOVA on the treatment variable was conducted, suggesting
similar results.
Table 2 shows the results for the two models. In both models, the treatments (default nudge,
and warning message nudge) signicantly inuence decision inertia. Both coecients of the
dummy variables (Model 1) have a negative sign, which means that they have a negative in-
uence on the dependent variable of decision inertia. When nudging participants with default
messages, the results show that the decision inertia rate decreases by 0.59 standard deviations
compared to the group without nudging.
Table 19: Linear regression on decision inertia rates in subsequent investments (1=decision
inertia) across all rebalancing decisions.
Variable Beta (SE) P Beta (SE) P
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 0.3813 0.0421 * 0.50 0.4540
Default Nudge (1=True) -0.5856 0.0102 * -0.5798 0.009 **
Warning Message Nudge (1=True) -0.4881 0.0276 * -0.47056 0.0282 *
Financial Literacy - - -0.2356 0.0217 *
Risk Aversion - - 0.0718 0.4676
Age - - 0.003 0.9133
Gender (1=Male) - - -0.3392 0.0997 .
Number of obs./participants: 96; Adjusted R-squared = .04 (Model 1), .11 (Model 2)
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Model 2, which includes the control variables (age, gender, nancial literacy, risk aversion)
supports this nding. The results provide evidence for a signicant negative inuence of
nudges on decision-making. In addition, there was also a signicant negative impact of -
nancial literacy on decision inertia in the market simulation. As such, participants with better
knowledge of properly making nancial decisions also showed less decision inertia. However,
the eects of the dummy variables on nudges remain signicant, so users with high nancial
literacy can also benet from the nudges. Another puzzling nding is a barely detectable sta-
tistically signicant dierence (p<=.1) in Model 2 suggesting that male participants showed a
trend towards less inertia than did female participants. In a similar study, Charness and Levin
reported a signicant association between female participants and increased decision inertia
(Charness & Levin, 2005). Another possible explanation for this nding could be gender role
theory suggesting that social role models tend to make women remain passive, while men
change strategies independently and dominantly. So far, there is only a nascent stream of re-
search in nancial services which partially explains nancial choices with gender roles (see
Hummel, Herbertz, and Mädche (2018)). Taking these ndings together, it seems possible that
decision inertia could be more common among women than men.
Based on the statistical analyses, the study therefore supports both hypotheses and it can be
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concluded that, compared to the control group, the implemented nudges have led to less nan-
cial decision inertia. Furthermore, a Wald-test to compare the eect of the nudges against each
other was conducted. The test showed no signicant results indicating that the eect for the
default nudge does not signicantly dier from the warning message nudges. Consequently,
both nudges are equally elaborated design features to reduce nancial decision inertia.
5.4.5 Discussion
This study aimed to shed light on the potential of nancial planning tools like robo-advisors
in reducing decision inertia by nudging users towards a better investment decision (in sense
of Bayesian rationality). In particular, this study focuses on a specic facet of inertia: the
tendency to repeat a previous choice, regardless of the consequences (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016).
It is hypothesized that decision inertia can be reduced by nudges in nancial planning tools.
The results of this study support the assumption that decision inertia can be mitigated by
choice architecture design. Choice architecture is a theoretical framework guiding researcher
in designing bias-sensitive systems. A consistent use of nudges derived from that theoretical
framework, can help users to make better eortless and automatic decisions, and hence makes
users less prone to specic biases. Furthermore, this study found that default nudges are more
robust to overcome decision inertia compared to warning messages. The ndings show that
nudges can reduce nancial decision inertia, however decision inertia is also linked to nancial
literacy and gender.
The results of this study support the assumption that decision inertia can be mitigated by
choice architecture design. Choice architecture is a theoretical framework guiding researchers
in designing bias-sensitive systems. A consistent use of nudges derived from that theoretical
framework, can help users to make better, eortless and automatic decisions, and hence makes
users less prone to specic biases. Furthermore, this study found that default nudges are more
robust in overcoming decision inertia than are warning message, and that nudges can reduce
nancial decision inertia; however, decision inertia is also linked to nancial literacy and gen-
der.
The study contributes to the still nascent robo-advisor literature and research by expanding the
understanding of choice architecture design to overcome decision inertia in nancial planning
tools. It is paramount to investigate nudges to overcome decision inertia to design information
systems that can help decision-makers avoid falling into the trap of repeating unfavourable
prior decisions. With this research design insights for existing decision support systems in
various other contexts are given (e.g., decision inertia in health context or policy selection),
which provides a foundation to implement adaptations that can better address this issue. The
research applies to both users of information systems (and this is where the focus lies for the
moment) and business decision-making, (e.g., in forecasting support systems).
However, the experimental study also has limitations worth mentioning. The study was con-
ducted in a laboratory setting. This was necessary to reduce the eect of confounding vari-
ables, and to test whether decision inertia can be manipulated reliably and with high internal
validity. However, it remains unclear whether the ndings can be generalised to existing robo-
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advisory and nancial planning tools. A practical evaluation of the nudges is necessary and
would increase the validity of the design recommendations.
Another, more theoretical limitation is that this study builds on a choice architecture approach.
However, the ndings reveal further research needs from other perspectives: i) they indicate
that increasing nancial literacy (e.g. based on training) could be another approach to reduce
decision inertia, and ii) that decision inertia is sensitive to gender dierences. Firstly, since the
purpose of this study was to develop and evaluate countermeasures for decision inertia, a next
interesting step would be to further investigate gender-specic dierences. Decision inertia
seems to be more pronounced in women (see Model 1 in Table 19), so it seems promising to
design and evaluate gender-specic nudges or training units. This would make it possible
to address users of nancial planning tools even more specically and thus help them more
eciently.
Secondly, approaches from another theoretical perspective seem also to be promising. For in-
stance, the signicant inuence of nancial literacy, suggests that decision inertia (and proba-
bly other nancial biases) can be partly explained by insucient nancial education. Building
on that nding, nancial education and training, seems to be a further promising pathway to
reduce nancial decision inertia. Furthermore, it would be interesting to benchmark the choice
architecture approach and a nancial training approach against each other. More research is
required to identify further methods to overcome decision inertia.
Given these limitations, the study is intended to form a basis for future research at the intersec-
tion of behavioural economics and decision support systems. Based on the insights generated
from the experiment, further examination of nudges to reduce decision inertia may be derived,
and these insights may be used to develop further IT-based counter-measures. This study is
one part of a research project designing adaptive decision support systems that detects situa-
tions in which the user is likely prone to biases such as decision inertia and reacts by changing
those interface elements that likely exacerbate biases - for a specic user in a specic decision
situation.
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6 Conclusion
Prior work has documented the many-faceted diculties of private investors in nancial
decision-making and the resulting need for nancial decision support and robo-advisory (see
e.g., Fisch, Laboure, et al. (2017); Looney and Hardin (2009)). In my thesis, I target this short-
coming aiming to help robo-advisor researchers and practitioners to design and develop robo-
advisor systems (challenge 1), and to increase the advisory quality (challenge 2) by considering
individual needs to overcome biased nancial decision-making like decision inertia.
Considering the rst challenge, I conducted a three cycled design science study to investigate
general design requirements of robo-advisors. This study focused on a better understanding
of user’s decision-making in robo-advisors, and the interaction of these users with a robo-
advisor (Part I ). I used the ndings to derive design recommendations for the general design
of a robo-advisor solution. My house of robo-advisory design (see Figure 18) can be used by
robo-advisor scholars as a mental guideline to design and develop basic robo-advisor solutions.
To target the second challenge, I focused on the advisor quality of robo-advisors. In a sub-
sequent step, I selected an exemplar of a recent bias in economic decision-making, decision
inertia (Part II ), and investigated how advisor quality can be increased by helping users to over-
come decision inertia in robo-advisory. Decision inertia is the tendency of decision-makers to
repeat unsuccessful strategies regardless of the consequences (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Dutt &
Gonzalez, 2012). It can be responsible for suboptimal investment decisions, and it is generally
accepted as a harmful bias in subsequent decision-making (Sautua, 2017; Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2016; Erev & Haruvy, 2013). To overcome decision inertia, I rst had to understand the driv-
ing forces behind this phenomenon. For that purpose, I conducted a series of experimental
studies in the lab to distinguish and investigate cognitive and motivational drivers of decision
inertia. Finally, I used the insights derived to implement two design features in a robo-advisor
system (Part III ). I tested the inuence of these design features of decision inertia in a market
simulation and showed their eectiveness in overcoming decision inertia.
6.1 Implications for Theory
This work contributes to the still-nascent stream of theoretical robo-advisor literature and re-
search. The current robo-advisor research lacks theoretical guidelines describing and explain-
ing how to design and develop robo-advisors. In particular, there are many biases in economic
decision-making that remain not well understood, and it is yet unclear how robo-advisor sys-
tems (or nancial decision support system in general) can target these shortcomings. In this
thesis, I illustrated a theoretical guideline subsuming the most relevant requirements in robo-
advisory design. This framework illustrates how the dierent requirements can be target by
specic design decisions. Hence, it provides a rst mental framework for the general design
of robo-advisors and comparable nancial decision support systems.
In my studies, I focused on a very recent bias in economic decision-making, decision inertia.
Prior work has suggested that decision inertia is mainly driven by motivational factors. For
instance, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) report the eects of preference for consistency on decision
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inertia (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016). However, certain studies have produced opposite ndings
(Zhang et al., 2014; Pitz, 1969), while other studies have proposed further motivational factors
like indecisiveness or decision avoidance as possible drivers of decision inertia (Sautua, 2017).
Targeting the need to clarify these mixed results, I conducted a systematic literature review.
My overview of the decision inertia literature illustrates the dierent conceptualizations of
this phenomenon in judgement and decision-making research (see Section 4.1.1), neuro sci-
ence research and related disciplines (see Section 4.1.2), and information system research (see
Section 4.1.3). Furthermore, this overview demonstrates that decision inertia has many impli-
cations, and suggests that it is a multi-determined bias (cognitivly and motivationally driven),
which could explain the mixed results in previous studies. Based on my literature review, I
proposed that cognitive processes like an individual’s evidence threshold and Bayesian proba-
bility updating capabilities may play a relevant role in explaining decision inertia in addition to
motivational factors. Finally, I integrate the ndings of my studies by distinguishing between
the most relevant motivational and cognitive drivers (see Section 4.6). Most notably, this is the
rst study to my knowledge that compares the interplay of cognitive and motivational drivers
of decision inertia.
Last but not least, my experiments suggest that the motivational factors are not as stable as has
been assumed. The results illustrated that only action orientation is consistently associated
with decision inertia. Other motivational factors like preference for consistency or indeci-
siveness showed no signicant associations. Furthermore, cognitive dierences in evidence
thresholds and capabilities in Bayesian updating aected the suboptimal behaviour rate in
general but not decision inertia specically. Combining this observation with the signicant
inuence of action orientation, my ndings suggest that decision inertia could be the result of
an interplay of loss-evidence considerations. In particular, decision-makers rely on decision
inertia, because they want not to engage too much with negative events and make faster and
riskier decisions.
Further research could investigate these relationships in more detail. For instance, there are
further possible individual characteristics that could act as drivers of decision inertia. These
ndings could be used as possible indicators of individuals sensitive to decision inertia. If an
individual is sensitive, it could be supported by trainings and warnings, and hence help the
individual to overcome decision inertia before it can result in negative consequences.
However, some limitations are worth noting in this context. Although my hypotheses were
supported statistically, there remains a need to investigate whether decision inertia is primar-
ily context-induced or is rather a stable personality trait that does not change over a wide range
of time and decision situations. This investigation is necessary to design and develop further
counter-methods against decision inertia. Future work should therefore investigate whether
decision inertia phenomena are stable over time and whether they contribute to other choice
avoidance phenomena in economic decision-making, such as inaction inertia, omission bias
or decision avoidance in general.
Moreover, I focused on decision inertia only as an example of biased nancial decision-making.
So far, the judgement and decision-making literature provides evidence of many other biases
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in nancial decision making (e.g., overcondence, household bias, home bias to name a few);
see also Benartzi and Thaler (2007); Bazerman et al. (2002)). Future robo-advisor research,
should bear these other biases in mind trying to nd other approaches to reduce the other
common biases to help users make better investment decisions.
6.2 Implications for Practice
My studies do not contribute only to the theoretical understanding of decision-making, and
the inertia phenomena in robo-advisory, but also illuminate explicit design interventions to
overcome these phenomena. An ever greater number of decisions are made in digital environ-
ments or are at least supported by digital technology. From an information system design per-
spective, this study provides insights which can be used in other information systems where
decision inertia occurs.
The proposed nudges, could help overcome decision inertia in various other setting; for in-
stance, in business decision-making scenarios. Most managers have to make various subse-
quent decisions, and it seems reasonable that in management decision-making, decision iner-
tia can have a negative inuence. Designers of management information systems, or decision
support systems in general, must consider not pushing their users accidentally into the de-
cision inertia bias. Using the insights from this work, they now have two design features at
hand to reduce decision inertia in such information systems.
My results provide the foundation for designing countervailing measures. Take, for instance,
a recommender system user-interface. A user who has high action-orientation induced by a
win framing of the user interface (for instance, by messages that describe the pleasures of the
recommendation) may be pushed accidentally into decision inertia. A user who is presented
with a rst default option, on the other hand, may experience less decision inertia but suer
increased errors in divergence and convergence situations. Highly action-orientated decision
makers could be detected, through a survey given prior to decision-making and faced with a
special warning if they tend to repeat previous decisions (even if such a survey is probably not
feasible in all situations).
In particular, further work in the research stream of adaptive information systems seems to
oer a promising pathway to continue this work (see Figure 2), and to develop adaptive in-
formation systems that detect decision inertia (and other biases) when they occur. In a sub-
sequent step, they could de-bias users by nudging them and helping them overcome biased
decision-making.
However, one relevant limitation of this work is that I proposed two design features to over-
come decision inertia. However, it seems likely that other nudges could also help to reduce
decision inertia in nancial decision-making. I decided on these nudges based on their ef-
fect size, and t with the identied drivers, and because they have been successfully applied
in comparable problems. Nevertheless, the choice architecture toolbox (Johnson et al., 2012)
contains many other nudges to overcome biased decision-making. Practitioners building robo-
advisor prototypes could try to identify and evaluate other suitable nudges for their feasibility
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to reduce decision inertia.
Furthermore, the explanatory power of the ndings and recommendations of my studies could
be increased through practical evaluation. Future researchers and practitioners should test the
ndings in a real-life robo-advisory solutions with real users. It is unlikely, but nonetheless
possible that in real-life decision-making, nudges do not have not have the same positive eect
on overcoming decision inertia in nancial decision-making.
Finally, my results show that robo-advisors can help investors overcome decision biases. Un-
experienced investors, in particular, prot from robo-advisory support in nancial decision-
making. Considering that robo-advisors are relatively inexpensive and easily accessible for
all kinds of users, future research into how robo-advice can be adapted to give more eective
feedback and support during the investment process seems very promising with regards to
improving nancial decision-making.
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A Scales and Questionnaires
Overview of the used scales and questionnaires used in the studies.
Think Aloud Interview Guideline
Table 20: Interview guideline for the think aloud study in the design science study.
ID Original Item Dimension
1 Hast Du den Eindruck, dass Du alle für Dich wichtigen
Informationen über die Firma und das Angebot erhal-
ten und verstanden haben? Wenn nein, was fehlt oder
ist nicht verständlich?
Eectiveness, Ecency,
Transparency (Cost, Process,
Information)
2 Fühlst Du dich nun in der Lage, eine Entscheidung für
oder gegen eine Geldanlage bei dieser Firma zu treen?
Wenn nein, weshalb?
Eectiveness, Transparency
(Information), Understand-
ing
3 Wie ndest Du das beschriebene Angebot? Satisfaction, Ecency
4 Welche Informationen haben Dich negativ überrascht? Eectiviness, Expectation
Conformity, Anticipation
5 Welche Informationen haben Dich positiv überrascht? Eectiviness, Expectation
Conformity, Anticipation
6 Wie ndest Du die Bedienung Satisfaction, Ease of Nav-
igation, Controllability,
Structural Consistency, Error
Tollerance
7 Fandst Du die Navigation selbsterklärend / über-
sichtlich? Am Ende mehr als am Anfang? Wenn nein,
an welchen Stellen?
Ease of Navigation, Antic-
ipation, Error Tollerance,
Structural Consistency,
Transparency (Process)
8 Was fandst Du verwirrend oder widersprüchlich? Expectation Conformity,
Transparency (Process,
Information)
9 Wie hast Du Dich auf der Startseite zurecht gefunden?
Fandst Du sie übersichtlich?
Ecency, Ease of Naviga-
tion, Controllability, Trans-
parency (Process, Informa-
tion)
Continued on next page
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10 Welche Informationen hättest Du auf der Startseite
nicht gebraucht? Welche hast Du vermisst?
Ecency, Ease of Navigation,
Transparency (Cost, Process,
Information)
11 Kannst du mit dem Angebot aktive und passive Fonds
etwas anfangen? Was ist aus deiner Sicht der Unter-
schied zwischen aktiv und passiv gemanagten Fonds?
Understanding, Trans-
parency (Information)
12 Vertraust du der Empfehlung? Satisfaction, Transparency
(Cost, Process, Information)
13 Könntest Du Dich jetzt für ein Portfolio entscheiden?
Wenn nein, würdest Du es speichern und später noch
einmal darüber nachdenken?
Eectiviness, Understanding,
Transparency (Cost, Process,
Information)
14 Wie ndest du die Lösung der Website, Produkte auf
diese Weise anzubieten?
Satisfaction, Understanding,
Transparency (Cost, Process,
Information)
15 Vertraust du der Website und dem Angebot? Warum
würdest du dem Robo-Advisor vertrauen?
Transparency (Cost, Process,
Information)
16 Was schränkt dein Vertrauen gegenüber dem Robo-
Advisor ein, oder verunsichert dich?
Transparency (Cost, Process,
Information), Understand-
ing, Error Tollerance
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Indecisiveness Scale
Table 21: Indecisiveness questionnaire from Spunt et al. (2009) to measure individual’s dispo-
sition to perceive diculties when making a decision, and its preference for decision avoidance
in decision-making.
Original Item German Translation Dimension
Once I make a decision, I feel
fairly condent that it is a good
one
Sobald ich eine Entscheidung
getroen habe, bin ich ziemlich
sicher, dass es eine gute ist
Aversive Subscale, re-
versed item
Once I make a decision, I stop
worrying about it
Sobald ich eine Entscheidung
getroen habe, höre ich auf, mir
darüber Gedanken zu machen
Aversive subscale, re-
versed item
I become anxious when making a
decision
Ich werde ängstlich, wenn ich
eine Entscheidung tree
Aversive subscale
I often worry about making the
wrong choice
Ich mache mir oft Sorgen, die
falsche Wahl zu treen
Aversive subscale
After I have chosen or decided
something, I often believe I’ve
made the wrong choice or deci-
sion
Nachdem ich etwas ausgewählt
oder entschieden habe, glaube ich
oft, dass ich die falsche Entschei-
dung getroen habe
Aversive subscale
I try to put o making decisions Ich versuche, Entscheidungen
hinauszuzögern
Avoidant subscale
I always know exactly what I
want
Ich weiß immer genau, was ich
will
Avoidant subscale, re-
versed item
I nd it easy to make decisions Ich nde es einfach, Entscheidun-
gen zu treen
Avoidant subscale, re-
versed item
I like to be in a position to make
decisions
Ich bin gerne in der Lage,
Entscheidungen zu treen
Avoidant subscale, re-
versed item
I usually make decisions quickly Normalerweise tree ich
Entscheidungen schnell
Avoidant subscale, re-
versed item
It seems that deciding on the most
trivial thing takes me a long time
Es scheint, dass die Entschei-
dung über die trivialste Sache
eine lange Zeit dauert
Avoidant subscale
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Risk Attitude Scale 1
Description: Auf Ihrem Entscheidungsblatt sind auf der linken Seite zehn Entscheidungen
aufgelistet. Jede Entscheidung besteht aus der Wahl zwischen „Option A“ und „Option B“. In-
sgesamt müssen Sie zehn Entscheidungen treen und diese in der letzten Spalte eintragen. Am
Ende des Experiments wird jedoch nur genau eine Ihrer Entscheidungen ausgewählt, die dann aus-
gezahlt wird. Das auszahlungsrelevante Ergebnis wird mit einem zehnseitigen Würfel bestimmt;
die Seiten sind nummeriert von 0 – 9 (die Zahl „0“ soll die „10“ repräsentieren.) Nachdem Sie Ihre
zehn Entscheidungen getroen haben wird der Würfel zunächst geworfen, um zu bestimmen,
welche der zehn Entscheidungen für die Auszahlungsberechnung herangezogen wird. Danach
wird der Würfel noch einmal geworfen, um die Auszahlung in Option A oder B zu bestimmen.
Sehen Sie sich nun die erste Reihe an. Option A bringt Ihnen 2,00 Euro falls der zehnseitige Würfel
1 zeigt und 1,60 Euro falls der Würfel 2-10 (0) zeigt. Mit Option B können Sie 3,85 Euro gewinnen
falls der Würfel 1 zeigt und 10 Cent falls der Würfel 2-10 (0) zeigt. Die anderen Entscheidungen
sind ähnlich, wobei in jeder Reihe bei beiden Optionen die Chancen, die höhere Auszahlung zu er-
reichen, steigen. Schließlich, bei der zehnten Entscheidung (in der letzten Reihe), wird der Würfel
nicht benötigt, da jede Option die höhere Auszahlung garantiert. Sie können Ihre Entscheidung
in einer beliebigen Reihenfolge treen und auch nachträglich noch ändern. Bei der Auszahlung
haben Sie dann die Möglichkeit, zweimal zu würfeln, um die auszahlungsrelevante Entscheidung
zu bestimmen. Ihr Gewinn (in Euro) bei dieser Entscheidung wird zu Ihren vorherigen Gewinnen
hinzuaddiert und die Summe dann ausgezahlt. Haben Sie noch Fragen? Sie können nun beginnen
Ihre Entscheidungen zu treen. Bitte sprechen Sie währenddessen mit Niemandem; wenn Sie eine
Frage haben, heben Sie bitte einfach Ihre Hand.
Table 22: Risk attitude questionnaire from Holt and Laury (2005) to measure individual’s
disposition to risk in economic decision-making.
Option A Option B Your
Choice
1/10 Chance auf €2.00; 9/10 Chance
auf €1.60
1/10 Chance auf €3.85; 9/10 Chance
auf €0.10
2/10 Chance auf €2.00; 8/10 Chance
auf €1.60
2/10 Chance auf €3.85; 8/10 Chance
auf €0.10
3/10 Chance auf €2.00; 7/10 Chance
auf €1.60
3/10 Chance auf €3.85; 7/10 Chance
auf €0.10
4/10 Chance auf €2.00; 6/10 Chance
auf €1.60
4/10 Chance auf €3.85; 6/10 Chance
auf €0.10
5/10 Chance auf €2.00; 5/10 Chance
auf €1.60
5/10 Chance auf €3.85; 5/10 Chance
auf €0.10
Continued on next page
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6/10 Chance auf €2.00; 4/10 Chance
auf €1.60
6/10 Chance auf €3.85; 4/10 Chance
auf €0.10
7/10 Chance auf €2.00; 3/10 Chance
auf €1.60
7/10 Chance auf €3.85; 3/10 Chance
auf €0.10
8/10 Chance auf €2.00; 2/10 Chance
auf €1.60
8/10 Chance auf €3.85; 2/10 Chance
auf €0.10
9/10 Chance auf €2.00; 1/10 Chance
auf €1.60
9/10 Chance auf €3.85; 1/10 Chance
auf €0.10
10/10 Chance auf €2.00; 0/10 Chance
auf €1.60
10/10 Chance auf €3.85; 0/10 Chance
auf €0.10
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Preference for Consistency Scale - short
Table 23: German short version Collani and Blank (2013) of the questionnaire from Cialdini
et al. (1995) to measure individual’s preference for consistency.
Original Item Dimension
Es ist mir wichtig, dass meine Handlungen im Einklangmit meinen
Überzeugungen stehen
Internal consistency
Ich nde es wichtig, dass Leute, die mich kennen, mein Verhalten
vorhersagen können
Public consistency
Ich fühle mich unwohl, wenn ich zwei Überzeugungen besitze, die
nicht zusammenpassen
Internal consistency
Es ist mir nicht wichtig, ob ich auf andere widersprüchlich wirke Public consistency, re-
versed item
Es macht mir nichts aus, wenn meine Handlungen miteinander un-
vereinbar sind
Internal consistency,
reversed item
Ich lege keinenWert darauf, dass meine engen Freunde berechenbar
sind
Consistency of others,
reversed item
Ich mag keine Menschen, die dauernd ihre Meinung ändern Consistency of others
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Preference for Consistency Scale - full
Table 24: German long version of the questionnaire from Cialdini et al. (1995) to measure
individual’s preference for consistency.
Original Item German Translation Dimension
I prefer to be around people whose
reactions I can anticipate
Ich habe lieber Personen um
mich, deren Reaktionen ich
vorhersagen kann
Consistency of others
It is important to me that my ac-
tions are consistent with my be-
liefs.
Ich nde es wichtig, dass meine
Handlungen im Einklang mit
meinen Überzeugungen stehen
Internal consistency
Even if my attitudes and actions
seemed consistent with one an-
other to me, it would bother me
if they did not seem consistent in
the eyes of others
Selbst wenn für mich meine
Handlungen im Einklang mit
meinen Überzeugungen stehen,
würde es mich stören, wenn sie in
den Augen der Anderen nicht im
Einklang stehen.
Public consistency
It is important to me that those
who know me can predict what I
will do.
Ich nde es wichtig, dass Leute,
die mich kennen, mein Verhalten
vorhersagen können.
Public consistency
I want to be described by others
as a stable, predictable person.
Ich möchte von Anderen gerne als
stabile und berechenbare Person
beschrieben werden
Public consistency
Admirable people are consistent
and predictable
Bewundernswerte Leute sind kon-
sistent und berechenbar.
Consistency of others
The appearance of consistency is
an important part of the image I
present to the world.
Konsistent zu wirken ist ein
wichtiger Teil des Bildes, das ich
der Welt präsentiere.
Public consistency
It bothers me when someone I de-
pend on is unpredictable
Es stört mich, wenn ich von je-
mandem abhängig bin, der un-
berechenbar ist.
Consistency of others
I don’t like to appear as if I am
inconsistent
Ich mag es nicht, inkonsistent zu
wirken.
Internal consistency
I get uncomfortable when I nd
my behavior contradicts my be-
liefs
Mir wird unwohl, wenn meine
Handlungen meinen Überzeu-
gungen widersprechen.
Internal consistency
Continued on next page
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An important requirement for
any friend of mine is personal
consistency
Eine wichtige Voraussetzung um
zu meinen Freunden zu gehören
ist persönliche Konsistenz.
Consistency of others
I typically prefer to do things the
same way
Normalerweise ziehe ich es vor,
die Dinge auf die gleiche Art und
Weise zu machen.
Internal consistency
I dislike people who are con-
stantly changing their opinions
Ich mag keine Menschen, die
dauernd ihre Meinung ändern.
Consistency of others
I want my close friends to be pre-
dictable
Ich lege Wert darauf, dass meine
engen Freunde berechenbar sind.
Consistency of others
It is important to me that others
view me as a stable person
Mir ist es wichtig, dass mich
Andere als stabile Person
wahrnehmen.
Public consistency
I make an eort to appear consis-
tent to others
Ich strenge mich an, auf Andere
konsistent zu wirken.
Internal consistency
I’m uncomfortable holding two
beliefs that are inconsistent
Ich fühle mich unwohl, wenn ich
zwei Überzeugungen besitze, die
nicht zusammenpassen.
Internal consistency
It doesn’t bother me much if my
actions are inconsistent
Es stört mich nicht sonderlich,
wenn meine Handlungen nicht
zueinander passen.
Internal consistency,
reversed item
156
Action Control Scale
Table 25: HAKEMP-24 (Action Control Scale : ACS) of Kuhl (1994b) to measure individual’s
disposition to action- or state-orientation.
ID Original Item German Translation Dimension
1 When I have lost something
valuable and can’t nd it any-
where:
Wenn ich etwas Wertvolles ver-
loren habe und es nirgendwo
nden kann:
A I have a hard time concentrat-
ing on anything else.
Fällt es mir schwer mich auf et-
was Anderes zu konzentrieren
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B I don’t dwell on it. Beharre ich nicht darauf es zu
nden.
Failure-related action
orientation
2 When I know I must nish
something soon:
Wenn ich weiß, dass ich bald et-
was fertigstellen muss:
A I have to push myself to get
started.
Muss ich mir einen Anstoß
geben um anzufangen.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I nd it easy to get it done and
over with.
Finde ich es einfach es fer-
tigzustellen.
Decision-related action
orientation
3 When Ive worked for weeks on
one project and then everything
goes completely wrong:
Wenn ich mehrere Wochen
an einem Projekt gearbeitet
habe und dann alles völlig
schieäuft:
A It takes me a long time to get
over it.
Brauche ich eine lange Zeit um
darüber hinweg zu kommen.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B It bothers me for a while, but
then I dont think about it any-
more.
Ärgert das mich eineWeile lang,
aber dann denke ich nicht mehr
darüber nach.
Failure-related action
orientation
4 When I have lost something
valuable and can’t nd it any-
where
Wenn ich nichts Besonderes zu
tun habe und mir langweilig
wird:
A I have trouble getting up enough
energy to do anything at all.
Fällt es mir schwer ausreichend
Energie aufzubringen um über-
haupt etwas zu tun.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I quickly nd something to do. Fällt mir schnell ein was ich tun
kann.
Decision-related action
orientation
5 When Im in a competition and
lose every time:
Wenn ich in einem Wettbewerb
bin und jedes Mal verliere:
Continued on next page
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A I can soon put losing out of my
mind.
Bekomme ich denGedanken ans
Verlieren schnell aus meinem
Kopf.
Failure-related action
orientation
B The thought that I lost keeps
running through my mind.
Geht mir der Gedanke ans Ver-
lieren ständig durch den Kopf.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
6 When I am getting ready to
tackle a dicult problem:
Wenn ich mich vorbereite ein
schwieriges Problem anzuge-
hen:
A It feels like I am facing a big
mountain that I dont think I can
climb.
Fühlt es sich so an, als ob ich
vor einem großen Berg stehe,
den ich glaube nicht besteigen
zu können.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I look for away that the problem
can be approached in a suitable
manner.
Suche ich nach einer Art und
Weise, wie ich das Problem
angemessen angehen kann.
Decision-related action
orientation
7 If I had just bought a new piece
of equipment (for example, a
laptop) and it accidentally fell
on the oor and was damaged
beyond repair:
Falls ich gerade ein neues Ar-
beitsgerät (z.B. einen Laptop)
gekauft habe und es mir aus
Versehen auf den Boden gefallen
ist und es so kaputtgegangen ist,
dass man es nicht mehr repari-
eren kann:
A I would get over it quickly. Würde ich schnell darüber hin-
wegkommen.
Failure-related action
orientation
B It would take me a while to get
over it.
Würde ich eine Zeit lange
brauchen um darüber hin-
wegzukommen.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
8 When I have to solve a dicult
problem:
Wenn ich ein schwieriges Prob-
lem zu lösen habe:
A I usually get on it right away. Fange ich normalerweise direkt
damit an.
Decision-related action
orientation
B Other things go through my
mind before I can get down to
working on the problem.
Gehen mir erst andere Dinge
durch den Kopf bevor ich
anfangen kann mich mit
dem eigentlichen Problem zu
beschäftigen.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
Continued on next page
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9 When I have to talk to some-
one about something impor-
tant and, repeatedly, cant nd
her/him at home:
Wenn ich mit jemanden über et-
was Wichtiges reden will und
ich sie/ihn öfters nicht zu Hause
aunden kann:
A I cant stop thinking about it,
even while Im doing something
else.
Kann ich nicht aufhören
darüber nachzudenken auch
wenn ich gerade etwas Anderes
tue.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B I easily forget about it until I can
see the person again.
Fällt es mir einfach es
abzuhaken bis ich die Per-
son wiedersehen kann.
Failure-related action
orientation
10 When I have to make up my
mind about what I am going to
do when I get some unexpected
free time:
Wenn ich unerwartete Freizeit
habe und mich entscheiden
muss was ich tue:
A It takes me a while to decide
what I should do.
Brauche ich eine Weile um zu
entscheiden was ich tue.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I can usually decide on some-
thing to do without having to
think it over very much.
Entscheide ich mich normaler-
weise etwas zu tun ohne groß
darüber nachdenken zumüssen.
Decision-related action
orientation
11 When Ive bought a lot of stu
at a store and realize when I get
home that I paid too much - but
I cant get my money back:
Wenn ich viel in einem Laden
eingekauft habe und zu Hause
erst bemerkt habe, dass ich zu
viel bezahlt habe aber mein
Geld nicht zurückbekommen
kann:
A I cant concentrate on anything
else.
Kann ich mich auf nichts An-
deres konzentrieren.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B I easily forget about it. Fällt es mir einfach es
abzuhaken.
Failure-related action
orientation
12 When I have work to do at
home:
Wenn ich Arbeit zu Hause
erledigen muss:
A It is often hard for me to get
started.
Finde ich es oft schwer damit
anzufangen.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I usually get started right away. Fange ich normalerweise gleich
damit an.
Decision-related action
orientation
Continued on next page
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13 When I am told that my work
has been completely unsatisfac-
tory:
Wenn mir gesagt wird, dass
meine Arbeit völlig unbefriedi-
gend erledigt wurde:
A I dont let it bother me for too
long.
Lass ich mich davon nicht lange
stören.
Failure-related action
orientation
B I feel paralyzed. Fühle ich mich wie gelähmt. Failure-related preoc-
cupation
14 When I have a lot of important
things to do:
Wenn ich eine Menge wichtiger
Sachen zu erledigen habe:
A I often dont know where to be-
gin.
Weiß ich oft nicht wo ich begin-
nen soll.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I nd it easy to make a plan and
stick with it.
Fällt es mir einfach einen Plan
zu machen und mich daran zu
halten.
Decision-related action
orientation
15 When Im stuck in trac and
miss an important appoint-
ment:
Wenn ich im Stau stehe und
einen wichtigen Termin ver-
passe:
A At rst, its dicult for me to
start doing anything else at all.
Finde ich es erstmal schwierig
mit irgendetwas Anderem anz-
ufangen.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B I quickly forget about it and fo-
cus on something else.
Fällt es mir einfach nicht mehr
weiter drüber nachzudenken
und ich kann mich auf etwas
Anderes fokussieren.
Failure-related action
orientation
16 When there are two things that
I really want to do, but I cant do
both of them:
Wenn es zwei Sachen gibt, die
ich wirklich machen will, aber
nicht beide machen kann:
A I quickly begin one thing and
forget about the other.
Fange ich schnell mit einer
Sache an und hake die Andere
ab.
Decision-related action
orientation
B Its not easy for me to put the
thing that I couldnt do out of my
mind.
Fällt es mir nicht einfach, die
nicht gemachte Sache aus dem
Kopf zu bekommen.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
17 When something is very impor-
tant to me, but I cant seem to get
it right:
Wenn mir etwas sehr wichtig
ist, es aber so aussieht als ob ich
es nicht richtig hinbekomme:
A I gradually lose heart. Verliere ich nach und nach den
Mut.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
Continued on next page
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B I just forget about it and go do
something else.
Hake ich es schnell ab und
mache etwas Anderes.
Failure-related action
orientation
18 When I have to carry out an im-
portant but unpleasant task:
Wenn ich eine wichtige aber
unangenehme Aufgabe mache
muss:
A I do it and get it over with. Mache ich sie und bringe sie
hinter mich.
Decision-related action
orientation
B It can take a while before I can
bring myself to do it.
Brauche ich eine Weile bevor
ich mich motivieren kann sie zu
machen.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
19 When something really gets me
down:
Wenn mich etwas wirklich de-
primiert:
A I have trouble doing anything at
all.
Habe ich Probleme überhaupt
etwas zu machen.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B I nd it easy to distract myself
by doing other things.
Finde ich es einfach mich
abzulenken, indem ich andere
Sachen mache.
Failure-related action
orientation
20 When I am facing a big project
that has to be done:
Wenn ich ein großes Projekt
habe das erledigt werden muss:
A I often spend too long thinking
about where I should begin.
Verbringe ich oft zu lange damit
nachzudenken, womit ich an-
fangen soll.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
B I dont have any problems get-
ting started.
Habe ich keinerlei Probleme
damit anzufangen.
Decision-related action
orientation
21 When several things go wrong
on the same day:
Wenn an einem Tag mehrere
Dinge schieaufen:
A I don’t know how to deal with it. Weiß ich nicht wie ich damit
umgehen soll.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
B I just keep on going as though
nothing had happened.
Mache ich einfach so weiter als
ob nichts passiert wäre.
Failure-related action
orientation
22 When I have a boring assign-
ment:
Wenn ich eine langweilige Auf-
gabe habe:
A I usually dont have any problem
getting through it.
Habe ich normalerweise keine
Probleme diese zu erledigen.
Decision-related action
orientation
B I sometimes just cant get mov-
ing on it.
Kann ich mich manchmal ein-
fach gar nicht dafür motivieren.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
Continued on next page
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23 When I have put all my eort
into doing a really good job on
something and the whole thing
doesnt work out:
Wenn ich meine ganze Kraft
reingesteckt habe um ein wirk-
lich gutes Ergebnis zu erzielen
und die gesamte Sache nicht
funktioniert:
A I dont have too much diculty
starting something else.
Habe ich keine Probleme damit
etwas Anderes anzufangen.
Failure-related action
orientation
B I have trouble doing anything
else at all.
Habe ich Probleme irgendetwas
anderes zu machen.
Failure-related preoc-
cupation
24 When I have an obligation to
do something that is boring and
uninteresting:
Wenn ich etwas tun muss das
langweilig und uninteressant
ist:
A I do it and get it over with. Mache ich es und bringe es hin-
ter mich.
Decision-related action
orientation
B It usually takes a while before I
get around to doing it.
Brauche ich normalerweise eine
Weile bis ich sie mache.
Decision-related hesi-
tation
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Financial Literacy Scale
Table 26: Financial Literacy questionnaire from Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) to measure in-
dividual’s literacy in the nancial domain. German translation adapted from L. Hansen et al.
(2015).
Original Item German Translation
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account
and the interest rate was 2% per year. After
5 years, how much do you think you would
have in the account if you left the money to
grow?
(1) More than $102
(2) Exactly $102
(3) Less than $102
(4) Don’t know
Angenommen, Sie haben 100, - € Guthaben
auf Ihrem Sparkonto. Dieses Guthaben wird
mit 2 % pro Jahr verzinst, und Sie lassen es
5 Jahre auf diesem Konto. Was meinen Sie:
Wie viel Guthaben weist Ihr Sparkonto nach
5 Jahren auf?
(1) Mehr als 102 Euro
(2) Genau 102 Euro
(3) Weniger als 102 Euro
(4) Weiß ich nicht
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings
account was 1 % per year and ination was
2% per year. After 1 year, with the money in
this account, would you be able to buy...
(1) More than today
(2) Exactly the same as today
(3) Less than today
(4) Don’t know
Angenommen, die Verzinsung Ihres Sparkon-
tos beträgt 1% pro Jahr und die Inationsrate
beträgt 2% pro Jahr. Was glauben Sie: Werden
Sie nach einem Jahr mit dem Guthaben des
Sparkontos genauso viel, mehr oder weniger
als heute kaufen können?
(1) Mehr
(2) Genauso viel
(3) Weniger
(4) Weiß ich nicht
If the interest rate falls, what should happen
to bond prices?
(1) Rise
(2) Fall
(3) Stay the same
(4) None of the above
(5) Don’t know
Was geschieht bei steigendenMarktzinsenmit
dem Preis einer festverzinslichen Anleihe?
(1) Der Preis steigt
(2) Der Preis fällt
(3) Der Preis verändert sich nicht
(4) Es gibt keinen Zusammenhang zwischen
dem Preis einer festverzinslichen Anleihe und
den Zinsen
(5) Weiß ich nicht
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Risk Attitude Scale 2
Table 27: Risk aversion questionnaire from Dohmen et al. (2011) to measure individual’s risk
aversion in decision-making.
Original Item German Translation
How do you see yourself: are you generally a
person who is fully prepared to take risks or
do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick
a box on the scale, where the value 0 means:
‘not at all willing to take risks’ and the value
10 means: ‘very willing to take risks’
Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind
Sie im allgemeinen ein risikobereiter Men-
sch oder versuchen Sie, Risiken zu vermei-
den? Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der
Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet: “gar
nicht risikobereit” und der Wert 10: “Sehr
risikobereit”. Mit den Werten dazwischen
können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen
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B Participant Instructions
Friendly User Study - General Instructions
Hallo,
vielen Dank, dass Sie sich bereit erklärt haben, an unserer Studie teilzunehmen. In unserer
Studie untersuchen wir die Oberäche einer Website zur privaten Finanzplanung bezüglich
Ihrer Nutzerfreundlichkeit. Wir werden mit Ihnen die Methode des lauten Denkens an-
wenden. Dazu bitten wir Sie, während Sie sich auf der Website bewegen, Ihre Gedanken
kontinuierlich zu verbalisieren. Sprechen Sie bitte frei aus, was Sie gerade tun, was Sie sehen,
empnden und was Ihnen auällt. Es gibt bei dieser Methode keine richtigen oder falschen
Antworten.
Während der Studie begleitet Sie ein Studienleiter; also ich. Ich werde Ihnen hin und wieder
Fragen stellen und stehe Ihnen natürlich auch für eventuelle Fragen Ihrerseits zur Verfügung.
Meine Rolle ist aber nur eine begleitende; bitte bewegen Sie sich frei durch die Website.
Das Experiment wird etwa 40 Minuten dauern. Ich möchte Sie bitten Ihre Eindrücke und
Gedanken laut auszusprechen. Nach 40 Minuten habe ich noch ein paar abschließende Fragen
sowie zwei Fragebogen vorbereitet.
Wenn Sie keine weiteren Fragen mehr haben, werde ich als Experimentator das Aufnah-
megerät starten und Ihnen Ihre Aufgabe kurz erläutern.
<Question: What is your planned nancial project?>
<Start Recording>
Vor sich sehen Sie nun eine Website. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, sich über das Angebot auf der
Website zu informieren und mit der Website Ihr <geplantes Projekt> zu realisieren. Bitte
sprechen Sie hierbei laut aus, was Sie gerade tun, was Sie sehen, empnden und was Ihnen
auällt.
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Urn Game - General Instructions
Willkommen beim Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!
Bitte schalten Sie ihr Smartphone aus und sprechen Sie von nun an nicht mehr mit anderen
Teilnehmern des Experiments.
Dieses Experiment dient der Untersuchung von ökonomischem Entscheidungsverhalten. Sie
können dabei Geld verdienen. Dieses wird Ihnen im Anschluss an das Experiment privat und
in bar ausbezahlt. Während des Experiments wird ihr Entscheidungsverhalten aufgezeichnet
und in der späteren Analyse ausgewertet.
Das Experiment - Überblick
Das Experiment besteht aus insgesamt <x> Teilen:
<table of contents>
Die folgenden Teile werden Ihnen nun kurz erläutert.
1. Verständnisfragen
Bevor das Experiment beginnt, werden Ihnen an Ihrem Bildschirm zunächst einige Ver-
ständnisfragen zu den Regeln dieses Experiments gestellt. Geben Sie bitte die jeweiligen
Antworten in Ihren Computer ein. Sie erhalten allgemeine Fragen um sicher zu stellen, dass
Sie die Anleitung gelesen und verstanden haben.
<experiment specic task description>
Fragebogen
Nach Beendigung des Urnenspiels, wird ein Fragebogen in einem Browserfenster geönet,
bitte beantworten Sie ihn und warten Sie anschließend in Ihrer Kabine. Sie werden von dem
Experimentalleiter abgeholt und erhalten Ihre Auszahlung.
Gewinnmöglichkeit: Für das Ausfüllen der Fragebögen erhalten Sie einen xen Teil-
nehmerbetrag von X Euro.
Zusammenfassung Zuerst müssen Sie Verständnisfragen beantworten. Dann müssen sie
ein Urnenspiel absolvieren. Das Spiel geht über mehrere Phasen, wobei jede Phase aus zwei
Runden / Ziehungen besteht. Anschließend müssen Sie einen Fragebogen ausfüllen.
Wir bitten Sie, während des Experiments nicht zu sprechen und sich nicht in Ihrer Konzen-
tration stören zu lassen.
Verständnisschwierigkeiten? Wenn Sie Fragen haben, so machen Sie die Experi-
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mentleitung im Anschluss an diese Anleitung per Handzeichen auf sich aufmerksam. Richten
Sie Ihre Frage so leise wie möglich an die Experimentleitung und sprechen Sie nicht mit den
anderen Teilnehmern.
Hilfsmittel An Ihrem Platz nden sie einen Kugelschreiber und Taschenrechner (Achtung:
Punkt- vor Strichrechnung wird von dem Taschenrechner nicht berücksichtigt!). Diese sind
bitte nach dem Experiment am Tisch liegen zu lassen.
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Instructions Urn Game - Version 1a
Im folgenden Experiment gibt es zwei Urnen, die eine unterschiedliche Anzahl an Kugeln
beinhalten. Sie ziehen zweimal jeweils eine Kugel mit Zurücklegen aus den Urnen (2 x
ziehen). Danach werden die Urnen neu gemischt. Ihr Ziel ist es möglichst oft eine schwarze
Kugel zu ziehen, da ihre Auszahlung von den gezogenen Kugeln abhängt.
<screenshot 1 of the urngame user interface>
Das Urnenspiel besteht aus 40 Phasen mit jeweils 2 Ziehungen (80 Runden). Pro Runde
können Sie immer nur eine Kugel aus eine der Urnen ziehen. Hierzu stehen Ihnen die Knöpfe
Linke Urne“ für die linke Urne und „Rechte Urne“ für die rechte Urne zur Verfügung. Jede
zweite Phase steht ihnen außerdem der Knopf „Entscheidung Ablehnen“ zur Verfügung. Mit
diesem Knopf legen Sie sich für keine der Urnen fest sondern erhalten eine geringere aber
xe Auszahlung.
<screenshot 2 of the urngame user interface>
Aufgabe: Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin möglichst oft eine schwarze Kugel zu ziehen. Alle zwei
Phasen können Sie eine Entscheidung ablehnen ("Entscheidung Ablehnen"-Knopf).
Gewinnmöglichkeit: Ihre Auszahlung im Experiment hängt davon ab, wie oft sie die
schwarze Kugel ziehen. Je häuger sie dies tun, desto mehr Geld erhalten Sie. Für jede
richtige Kugel erhalten Sie x Euro. Wenn Sie den Knopf „Decline“ drücken und damit
eine Entscheidung für eine der Urnen ablehnen, erhalten Sie x Euro. Um die Entschei-
dungsablehnung zu verdeutlichen, wird dann angezeigt, dass Sie eine graue Kugel gezogen
haben.
Verteilung der Kugeln: Es gibt insgesamt zwei mögliche Zustände der Welt. Je nachdem
sind die Kugeln in den Urnen verteilt:
<table with distributions of balls>
Die Verteilung der Zustände „up“ and „down“ ist zufällig und gleich häug (je 50 Prozent).
Ebenfalls bleibt sie über eine Phase bzw. zwei Ziehungen konstant (Runde 1 und Runde 2,
Runde 3 und 4 usw.). Danach werden die Kugeln neu gemischt. Das heißt Sie können nur
von Runde 1 auf Runde 2 Rückschlüsse auf die Welt ziehen. Nie jedoch von Runde 2 auf die
nachfolgenden Runden.
Im Anschluss an das Urnenspiel erhalten Sie einen Fragebogen, für den Sie eine xe Vergü-
tung erhalten.
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Instructions Urn Game - Version 1b
Im folgenden Experiment gibt es zwei Urnen, die eine unterschiedliche Anzahl an Kugeln
beinhalten. Sie ziehen zweimal jeweils eine Kugel mit Zurücklegen aus den Urnen (2 x
ziehen pro Phase). Danach werden die Urnen neu gemischt. Ihr Ziel ist es möglichst oft eine
schwarze Kugel zu ziehen, da ihre Auszahlung von den gezogenen Kugeln abhängt.
Jede zweite Phase, wird der Computer für Sie die erste von zwei Entscheidungen treen.
Die Auswahl des Computers erfolgt zufällig. Pro Runde können Sie immer nur eine Kugel
aus eine der Urnen ziehen. Hierzu stehen Ihnen die Knöpfe „Linke Urne“ für die linke Urne
und „Rechte Urne“ für die rechte Urne zur Verfügung. Wenn der Computer für Sie eine Urne
auswählt, können Sie in der Ziehung nur die ausgewählte Urne wählen. Somit besteht das
Urnenspiel aus je 2 mal 40 Phasen mit jeweils 2 Ziehungen (160 Runden oder 80 Phasen).
Verteilung der Kugeln: Es gibt insgesamt zwei mögliche Zustände der Welt. Je nachdem
sind die Kugeln in den Urnen verteilt:
<table with distributions of balls>
Die Verteilung der Zustände „up“ and „down“ ist zufällig und gleich häug (je 50 Prozent).
Ebenfalls bleibt sie über eine Phase bzw. zwei Ziehungen konstant (Runde 1 und Runde 2,
Runde 3 und 4 usw.). Danach werden die Kugeln neu gemischt. Das heißt Sie können nur
von Runde 1 auf Runde 2 Rückschlüsse auf die Welt ziehen. Nie jedoch von Runde 2 auf die
nachfolgenden Runden.
Aufgabe: Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin möglichst oft eine schwarze Kugel zu ziehen.
Gewinnmöglichkeit: Ihre Auszahlung im Experiment hängt davon ab, wie oft sie die
schwarze Kugel ziehen. Je häuger sie dies tun, desto mehr Geld erhalten Sie. Für jede
schwarze Kugel erhalten Sie x Euro.
169
Instructions Urn Game - Version 2
Bei dem Urnenspiel Version 2 handelt es sich um eine Variante der ersten Version (Version
1, siehe oben). Es gibt erneut zwei Urnen, die eine unterschiedliche Anzahl an Kugeln
beinhalten. Ihr Ziel ist es möglichst oft eine schwarze Kugel zu ziehen, da ihre Auszahlung
von den gezogenen Kugeln abhängt.
Das Urnenspiel besteht wieder aus 40 Phasen mit jeweils 2 Ziehungen (80 Runden). Pro
Runde können Sie immer nur eine Kugel aus eine der Urnen ziehen. Hierzu stehen Ihnen die
Knöpfe „Linke Urne“ für die linke Urne und „Rechte Urne“ für die rechte Urne zur Verfügung.
Die Kugeln sind exakt gleich, wie davor verteilt.
<table with distributions of balls>
Jedoch haben jetzt die Möglichkeit beliebig oft einen Testball aus eine der Urnen zu ziehen,
bevor Sie sich entscheiden müssen. Allerdings „kostet“ Sie jeder Testversuch 0,001 Euro. Das
heißt, jedes Mal wenn Sie sich entscheiden einen Testball zu ziehen, wird ihnen der Zehnte
Teil eines Euro-Cents von Ihrer nalen Auszahlung abgezogen. Sie können beliebig viele
Testbälle ziehen bevor Sie sich entscheiden.
Aufgabe: Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin möglichst oft eine schwarze Kugel zu ziehen.
Gewinnmöglichkeit: Ihre Auszahlung im Experiment hängt davon ab, wie oft sie die
schwarze Kugel ziehen. Je häuger sie dies tun, desto mehr Geld erhalten Sie. Für jede
richtige Kugel erhalten Sie x Euro, für jeden Test verlieren Sie 0,001 Euro.
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Instructions Urn Game - Version 3
Bei dem Urnenspiel Version 3 handelt es sich um eine Variante der ersten beiden Versionen
(Version 1 und Version 2, siehe oben). Hier zieht der Computer eine Stichprobe aus eine
der beiden Urnen. Das Ergebnis wird Ihnen Zug für Zug angezeigt. Sie müssen nach jedem
Zug sagen mit welcher Wahrscheinlichkeit es sich Ihrer Meinung nach um die Urne mit den
mehrheitlich schwarzen Kugeln handelt (+/- 5 Prozent Toleranz).
<table with distributions of balls>
Nach 10 Bällen wird wieder eine der beiden Urnen zufällig neu ausgewählt und das Spiel
beginnt von vorne. Insgesamt müssen sie 5-mal anhand einer Stichprobe von 10 Bällen die
Wahrscheinlichkeit anhand der Stichprobe raten. Für jede korrekte Antwort erhalten Sie x
Euro.
Aufgabe: Ihre Aufgabe besteht darin die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass es sich um die Urne mit
überwiegend schwarzen Bällen handelt zu bestimmen.
Gewinnmöglichkeit: Ihre Auszahlung im Experiment hängt davon ab, wie ob sie die
korrekte Wahrscheinlichkeit anhand den Informationen angeben (+/- 5 Prozent Toleranz) für
die Urne angeben. Je häuger sie dies tun, desto mehr Geld erhalten Sie. Für jede richtige
Antwort erhalten Sie x Euro.
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Instructions Distraction Task
Im Merkspiel werden Ihnen jeweils ein Trigram (eine Abfolge von drei zufälligen Buchstaben),
sowie eine dreistellige Zahl angezeigt. Dann blinkt eine Kugel bis zu 12 Mal auf. Jedes Mal,
wenn die Kugel die Farbe wechselt, ziehen Sie 3 von der angezeigten Zahl ab. Im Anschluss
werden sie gebeten, entweder das Trigram oder die Zahl (abzüglich 3 für jeden Farbwechsel
der Kugel) einzugeben.
Aufgabe: Ihre Aufgabe besteht daraus sich das Trigram oder die Zahl korrekt zu merken.
Gewinnmöglichkeit: Für jede korrekte Antwort erhalten Sie x Euro.
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C Samples Bayesian Updating Task
The dierent samples and their related posterior probabilities in the Bayesian updating task.
Table 28: Set 1 Bayesian Updating Task.
Round Sample Posterior Probability
1 ◦ 0.33
2 ◦◦ 0.2
3 ◦ ◦ ◦ 0.11
4 ◦ ◦ ◦• 0.2
5 ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ 0.11
6 ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦◦ 0.06
7 ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ 0.03
8 ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦◦ 0.02
9 ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • 0.3
10 ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ •• 0.6
Table 29: Set 2 Bayesian Updating Task.
Round Sample Posterior Probability
1 ◦ 0.33
2 ◦• 0.5
3 ◦ • • 0.6
4 ◦ • •• 0.8
5 ◦ • • • • 0.88
6 ◦ • • • •◦ 0.8
7 ◦ • • • • ◦ • 0.88
8 ◦ • • • • ◦ •• 0.94
9 ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • 0.96
10 ◦ • • • • ◦ • • •• 0.98
Table 30: Set 3 Bayesian Updating Task.
Round Sample Posterior Probability
1 • 0.33
2 •• 0.8
3 • • • 0.88
4 • • •• 0.94
5 • • • • • 0.96
6 • • • • •◦ 0.94
7 • • • • • ◦ ◦ 0.88
8 • • • • • ◦ ◦◦ 0.8
9 • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 0.66
10 • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦◦ 0.5
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Table 31: Set 4 Bayesian Updating Task.
Round Sample Posterior Probability
1 • 0.66
2 •◦ 0.5
3 • ◦ • 0.66
4 • ◦ •• 0.8
5 • ◦ • • ◦ 0.66
6 • ◦ • • ◦◦ 0.5
7 • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ 0.33
8 • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦◦ 0.2
9 • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ 0.111
10 • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦◦ 0.6
Table 32: Set 5 Bayesian Updating Task.
Round Sample Posterior Probability
1 • 0.66
2 •◦ 0.5
3 • ◦ • 0.66
4 • ◦ •• 0.8
5 • ◦ • • ◦ 0.66
6 • ◦ • • ◦• 0.8
7 • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ 0.66
8 • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦• 0.8
9 • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ 0.66
10 • ◦ • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦• 0.8
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